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WHAT DO YOU WANT TO BE WHEN YOU GROW UP? 
COGNITIVE FLEXIBILITY INFLUENCES CAREER DECISION-
MAKING AND RELATED ANXIETY 
 
EMILY M. FLANDERMEYER, KEEGAN G. SAWIN, BUTLER UNIVERSITY 
MENTOR: TARA LINEWEAVER 
 
Abstract 
Career indecision is a stage most individuals pass through during their 
lifetimes, but it is often accompanied by anxiety. Although anxiety can have a 
positive influence on decision-making by focusing attention and cognitive 
resources, excess anxiety can disrupt the career decision-making process. Existing 
literature links anxiety to cognitive flexibility, an individual’s ability to efficiently 
switch between thoughts and ideas and to adapt to evolving situations, with young 
adults higher in cognitive flexibility typically experiencing less anxiety than their 
less-flexible peers. No studies to date have examined cognitive flexibility as it 
relates to career indecision or to career-indecision-related anxiety, however. This 
study examines the relationships between cognitive flexibility, career indecision, 
and anxiety in undergraduate students; 156 undergraduate students (72% female, 
91% Caucasian, 63% juniors and seniors) completed an online Qualtrics survey 
assessing career indecision, career anxiety, cognitive flexibility, and general 
demographic information including academic trajectory, career confidence, and 
personal characteristics. The data support previously documented relationships 
between career indecision and anxiety and demonstrated that cognitive flexibility 
significantly relates to both of these factors. Our results suggest a model in which 
cognitive flexibility directly influences career decision-making, which in turn 
dictates levels of career-indecision-related anxiety; thus, individuals who are low 
in cognitive flexibility and high in career indecision may be excellent candidates 
for interventions designed to increase cognitive flexibility to promote career 
decision-making and to reduce career-indecision-related anxiety. 
 
Career decisions are some of the most complex choices individuals must 
make, as the individual must consider a variety of factors—personal abilities, life 
and career goals, work preferences, and personal expectations—when selecting a 







career path (Di Fabio, Palazzeschi, Asulin-Peretz, & Gati, 2013). The sheer number 
of factors to consider is often overwhelming. Although career indecision appears 
to be a normal stage that most individuals pass through during their lifetimes, 
decision-making confidence, perceived breadth of career options, and anxiety 
levels surrounding the decision can all influence the length and severity of the 
period of career indecision (Campagna & Curtis, 2007; Creed, Patton, & Prideaux, 
2006; Osipow, 1999).  
Even though career indecision is a common phenomenon, it is often 
accompanied by anxiety. Anxiety is a relatively frequent emotion that is influential 
in driving judgments and decisions, including those about careers (Campagna & 
Curtis, 2007; Fuqua, Newman, & Seaworth, 1988). Although anxiety can have a 
positive influence on judgment and decision-making by focusing attention and 
cognitive resources, excess anxiety can impede the career decision-making process 
(Campagna & Curtis, 2007; Fuqua et al., 1988). A variety of factors can drive the 
anxiety associated with career indecision, including a lack of information about self 
and careers, uncertainty about the appropriateness and degree of career fit, having 
multiple interests, and the existence of barriers associated with specific careers. 
Fuqua, Newman, and Seaworth (1988) investigated the relationships between these 
factors and anxiety in undergraduate students at a Midwestern university. They 
found that a lack of information about the self and about careers shared the strongest 
relationship with anxiety, but anxiety also significantly correlated with uncertainty 
of fit and the presence of barriers to intended career choice. Although these results 
suggest that anxiety is highly related to career indecision, they do not address the 
direct relationship between these two factors.  
In an effort to better understand the links between career indecision and 
anxiety, several studies have investigated the specific roles of state anxiety and trait 
anxiety in career indecision and career certainty (Campagna & Curtis, 2007; Fuqua 
et al., 1988; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). State anxiety 
consists of anxious feelings surrounding specific events or situations, whereas trait 
anxiety represents an individual’s natural tendency to become anxious regardless 
of situational factors. To date, it is unclear whether state anxiety, trait anxiety, or a 
combination of the two best accounts for the anxiety associated with career 
indecision (Campagna & Curtis, 2007; Fuqua et al., 1988; Spielberger et al., 1983). 
Campagna and Curtis (2007) found that both state and trait anxiety positively 
correlated with career indecision, but state anxiety was the better predictor. In 
addition, only state anxiety was negatively correlated with career certainty, 
suggesting that increased career uncertainty may lead to higher levels of state 







anxiety, rather than trait anxiety leading to career uncertainty. While it is still 
unclear exactly which type of anxiety is responsible for the negative feelings 
associated with career indecision and whether anxiety precedes or results from 
difficulties in selecting a career path, these findings suggest that state anxiety 
resulting from the stressful nature of selecting a career may be more influential in 
the experience of career-indecision-related anxiety than an individual's natural 
tendency to become anxious.  
A variable that may affect the amount of anxiety an individual will 
experience is cognitive flexibility. Cognitive flexibility is the ability to efficiently 
switch between thoughts and ideas, to consider multiple perspectives or approaches 
simultaneously, or to easily adapt to specific or evolving situations (Kercood, 
Lineweaver, Frank, & Fromm, 2017; Scott, 1962). Though past research has not 
explicitly addressed the relationship between cognitive flexibility and the anxiety 
associated with career decision-making, studies outside the realm of career 
decision-making have documented links between cognitive flexibility and anxiety 
more generally. For example, higher anxiety levels are correlated with lower levels 
of cognitive flexibility in individuals with generalized anxiety disorder (Arlt, Yiu, 
Eneva, Dryman, Heimberg, & Chen, 2016) and eating disorders (Simon & 
Verboon, 2016). Given this relationship with anxiety in non-career-related settings, 
it is possible that cognitive flexibility may also be related to career-indecision-
related anxiety. If the pattern is similar to that with other types of anxiety, 
individuals who are higher in cognitive flexibility may experience lower levels of 
career-related anxiety. 
Cognitive flexibility may also relate to career indecision in undergraduate 
students, although this is a much less extensively studied area than is cognitive 
flexibility’s relationship with anxiety. In a study of professional identity in first-
year health- and social care students, students who were higher in cognitive 
flexibility reported a stronger professional identity (the extent to which they felt 
they belonged to a certain profession and identified with individuals in that line of 
work) than did students lower in cognitive flexibility (Adams, Hean, Sturgis, & 
Clark, 2006). Additionally, a different study asked undergraduate students with and 
without ADHD to rate their subjective cognitive flexibility, as part of a larger 
investigation of cognitive flexibility’s impact on academic achievement and career 
choice. Interestingly, the relationship between cognitive flexibility and career 
confidence differed in these two populations. Students with ADHD who were 
higher in subjective cognitive flexibility showed less career confidence than their 
less-cognitively flexible peers, whereas non-ADHD students with higher subjective 







cognitive flexibility showed increased confidence in their career choices than did 
those lower in cognitive flexibility (Kercood et al., 2017). Together, these two 
studies raise the possibility that in typical undergraduate populations, the ability to 
consider multiple options may influence decision-making about future career paths, 
although career indecision was not explicitly addressed in either investigation. 
The current descriptive study fills two gaps in the literature by exploring the 
relationships between cognitive flexibility and career-indecision-related anxiety as 
well as between cognitive flexibility and career indecision. Although trait anxiety 
may contribute to career indecision, given the prior literature’s indication that state 
anxiety relates more strongly to career certainty and indecision, the current study 
focuses only on career-indecision-related anxiety (a form of state anxiety). Given 
what is known about cognitive flexibility’s relationships with anxiety and with 
professional identity and career confidence, we expected students with greater 
cognitive flexibility to experience less anxiety (hypothesis 1) and less indecision 
(hypothesis 2) about their future careers.  
Although the previous literature does not specifically address the 
relationships between cognitive flexibility, anxiety, and career indecision, the 
relationships that exist between these variables independently (cognitive flexibility 
and anxiety; cognitive flexibility and professional identity/career confidence) 
suggest a promising area in which to expand the existing literature. Because of the 
strong relationships between cognitive flexibility and anxiety outside of the realm 
of career decision-making, our third hypothesis is that cognitive flexibility may 
influence anxiety differently in people who are undecided about their future careers 
than in those who are decided about their career paths. Cognitive flexibility may 
play little role in the anxiety experienced by individuals who are fairly decided in 
their careers, as their anxiety levels are likely to be minimal. In contrast, individuals 
who are undecided tend to experience much higher levels of anxiety, and in this 
group, those who are lower in cognitive flexibility may experience higher levels of 
anxiety, whereas those who are higher in cognitive flexibility may not suffer from 
anxiety to the same extent.  
Given the importance of these three factors, a study integrating all three 
concepts has the potential to enhance our understanding of the complex 
relationships they may share and of their influence on the career decision-making 
process as a whole. Understanding factors that influence the anxiety associated with 
career decision-making could contribute to improving the experiences of 
individuals who are in the process of choosing career paths. The results of the 
current study could also point to interventions that target the negative feelings 







associated with indecision, allowing individuals to redirect their cognitive 
resources back toward career-related decision-making. Finally, by demonstrating 
who is most vulnerable to career-indecision-related anxiety, the current study could 




Participants included 156 undergraduate students (91% Caucasian) aged 
18–23 (M = 20.05, SD = 1.28) from a variety of educational backgrounds. Age did 
not share a significant relationship with any of the three main outcome variables 
(all ps >.247). The sample included a greater proportion of juniors and seniors 
(63%) than of first- and second-year students (37%). Additionally, more women (n 
= 113, 72%) participated in the study than men (n = 43, 28%). Women and men did 
not differ in career indecision (t(154) = .21, p = .831) or cognitive flexibility (t(154) 
= –1.08, p = .283), but women scored significantly higher than men on the career 
anxiety measure, t(154) = –2.29, p = .023. To assure that gender did not influence 
the results of any of the primary analyses, we initially included it as a covariate. 
Covarying gender did not change any of the results. Therefore, for simplicity, the 
primary analyses do not include gender.  
Materials 
Each participant completed a 29-question online Qualtrics survey consisting 
of a series of questionnaires related to career indecision, anxiety, and cognitive 
flexibility. We adapted existing questionnaires assessing these three factors to fit 
the Qualtrics format.  
Demographic Questionnaire 
This questionnaire gathered participant demographics such as age, gender, 
year in school, and race. Additionally, it evaluated students’ self-perceptions of the 
number of times they are asked about their career plans, their number of majors 
and/or minors, and their career confidence. 
 







Career Anxiety Scale (Thai, 2014) 
This 12-item scale assessed career-related anxiety using a 6-point Likert 
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree). Some example items included 
“Thinking about my future career is scary”; “I feel nervous about choosing a 
career”; and “I feel nervous when others ask me about my career plans.” Scores on 
this measure ranged from 12 to 72, with higher scores indicating more career-
related anxiety. 
My Vocational Situation (Holland, Daiger, & Power, 1980) 
This questionnaire assessed individuals’ current perceptions of their 
potential career paths and provided an objective measure of career indecision. This 
study utilized only one of three subscales from the larger questionnaire: the 
vocational identity subscale, which consists of 18 true/false items that evaluate 
career indecision. Example items included: “If I had to make an occupational choice 
right now, I'm afraid I would make a bad choice”; “I am uncertain about which 
occupation I would enjoy”; and “I am uncertain about the occupations I could 
perform well.” Participants indicated whether each statement was more true or 
more false for them. Scores on the subscale ranged from 0 to 18, with higher scores 
indicating greater levels of career indecision.  
Cognitive Flexibility Scale (Martin & Rubin, 1995) 
This 12-item self-report questionnaire measured aspects of cognitive 
flexibility on a 6-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree). 
It assessed flexibility in interactions and communication style, willingness to adapt 
to changing circumstances, and self-efficacy about flexibility. Example items 
included “I can communicate an idea in many different ways”; “My behavior is a 
result of conscious decisions that I make”; and “I am willing to work at creative 
solutions to problems.” Scores on this measure ranged from 12 to 72, with higher 
scores indicating greater cognitive flexibility.  
Procedure 
This descriptive study involved an online Qualtrics survey constructed from 
the measures presented above. First, participants completed the Demographic 
Questionnaire, followed by the Career Anxiety Scale, the My Vocational Situation 
questionnaire, and the Cognitive Flexibility Scale. All participants completed these 







questionnaires in a fixed order. The survey ran for a month-long period 
(September–October 2018) and was advertised via an online participant-
management system posting, the Honors program listserv, and our personal 
connections. Students answered the survey questions at their leisure, averaging 12 
minutes to complete the survey. Upon full completion of the survey, students 
received either extra credit in a psychology-related course or a link to a $5 Amazon 
gift card. 
Results 
Relationships among Key Variables 
We ran standard correlation analyses in IBM SPSS Statistics to explore the 
relationships between the primary study variables. Not surprisingly, and in 
accordance with the prior literature, students who were highly undecided in relation 
to their future careers reported more anxiety than students with less career 
indecision, r = .809, p < .001. Consistent with our first hypothesis, students who 
were higher in cognitive flexibility experienced less career-indecision-related 
anxiety than did their less-cognitively flexible peers, r = –.199, p = .013. Students 
who were more cognitively flexible also experienced less career indecision (r = –
.280, p < .001), supporting our second hypothesis and suggesting that individuals 
who are better able to consider multiple options are more decisive in their career 
planning. 
In terms of career confidence, students experiencing more career indecision 
reported that they were less confident in their proposed career paths than did 
students who were more decided, r = –.596, p < .001. Individuals with greater career 
confidence also reported less anxiety about their future career plans, r = –.595, p < 
.001. Finally, career confidence, unlike career indecision, did not share a significant 
relationship with cognitive flexibility, r = .103, p = .200.  
When we examined relationships among other variables, we found that 
students’ perceptions of the number of times others have asked them about their 
future career plans were influenced by their career indecision, with students higher 
in indecision reporting that they were asked more often about their careers than 
were students lower in indecision, r = .206, p = .010. Interestingly, career-
indecision-related anxiety did not share a significant relationship with students’ 
perceptions of the number of times they were asked about their plans, r = .097, p = 
.227. 







Mediating Effects of Cognitive Flexibility 
To test our third hypothesis and the potential differential influence of 
cognitive flexibility on the career-indecision-related anxiety of career-decided 
versus career-undecided students, we first ran a series of regression analyses to test 
the potential mediating effect of cognitive flexibility using the statistical approach 
recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). In partial support of the hypothesized 
model (Figure 1a), career indecision significantly predicted career-indecision-
related anxiety (R2 = .654, F(1,154) = 290.92, p < .001), and career indecision 
significantly predicted cognitive flexibility, R2 = .078, F(1,154) = 13.08, p < .001. 
When both career indecision and cognitive flexibility were included as predictors 
of career-indecision-related anxiety, however, instead of cognitive flexibility 
remaining significant and indecision being rendered insignificant as hypothesized, 
career indecision significantly predicted anxiety (t(153) = 16.51, p < .001) while 
cognitive flexibility did not, t(153) = .59, p = .555. Cognitive flexibility thus 
appears to share only an indirect relationship with career-indecision-related 
anxiety, specifically through its relationship with career indecision.  
 
 
Figure 1. Two potential models explaining the relationships between cognitive flexibility, 
career indecision, and career-indecision-related anxiety: (a) hypothesized model and (b) 











To examine the possibility that the relationship between cognitive 
flexibility and career indecision is nonlinear, we examined a scatterplot of these 
two variables. Because the scatterplot suggested a possible curvilinear relationship, 
we divided participants into three groups based on their cognitive flexibility: low 
(n = 48), medium (n = 54), and high (n = 54) and then used a median split to create 
low-indecision (n = 85) and high-indecision (n = 71) groups. We conducted a 2 
(Career Indecision: Low versus High) x 3 (Cognitive Flexibility: Low, Medium, 
High) ANOVA, with career anxiety as the dependent variable. We expected that in 
the low-indecision group, career-indecision-related anxiety would not vary based 
on cognitive flexibility levels because the anxiety levels of these students would 
generally be low; however, we expected that cognitive flexibility would play a 
significant role in the more substantial anxiety levels experienced by those in the 
high-indecision group. 
As shown in Figure 2, there was a significant main effect of career 
indecision (F(1,150) = 94.112, p = .000), but not of cognitive flexibility, F(2,150) 
= 0.164, p = .849. Contrary to our expectations, the interaction effect between 
cognitive flexibility and career indecision did not reach significance, F(2,150) = 
.540, p =.584. That is, cognitive flexibility did not differentially influence the 
career-indecision-related anxiety of students who were decided or undecided about 
their future career paths. These results further support the lack of mediation found 
in the regression analyses. Together, these findings suggest that the relationships 
between these three variables do not fit the hypothesized model (Figure 1a). 
Instead, career indecision seems to mediate the relationship between cognitive 
flexibility and anxiety, pointing to a new model of the relationships between these 
three factors (Figure 1b).  







Figure 2. Differences in career anxiety of undergraduate students based on levels of 
career indecision (undecided vs. decided) and levels of cognitive flexibility (low CF, 
medium CF, high CF). The main effect of Career Indecision was significant (p = .000), 
while the main effect of Cognitive Flexibility (p = .849) and the interaction of Career 




This study strongly supports the previously documented relationship 
between career indecision and anxiety but augments prior research through an 
exploration of cognitive flexibility in the context of career decision-making. The 
strong positive relationship between career indecision and career-indecision-related 
anxiety seen in this study is consistent with prior findings that suggest that 
individuals who are more undecided about their future careers experience more 
anxiety (Campagna & Curtis, 2007; Fuqua et al., 1988). More importantly, the 
current study expands on prior literature that has documented relationships between 
cognitive flexibility and anxiety disorders by showing that cognitive flexibility also 
predicts anxiety in a career-decision-making context. Consistent with our first 
hypothesis, individuals who were more cognitively flexible experienced less 
career-indecision-related anxiety. Additionally, in support of our second 
hypothesis, we found that individuals with higher cognitive flexibility reported less 







career indecision, suggesting that those with the ability to consider more career 
options may be more decided in the careers they choose to pursue. This relationship 
is a novel finding given that no other studies have explicitly looked at these two 
variables as they pertain to career choice, but it supports existing research on 
cognitive flexibility and other career-related variables such as professional identity 
(Adams et al., 2006).  
Despite cognitive flexibility’s established relationships with both career 
indecision and career-indecision-related anxiety, our results do not support the 
anticipated mediating effect among these three variables. We hypothesized that 
cognitive flexibility would play a different role in students’ anxiety levels based on 
the students’ levels of career indecision. Specifically, we anticipated that cognitive 
flexibility would have a greater potential to influence anxiety in students 
experiencing more indecision than in their more-decided peers. This was not the 
case, however. Although cognitive flexibility did not mediate the relationship 
between career-indecision-related anxiety and career indecision, it did significantly 
relate to both variables, suggesting an alternative model of cognitive flexibility’s 
role in the career-decision-making process. Instead of acting as a mediator, 
cognitive flexibility appears to act directly on career indecision and through career 
indecision to influence career-indecision-related anxiety.  
This new model, depicted in Figure 1b, points to reducing indecision by 
increasing cognitive flexibility as a promising initial target for intervention. For 
example, career counselors or other advisors could promote a broader exploration 
of career options, giving students a wider variety of careers to consider and 
allowing them to feel more informed when making selections. With this approach, 
advisors inherently model and encourage cognitive flexibility. Additionally, 
advisors’ mindful selection of language surrounding the career-decision-making 
process could help students develop more-flexible mind-sets. For example, framing 
a student’s first job as an opportunity to explore an interest rather than as a final 
irreversible choice may establish the idea of a flexible career journey instead of a 
set career path. These proposed flexibility-based strategies should be simple to 
implement and have the potential to effectively assist students with their career 
decision-making and to reduce their elevated anxiety levels. 
Interestingly, cognitive flexibility did not relate to career confidence. This 
finding is contrary to the results of Kercood et al. (2017), who found that higher 
levels of cognitive flexibility corresponded with higher levels of career confidence 
in undergraduate students. This finding was also surprising because cognitive 
flexibility seemed to influence career indecision but did not influence how 







confident individuals were in their career choices. These opposing results suggest 
that career confidence and career decision-making may be independent constructs.  
Despite this study’s promising findings about cognitive flexibility and the 
career-decision-making process, its results should be interpreted within the context 
of its limitations. First, the participants of this study attend an expensive private 
university in the Midwest and may not be demographically representative of 
undergraduate students at other institutions. Most students at this university are 
Caucasian, and many come from upper-middle-class households with two working 
parents. Given these demographic characteristics, these students could experience 
different levels of pressure to have successful careers in the future than when 
compared to undergraduate students from lower-income households. For example, 
higher-income students may experience more pressure in their career-decision-
making processes as they try to live up to familial expectations. Alternately, these 
students may feel less pressure because prior advantages and associated successes 
resulting from their higher socioeconomic status may lead them to assume this trend 
will continue in the future as they pursue careers.  
Second, because of its online nature, this study contained only a subjective 
measure of cognitive flexibility, the Cognitive Flexibility Scale (Martin & Rubin, 
1995). The verbiage of some of this scale’s statements (e.g., “I can communicate 
an idea in many different ways”) may have led students to self-report in a socially 
desirable way, as flexible communication, efficient problem solving, and diversity 
of thought are typically viewed favorably in academic settings. Future studies may 
want to utilize an objective neuropsychological measure of cognitive flexibility, 
such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Grant & Berg, 1948), to counteract 
possible biases due to social-desirability effects.  
Third, all participants filled out the survey questionnaires in the same order, 
which may have resulted in order effects. The administration of the measures in a 
fixed order was purposeful, however. The Career Anxiety Scale proceeded the My 
Vocational Situation questionnaire to get a baseline of career anxiety before 
participants were prompted to think about career indecision, which has been shown 
in prior literature to increase anxiety (Campagna & Curtis, 2007; Fuqua et al., 
1988). Furthermore, because cognitive flexibility affects both anxiety (Arlt et al., 
2016; Simon & Verboon, 2016) and indecision (Adams et al., 2006; Kercood et al., 
2017), the Cognitive Flexibility Scale was administered after the assessments of 
anxiety and indecision to prevent any carryover effects on these other measures.  
Fourth, this study focused on state anxiety surrounding the career-decision-
making process (how an individual feels in a specific situation) rather than on 







individuals’ general trait anxiety (how someone feels a majority of the time). Prior 
literature has suggested that state anxiety is more influential in the process of 
selecting a career (Campagna & Curtis, 2007), but this does not mean that trait 
anxiety does not play a role in these relationships. Because we did not include a 
measure of trait anxiety, we could not examine this role in the context of the current 
study.  
Lastly, because our study was cross-sectional in nature, we were able to 
capture only a snapshot of our variables at one point in time. This limited the 
complexity of the relationships we were able to examine. It is possible that career-
indecision-related anxiety, cognitive flexibility, and career indecision share a 
cyclical rather than linear relationship. For example, the high anxiety levels that 
were associated with low cognitive flexibility and high career indecision in our 
study could in turn decrease students’ cognitive flexibility and thus interfere with 
their career decision-making, further contributing to their career-indecision-related 
anxiety. Although we were unable to explore this possibility, future longitudinal 
studies could examine interactive relationships between these factors.  
Despite these limitations, we found support for two of our three original 
hypotheses: higher levels of cognitive flexibility are associated with lower levels 
of both career-indecision-related anxiety and career indecision. Although cognitive 
flexibility did not mediate the relationship between these two variables, its effect 
on career indecision suggests it could serve as a mechanism to promote career 
decision-making, a promising new direction for the development of interventions 
aimed at reducing career anxiety in undergraduate students. In addition, the findings 
of this study could be used to help identify students who would most benefit from 
interventions—those who are undecided and those who are low in cognitive 
flexibility. Furthermore, the current study significantly contributes to the existing 
body of research by being one of the first to look directly at cognitive flexibility as 
it relates specifically to career decision-making and career-related anxiety. As such, 
this study provides valuable information that begins to elucidate the complex 
interplay among cognitive flexibility, indecision, and career anxiety, not only 
providing a foundation for new avenues of research but also identifying a potential 
mechanism that advisors and other higher education professionals can utilize to 
promote students’ decision-making and reduce their career-related anxiety.  
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Background 
Outpatient parenteral antimicrobial therapy (OPAT) is defined as the 
administration of parenteral antimicrobials in at least two doses given on different 
days and without a hospitalization between.1 Rather than a patient being required 
to remain in a hospital solely to receive antimicrobial therapy after medical 
discharge, he or she can complete a portion of the therapy as an outpatient. The 
ability to discharge a patient on intravenous (IV) antimicrobial therapy has been 
shown to potentially reduce the high costs associated with chronic administration 
of antibiotics,2 increase the patient’s quality of life by granting improved flexibility 
and convenience, and reduce the likelihood that the patient will acquire a 
nosocomial infection.2 As a result, OPAT has grown at a breakneck pace since its 
inception in the 1970s, and projections of its market share predict that it will soon 
reach the multibillion-dollar-a-year threshold.1  
Interprofessional collaboration and careful selection of patients designated 
to receive OPAT are critical to ensuring successful therapy. Beyond the clinical 
expertise offered by infectious diseases (ID) physicians, coordination of social 
support and third-party authorizations between case management and pharmacy 
contribute significantly to a patient’s ability to receive appropriate therapy. In some 
cases, the provision of home-based OPAT services can prevent an otherwise 
medically unnecessary stay at a subacute rehabilitation facility to receive IV 
antimicrobials for patients without reliable transportation to an infusion center. 
Additionally, in patients for whom adequate monitoring and follow-up cannot be 
guaranteed, complications related to vascular access devices and adverse drug 
reactions can lead to significant harm.3 Both social and medical evaluations should 
therefore be integral in the process of identifying patients appropriate to receive 
OPAT. 







Furthermore, input from pharmacists to assist in the appropriate selection 
of antimicrobials and of durations of therapies has the potential to stem the rising 
tide of resistant microorganisms. The interventions related to spectrum and duration 
can lead to vastly reduced rates of adverse effects due to unnecessary antimicrobial 
use and can also reduce the likelihood that the patient may encounter an infection 
caused by a resistant organism later in life.4 Additionally, it may reduce the rate of 
multidrug-resistant organisms, which is especially critical for patients who must be 
admitted but are also most at risk. Through appropriate recommendations related 
to the spectrum and duration of therapy, selection of resistant microorganisms can 
be minimized, which partially mitigates these risks. 
In November 2016 at a community hospital, a dedicated pharmacist was 
hired to continue to build a formal OPAT program for all patients discharged on IV 
antimicrobials under the care of the ID physician group. Through a collaborative-
practice agreement, the pharmacist’s responsibilities upon consultation were to 
evaluate and create a plan with recommendations related to antimicrobial selection 
(including drug, dose, route, frequency, and duration) as well as monitoring 
parameters. The pharmacist also provided patient education and assistance to case 
managers involved with disposition planning. Upon patients’ discharge from the 
hospital, the pharmacist continued weekly monitoring throughout the duration of 
therapy of all patients who received such consultative services during their inpatient 
stay. Because of the relatively new nature of this OPAT program and the number 
of “good catch” events—in which a potential medical error related to the therapy 
or monitoring was prevented—observed since the program’s formal inception, this 
study sought to examine the impact of an OPAT program for those patients 
receiving OPAT at hospital discharge.  
Methods 
This was a retrospective observational cohort study examining patients with 
an order for an IV antibiotic following discharge from a community hospital within 
the period of December 1, 2016, to May 31, 2017. Patients who received OPAT 
consults during their index hospital stay were compared to those patients who did 
not receive consults in the same period. Only adult patients were included in this 
study. Patients residing in a nursing home or long-term care facility prior to 
admission and those also receiving oral antimicrobials were excluded from the 
analysis. The primary objective was the proportion of patients in each group 
readmitted within 30 days of discharge and OPAT initiation, which was stratified 
by the reason for readmission (ID process, adverse drug event, or unrelated reason). 







Baseline demographic information collected included age, sex, weight, and length 
of stay prior to discharge. Type of infection, antimicrobial selection (including 
agents with antipseudomonal activity or requiring therapeutic drug monitoring), 
duration of treatment, and disposition at hospital discharge were also collected from 
the electronic medical record. As avoiding unnecessary short-term acute 
rehabilitation (SAR) stays in cases where therapy can be altered and coordinated 
with home healthcare is one potential benefit of OPAT, change in disposition from 
admission to discharge was also collected.  
Statistical Analysis 
The Fisher’s exact test and chi-square analyses were utilized as appropriate 
for nominal endpoints including the 30-day readmission rate, use of each 
antimicrobial class, and use of agents with a high risk for a Clostridioides difficile 
infection, such as ceftriaxone, or requiring therapeutic drug monitoring. The 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test was utilized to determine the significance of differences in 
length of stay and duration of therapy. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) software was utilized for these analyses. All other variables and baseline 
demographic information were described utilizing descriptive statistics. 
Results 
No statistically significant differences between groups were seen in terms 
of demographic information (Table 1).  
 
 OPAT Consult 
(n = 95) 
No OPAT 
Consult 
(n = 22) 
p Value 
Median Age (IQR) 61 (21) 63 (26) 0.503 
Sex (%) 
     M 











91 kg  
(35 kg) 
79 kg  
(41 kg) 
0.085 
Median Index LOS 
(IQR) 
6 (5) 7 (8) 0.313 
Table 1. Patient Demographics 
 







No statistically significant difference between the readmission rates of the 
OPAT consult group and the non-consult group was observed; however, the rate 
for the former was less than half of the latter, numerically (14.73% vs. 31.82%, p = 
0.07). Additionally, the proportion of patients requiring a change in disposition did 
not vary significantly between groups (Table 2), with 39 (41%) patients with a 
consult and 12 (55%) patients without a consult being discharged to a SAR center 
or extended-care facility (ECF; p = 0.252). Bacteremia associated with various 
sources of infection was the most common type of infection requiring IV therapy 
in both groups, constituting 35% of patients in the OPAT consult group and 59% 
of the patients without a consult. Differences in provider type and indication for 
therapy between groups were statistically significant (p < 0.0001; 3 x 10–12). The 
median total days of therapy for patients with a consult was 24, in comparison to 
25 in the non-consult group (p = 0.095).  
 
 OPAT Consult 
(n = 95) 
No OPAT 
Consult  
(n = 22) 
p Value 
Disposition Change 39 (41%) 12 (55%) 0.252 
Indication for Therapy 
     Empyema 
     Osteomyelitis 
     Bacteremia 
     Intra-Abdominal Infection 
     Skin and Soft Tissue 
Infection (SSTI) 

















3 x 10–12 
 
Primary Provider Type 
     Pulmonary 
     Cardiology 
     Surgery 
     Internal Medicine 















Median Days of Therapy 
(IQR) 
24 (19) 25 (17) 0.095 
Table 2. Disposition Change, Therapy Indication, and Provider Type, All Patients 
 







The most significantly differing trends between groups were evident in 
prescribing practices. The usage of antipseudomonal coverage was significantly 
lower in the OPAT consult group (39.58% vs. 86.36%, p = 0.00006). Additionally, 
utilization of ceftriaxone, known for its potential to predispose patients to C. 
difficile infections, was also significantly lower in the OPAT consult group (9.47% 
vs. 45.45%, p = 0.00004). Differences in other key antibiotics that serve as 
stewardship targets were also seen with piperacillin-tazobactam, cefepime, and 
vancomycin (Table 3). Also of interest, patients without an OPAT consult who 
were discharged to a SAR center or ECF were significantly more likely to have 
been prescribed agents requiring therapeutic drug monitoring (100% vs. 59.56%, p 
= 0.038) and to have later required readmission (54.55% vs. 16.22%, p = 0.001). 
 
Drug Choice      OPAT Consult  
(n = 95) 
No OPAT 
Consult 
(n = 22) 
p Value 
Ampicillin 5 2 0.495 
Ampicillin-Sulbactam 12 2 0.645 
Piperacillin-Tazobactam 13 11 0.0001 
Cefazolin 15 3 0.801 
Ceftazidime 1 0 0.203 
Ceftriaxone 9 10 0.00004 
Cefuroxime 1 1 0.255 
Cefepime 10 7 0.011 
Meropenem 8 5 0.054 
Ertapenem 4 1 0.944 
Gentamicin 6 5 0.017 
Tobramycin 0 4 0.0002 
Vancomycin 39 19 0.0001 
Linezolid 0 2 0.023 
Daptomycin 1 0 0.213 
Metronidazole 2 5 0.0002 
Clindamycin 2 2 0.104 
Fluconazole 2 2 0.104 
Antipseudomonal 
Agents 
37 19 0.00006 
Table 3. Therapeutic Drug Choice, All Patients 
 








When examining readmitted patients as a subgroup, several differences 
between those receiving a consult and those without were seen (Table 4). 
Significant differences in the indications for therapy (p = 0.009) were seen in this 
population, with bacteremia and SSTIs as the most common infection types in the 
OPAT consult (71%) and non-consult (43%) groups, respectively. Additionally, a 
trend was seen showing that patients in this subgroup without a consult were more 
likely to have experienced a change in disposition (85.71% vs. 42.86%, p = 0.061). 
 
 OPAT Consult  
(n = 14) 
No OPAT Consult  
(n = 7) 
p Value 
Median Age (IQR) 61 (16) 64 (26) 0.711 
Sex 
     Male 









Indication for Therapy 
     Osteomyelitis 
     Bacteremia 
     Intra-Abdominal 
Infection 
     Skin and Soft Tissue 
Infection (SSTI) 



















Median Index Length of 
Stay in Days (IQR) 
6 (2) 7 (3) 0.352 
Median Days to 
Readmission (IQR) 
12 (14) 9 (6) 0.368 
Disposition at Discharge 
     Home 












Disposition Change 6 (43%) 6 (86%) 0.061 
Median Total Days of 
Therapy (IQR) 
28 (24) 28 (27) 0.190 







Reason for Readmission 
     ID Process 
     Adverse Drug Event 














Table 4. Readmitted Patients 
 
Discussion 
No statistical significance in terms of the primary objective (30-day 
readmission rate) was seen in the study; however, the more than twofold difference 
in readmission rate can certainly be seen as clinically significant. The readmission 
rate of 14.74% was also similar to the 21.5% readmission rate reported by another 
study, which somewhat adds to the confidence with which the results from this 
study can be interpreted.5 
Considerable improvements in antimicrobial stewardship were seen when 
comparing the group of patients receiving a consult to those who did not. This 
enhancement in stewardship was primarily via reduced utilization of 
antipseudomonal coverage, vancomycin, and ceftriaxone, which demonstrated the 
key role that such programs can have on selecting therapy with an appropriately 
narrow spectrum. One way by which OPAT can reduce costs and improve patient 
outcomes comes via the involvement of ID specialists to improve the selection of 
appropriately narrow-spectrum antimicrobials. By avoiding the use of overly broad 
coverage, the risk of off-target eradication of the gut microbiome and subsequent 
development of a C. difficile infection can be significantly reduced. Beyond the 
clinical impact of this variety of infectious diarrhea, C. difficile’s propensity for 
toxin production leads to 4.8 billion dollars in additional costs to hospitals in the 
United States annually.6 For example, unnecessary use of ceftriaxone, a 
cephalosporin utilized for a variety of infections, has become one of many potential 
targets for antimicrobial stewardship programs because of its common use and 
propensity for causing this type of infection.6,7 It is imperative that therapies be 
selected appropriately to cover only the types of microorganisms likely to be 
causing the patient’s infection and that therapies be narrowed when culture and 
susceptibility data are available. This is a major point of potential impact for 
pharmacist-led OPAT services. 
The difference in readmissions seen for patients without a consult sent to a 
SAR center or ECF may hint at a potential positive influence seen with the inclusion 







of a dedicated ID clinical pharmacy specialist to coordinate careful monitoring 
during the course of OPAT. Especially when utilizing agents requiring therapeutic 
drug monitoring, such as vancomycin or aminoglycosides, the potential for 
significant adverse effects is considerable. Additionally, poor availability of lab 
data during the course of OPAT has been noted to be a significant risk factor for 
readmission, which may partially explain the difference seen here.8 The potentially 
increased debility or acuity of patients more likely to be sent to a SAR center or 
ECF, in comparison to a patient able to be sent home, could have also contributed 
to this observation; however, an increase in readmission for patients discharged to 
these facilities after receiving a consult was not observed. 
The need for appropriate monitoring and communication between 
healthcare systems should be given careful consideration prior to the 
implementation of OPAT. One report noted that 26% of sites surveyed had a team 
specifically designated to handle OPAT cases.5 A survey of practitioners involved 
in an OPAT service indicated that up to 70% had seen such therapy implemented 
without a consult from an ID specialist, and another study showed that the addition 
of a pharmacist or ID physician or pharmacist to an OPAT team raised adherence 
to monitoring by 32% and 64%, respectively.9,10 One study showed that cases 
reviewed by an ID physician led to changes in therapy from parenteral to oral agents 
in 27%–40% of cases.9 This shows the value of a dedicated OPAT team’s ability to 
improve patient care via appropriate selection of antimicrobial therapy from a 
therapeutic perspective, which often reduces costs.  
Although poor communication can be a barrier to the success of OPAT, 
adverse effects have been cited as the primary reason for OPAT discontinuation or 
therapy modification in 3%–5% of cases.9 The rate of readmission, potentially 
requiring a change in therapy, in this study for adverse events in the OPAT and 
non-OPAT groups was similar to this cited figure, at 3.2% and 4.5%, respectively. 
A survey of ID physicians conducted in 2012 showed that only 22% of the OPAT 
programs in which they worked had a way to track medication errors, “near 
misses,” or adverse events.5 Additionally, it is of utmost importance that patients 
who are to receive OPAT be carefully selected to ensure that they have appropriate 
social and financial support to receive therapy at home, at an infusion center, or at 
another location. The potential ramifications for patients inappropriately selected 
for outpatient therapy include both clinical decompensation as well as the potential 
for enhanced resistance by the responsible pathogen due to incomplete eradication.  
Several limitations should be considered when interpreting the results of 
this study. The small sample size and timing of the study period at the advent of the 







program could have affected the results. This trend could possibly have been due 
to the novelty of the new program or to increased provider confidence in the 
utilization of a formalized OPAT program able to more consistently offer improved 
monitoring and follow-up after discharge. The lack of assessments related to 
appropriateness of therapy, comorbidities, severity of infection, and causative 
pathogen limits the generalizability of these findings.  
As OPAT services continue to expand in the United States, further 
investigations utilizing larger sample sizes and examining shifting trends in patient 
outcomes should be conducted in order to further assess the value of the program 
and monitor for potential quality-improvement opportunities. Furthermore, patient 
and provider satisfaction data could be included to better assess the improvements 
in quality of life and perception of value associated with the program. This study 
suggests a potential indication for the potential patient-care improvements related 
to improved patient outcomes that OPAT services can offer to patients. 








1. Tice AD, Rehm SJ, Dalovisio JR. Practice guidelines for outpatient 
parenteral antimicrobial therapy. Clin Infect Dis. 2004;38:1661-1672. 
doi:10.1086/420939. 
2. Ruh CA, Parameswaran GI, Wojciechowski AL, Mergenhagen KA. 
Outcomes and pharmacoeconomic analysis of a home intravenous antibiotic 
infusion program in veterans. Clin Ther. 2015;37(11):2527-2535. 
doi:10.1016/j.clinthera.2015.09.009. 
3. Chung EK, Beller CB, Muloma EW, et al. Development and 
implementation of a pharmacist-managed outpatient parenteral 
antimicrobial therapy program. Am J Health Syst Pharm. 2016;73(1):e24-
e33. doi:10.2146/ajhp150201. 
4. Diaz Granados CA. Prospective audit for antimicrobial stewardship in 
intensive care: impact on resistance and clinical outcomes. Am J Infect 
Control. 2012;40(6):526-529. doi:10.101/j.ajic.2011.07.011. 
5. Lane MA, Marschall J, Beekmann SE, et al. Outpatient parenteral 
antimicrobial therapy practices among adult infectious disease physicians. 
Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2014;35(7):839-844. doi:10.1086/676859. 
6. Scott II RD. The direct medical costs of healthcare-associated infections in 
U.S. hospitals and the benefits of prevention 2009. Division of Healthcare 
Quality Promotion National Center for Preparedness, Detection, and 
Control of Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
7. Ceftriaxone [package insert]. Indianapolis, IN: Hoffmann La Roche; 1984. 
8. Huck D, Ginsberg JP, Gordon SM, et al. Association of laboratory test result 
availability and rehospitalizations in an outpatient parenteral antimicrobial 
therapy programme. J Antimicrob Chemother. 2014;69(1):228-233. 
doi:10.1093/jac/dkt303. 
9. Muldoon EG, Snydman DR, Penland EC, Allison GM. Are we ready for an 
outpatient parenteral antimicrobial therapy bundle? A critical appraisal of 
the evidence. Clin Infect Dis. 2013;57(3):419-424. doi:10.1093/cid/cit955. 
10. Shah PJ, Bergman SJ, Graham DR. Monitoring of outpatient parenteral 
antimicrobial therapy and implementation of clinical pharmacy services at 
a community hospital infusion unit. J Pharm Pract. 2014;28(5):462-468. 
doi:10.1177/0897190014544786. 
  







BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION POLICY: THE FIGHT 
AGAINST TERRORISM 
 
CAROLINE KLENCK, BUTLER UNIVERSITY 
MENTOR: KENNETH COLBURN, JR. 
 
Introduction 
The 9/11 terrorist attack resulted in the death of 2,996 people after the 
hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 attributed 
to al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden. After this devastating event, many 
countries reevaluated their border security and immigration policies to try to 
prevent any future destructive attacks. The fear of terrorists again grew after the 
2015 Paris attacks, which resulted in the death of 130 people: “The triad 
security/immigration/terrorism has now reached enormous significance after the 
terrorist attacks of 13-N in Paris that have killed more than 120 people” (De Castro 
Sanchez 2017:244). Citizens fear for their safety, and it is put into the government’s 
hands to protect them. Many people believe there should be more liberal policies 
to allow more access for people to enter the country, while others believe there 
should be much stricter policies to ensure safety by not allowing any migration.  
One of the biggest controversies to arise recently is Donald Trump’s 
promise to build a wall between the United States and Mexico. The wall was one 
of the greatest points in Trump’s campaign, and one reason he was elected. Many 
question who will pay the bill and how much the wall will actually help. One of the 
reasons given to build the wall is to make it more difficult for people to illegally 
come into the country. In terms of the terrorist debate, how many terrorist attacks 
have there been from Mexico to the United States? Zero. 
The debate has emerged: do these restrictive immigration policies and 
increased border security in fact reduce the probability of future terrorist attacks? 
“Academic and policy circles are in the dark as to how those different restrictions 
[immigration policy] affect the flow of immigrants and the consequent likelihood 
of terrorism. It is reasonable to speculate that not all restriction policies are equal 
in their ability to reduce or deter terrorism” (Choi 2018:16). Many research papers 
have focused only on immigration or border security, but very few have considered 
both. According to d’Appollonia (2008:228), “There is strong evidence that 
terrorist threats are not only external but also deeply rooted in domestic issues. 







European governments … still emphasize the external dimension of terrorism by 
using border controls and restrictive asylum policies as a way to improve their 
internal security.” The internal (immigration) and external (borders) workings of 
government both play roles in preventing terrorism, and it is the goal of this paper 
to discover the scope of the roles they play.  
Literature Review 
Why build a wall? Many states ask themselves this question while weighing 
the pros and cons of doing so; however, “the growth in violence by nonstate groups 
has led government to use fences to prevent insurgent activity and transnational 
terrorism” (Avdan and Gelpi 2017:14). Avdan and Gelpi (2017:23) found a positive 
association between fencing and terrorist attacks: “The incidence of transnational 
terrorist attacks across fenced border-years is approximately 4.8 percent, while the 
incidence across unfenced border years is just under 1.9 percent.” Jellissen and 
Gottheil (2013), however, found that “on the utility of security fences along 
international borders,” both Israel and India built walls because of armed conflicts 
with neighboring states, and both walls resulted in a decreased number of total 
civilian fatalities during terrorist attacks between 2003 and 2009. Although the 
research results of Avdan and Gelpi and of Jellissen and Gottheil conflicted, both 
pairs of researchers looked only at the presence of a wall, not also at border security. 
As Jellisen and Gottheil (2013:267) state, walls are “designed to obstruct the free 
and natural flow of demographic and economic movement.” In contrast, borders 
are permeable and allow movement of goods and services under the scrutiny of 
safety measures by personnel. It is important to note the difference between walls 
and borders to understand the level of protection that is being supplied.  
Border security fulfills both long- and short-term strategies in the fight 
against terrorism. Short-term strategy looks at the plans and operations to interrupt 
terrorists and block their ability to achieve their goals. Long-term strategy focuses 
on preventing the growth of terrorist groups through ideologies and on building 
stronger international coalitions (Willis et al. 2010:17). Short-term actions include 
preventing terrorist attacks, blocking the transport of weapons of mass destruction 
to states, and denying terrorists support or control of any state. Long-term actions 
include promoting international partnerships and enhancing government 
counterterror infrastructure and capabilities. Willis presents that terrorism is fought 
not just by the presence of a wall but also by border security, which attempts to 
actively disrupt and hopefully stop future terrorist attacks.  







With new terrorist threats and attacks, many countries are more inclined to 
make their security and immigration policies stricter. European governments, 
according to d’Appollonia (2008:228), have raised concerns about asylum seekers 
in particular because they are “the second most prevalent group of discrimination 
victims because of the perceived threat that they are potential ‘international 
terrorists.’ ” There is a balance that many governments try to achieve that is not too 
restrictive, which may result in criticism that they are building a “fortress,” but also 
isn’t too liberal, as legal or undocumented immigrants or asylum seekers have the 
potential to threaten internal security. New immigrants do not have strong ties to 
their receiving country and therefore may not have as many qualms about betraying 
that country. 
Choi (2018) conducted a study on restrictive immigration policies. A debate 
was formed: “On the one hand, terrorism is likely to decrease when states impose 
immigration restrictions based on skill or wealth, or when states offer immigrants 
limited legal rights that permit only restricted residence and designated employers. 
On the other hand, terrorism is expected to increase when states allow no special 
visas or procedures to recruit immigrants, or when states give workers citizenship 
only when they are born to a native parent” (Choi 2018:14). Choi summarizes the 
biggest struggle countries face when making policies: There is a hard balance to 
find what will work best for each country, or what kind of policy is most effective.  
A leaked memo from Dr. Frank Luntz, a famous communications expert, to 
the U.S. Republican party in 2005 discusses concerns that the United States may 
have about liberal policies with both border security and immigration/migrant 
policies: “ ‘Border security is homeland security. In a post-9/11 world, protecting 
our borders has taken on a whole new importance.’ As fear of terrorist attacks in 
the United States grows, this suggested framing has become the dominant narrative 
in the U.S. debate regarding refugees” (Voss 2018:43–44). The United States has 
clearly been moving toward strict immigration policies and border security, but has 
it been as successful in preventing terrorist attacks as other countries with more 
liberal policies?  
Although research has been done on borders and terrorism, not much has 
been done concerning border security and terrorism. There has also been research 
on immigration policy and terrorism. Most of the available research has focused on 
small related groups of countries, such as Western democracies or a few countries 
that have strong conflicts with their neighbors, such as India. There has been very 
limited research on both immigration policy and border security along with 
terrorism, even though many studies have commented that the concepts have 







recently been tied together: “the triad security/immigration/terrorism has now 
reached enormous significance” (De Castro Sanchez 2017:244).  
According to the European Parliament (2018), there were 135 deaths in 13 
attacks in 2016, compared to 62 deaths in 33 religious terrorist attacks in 2017; 
“Ten of these thirty-three attacks were ‘completed’, while twelve failed to reach 
their objectives in full and eleven were foiled, mostly in France and the UK.” Seven 
hundred and five (705) people were arrested in 18 EU countries on involvement or 
suspicion of involvement in jihadist terrorist activities. In 2017, there were more 
failed attacks compared to 2016. Although there has been an increase in failed 
attacks, there has been no research on a correlation of this increase with 
immigration policy or border security. 
This paper seeks to answer the following question: How do border security 
and immigration policy affect terrorism across borders? Other questions I will touch 
on while conducting my research are: How fluid are their borders? How strict is 
their border security? What is their definition of citizenship? What are the rights of 
noncitizens? How many illegal immigrants enter the country? How firm is the 
enforcement of law?  
This paper investigates both border security and immigration policy 
because they have been shown to work hand in hand. It will also look at countries 
all over the world, rather than a single cohesive group. I predict that weak central 
government, inadequate border security, and insufficient immigration policy foster 
terrorism. I hope my research will shed new light on border security and 
immigration policies regarding their effect on terrorism, especially because these 
have been topics of heightened concern and debate in recent years. 
Methodology 
For data, this paper uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) provided by 
the University of Maryland, a reputable school. The GTD is an open-source 
database that collects information about terrorist attacks around the world from 
1970 through 2017 and has been used in numerous studies. This data set contains 
both domestic and international terrorist incidents. The GTD’s variables are split 
into eight categories: GTD ID and Date, Incident Information, Incident Location, 
Attack Information, Weapon Information, Target/Victim Information, Perpetrator 
Information, Casualties and Consequences, and Additional Information and 
Sources. My research focused primarily on dates and incident locations. 
Throughout my research, I utilized the year each attack occurred to examine the 







policies implemented in that country during the same year. (For a complete list of 
the number of terrorist attacks per year per country, see Appendix A.) 
I collected data on immigration policies from the Library of Congress, 
which provides information on refugee law and policy, citizenship pathways and 
border protection, and family-reunification laws for many countries. The Library 
of Congress is a reliable source. This was a starting point for much of the 
information to determine the restrictiveness of policies and border security.  
Additional sources used to collect data are individual countries’ laws, 
because going directly to the source rather than only to sources summarizing the 
policies gives the best and most reliable information for determining how restrictive 
a policy is and how strong a country’s border security is.  
The independent variable is immigration policy. To measure the level of 
restrictiveness of immigration policy, I utilized a format designed by Margaret E. 
Peters in her research “Open Trade, Closed Borders: Immigration Policy in the Era 
of Globalization” (2014). There are eleven subcategories of immigration policy: 
nationality, skill, quotas, recruitment, work prohibitions, family reunification, 
refugee policy, asylum policy, citizenship, deportation, and enforcement (Table 1). 
Each of these subcategories is coded on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being the most 
conservative and 5 being the most liberal. Conservative policies include complete 
closed borders or lack of entry for any asylum seekers or refugees, or, if allowing 
immigrants, policies deny immigrants rights or access to welfare and other benefits. 
Liberal policies include open borders; no quotas; high levels or high entry of 
immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers; equal rights for these people when 
compared to citizens; and access to benefits such as welfare and health care. (For 
each country’s overall score in each category, see Table B.1.) 







Category  Subcategory Description 
Border Regulations Nationality Used as a basis for immigration restrictions 
 Skill Restricts based on skill or wealth 
 Quota Limits number of immigrants each year 
 Work prohibitions Imposes restrictions on industries worked in or 
positions held 
 Family reunification Allows varying levels of family reunification 
 Refugee policy Sets entrance policies for refugees outside the 
state 
 Asylum policy Sets entrance policies for those claiming refugee 
status at the border 
Immigrant Rights Citizenship Defines who can be a member of the state 
 Other rights Outlines other rights for immigrants  
Enforcement Deportation Regulates who can be deported, and how 
 Other enforcement Imposes other enforcement measures 
Table 1. Categories and Subcategories of Immigration Policy. Source: Choi (2018). 
 
The dependent variable is the number of terrorist attacks. The definition I 
used for terrorist attack is the GTD’s definition: “the threatened or actual use of 
illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”  
I chose at least one country per region of the world in order to have a global 
scale. The countries I decided to evaluate often receive a lot of media attention and 
have developed enough to have consistent data. The countries I chose were Rwanda 
(Africa), China (Asia), Germany and Sweden (Europe), Brazil (South America), 
the United States (North America), and Australia (Oceania). I chose to not include 
Antarctica because of the highly unpopulated area. Past research has focused 
mostly on cohesive groups of countries such as Western democracies or those with 
specific conflicts, such as those based on religion, rather than conflicts with a wide 
variety of possible causes, such as economic stability, corruption, and government.  
A score was given to each of the 11 subcategories of immigration policy to 
measure the restrictiveness of the policy (see Appendix B). In analyzing the data, I 
compared the average policy restrictiveness for each year compared to the number 
of terrorist attacks. Comparing the number of terrorist attacks from before and after 
a restrictiveness score change will allow me to understand if these policies have 
been effective and if that effectiveness is contingent on how liberal (5) or 
conservative (1) the policies are.  
 









Score: 2.9 (See Table B.2) 
Nationality: 4.  Almost all nationalities are allowed into Australia (Simon-Davies 
2018). 
Skill/Income: 1.  Australia is focused on receiving only highly skilled and educated 
workers (Buchanan 2013). The 1994 Migration Regulations draw focus to skill-
typed work visas. 
Quota: 1.  The migration program is separated into three streams: skill, family, and 
special eligibility. For 2018–2019, 190,000 total spots were available, including 
128,550 for skilled laborers, 57,400 for partner visas for family reunification, and 
565 for special eligibility. This program is set by the Australian government’s 
budget process (Australian Government 2018).  
Work Prohibitions: 5.  The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
the 1967 Protocol required states to allow refuges to work and engage in wage-
earning employment, including the right to self-employment (United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 2010). Australia is seeking out skilled 
workers and has no restrictions set on any positions available to immigrants other 
than national security positions or the number of immigrants who can work in a 
given firm.  
Family: 3.  Australia’s migration program has a family stream that includes partner 
visas. These visas allow Australians to connect with their family members from 
overseas, in addition to providing a pathway to citizenship. (Australian Government 
2018) An immigrant applying for his or her own visa “can include his or her spouse 
or partner (except in the case of the woman at risk visa), dependent children, and 
other dependent relatives in the visa application” (Buchanan 2013). 
Refugee: 3.  According to the Migration Act 1958, to be considered a refugee and 
be granted a protection visa, an individual must fear prosecution or serious harm 
based on their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, 
or political opinion and must not have committed a crime against peace, a war 
crime, a crime against humanity, or any serious crime before entering Australia 
(Australian Government 2019). The Refugee and Humanitarian Program holds 
18,750 places for refugees. No test is required to receive a protection visa.  







Asylum: 4.  There are three visas set up for those seeking asylum: permanent 
protection visa, temporary protection visa, and safe haven enterprise visa. Once one 
has applied for a protection visa, they may receive financial assistance, health care, 
and help with other visa-related costs through the Asylum Seeker Assistance 
Scheme. With a protection visa, one is allowed to live, work, and study in Australia 
permanently (Buchanan 2016). There are 18,750 places available for all refugees 
and asylees. Since 2014, those seeking asylum in Australia without a valid visa are 
taken to a third country for processing and resettlement and are not able to apply 
for visas in Australia (Australian Government 2018). 
Citizenship: 4.  According to the Australian Citizenship Act 2007, a person born in 
the country is automatically an Australian citizen only if one parent is an Australian 
citizen or permanent resident. Anyone with a permanent residence visa who 
“[satisfies] residence requirements, [is] of good character, possess[es] a ‘basic 
knowledge of the English language,’ and [has] ‘an adequate knowledge of Australia 
and of the responsibilities and privileges of Australian citizenship’ ” can obtain 
citizenship. Those applying for citizenship must also pass a citizenship test and 
have lived in the country for at least four years (Buchanan 2013). 
Immigrant Rights: 3.  Some rights given to migrants include visa and travel costs, 
access to the Australian Cultural Orientation Program (a five-day course designed 
to prepare visa holders to travel to Australia and settle in; to provide information 
on laws, values, lifestyle; and more), and access to the Adult Migrant English 
Program (510 free hours delivered by the Department of Education and Training). 
In addition to those programs, refugees are able to apply for government payments 
and for access to Australia’s national health care system, Medicare.  
The Humanitarian Settlement Services Program is a voluntary program 
delivered by a nongovernment service provider. The program includes arrival 
reception and assistance; help finding accommodation; property induction; an 
initial food package and start-up pack of household goods; orientation information 
and training; help registering with Medicare, health services, welfare, banks, and 
schools; and help linking with community and recreational programs (Buchanan 
2013). 
Deportation: 4.  The minister may order the deportation of a noncitizen according 
to Division 9 of the Migration Act. Deportation can occur if a noncitizen is 
convicted of a serious offense. 
Unlawful noncitizens are subject to mandatory immigration detention, 
during which detention they can apply for a visa. A person may be held in detention 







until he or she is granted a visa or is deported. There is no limit to the length of time 
that a person may be held in immigration detention (Buchanan 2013).  
Enforcement: 2.  The Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Centrelink, the 
Australian Taxation Office, and the Australian federal and state police all work on 
locating unlawful noncitizens, including those who are illegally employed or who 
claim welfare payments to which they are not entitled (Buchanan 2013). 
The Australian Border Force is located in all Australia’s major and regional 
international airports; more than 60 international seaports around the country, 
including those in remote areas such as mining ports; and locations where 
international air and sea cargo, including mail, are processed after import or before 
export (Australian Border Force 2018). Border Force officers check the identities 
of all travelers and ensure that those travelers have relevant travel documentation 
in place. Officers also examine people, baggage, aircraft, ships, and small craft for 
drugs, tobacco, and prohibited goods and images, and they seize illegal goods and 
regulated items, among performing other checks. The Counter Terrorism Units help 
with inbound and outbound national security risks and are located around 
Australia’s international airports and airports that operate international sectors 
(Australian Border Force 2018). 
In 2013, Australia launched the National Security Strategy. The Strategy 
works on the increasing movement of people and goods to Australia, growth in 
transnational crime, and “ongoing irregular migration patterns,” including 
increasing use of risk-based systems to target threats; enhancing cooperation across 
border security, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies; cooperating with 
regional partners to counter people smuggling; and implementing the 
recommendation of the Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers (Buchanan 
2013). 
Brazil 
Score: 3.1 (See Table B.3) 
Nationality: 4.  Brazil has no laws or restrictions on nationalities allowed in. 
Skill/Income: 1.  Brazil focuses on highly skilled workers (Meyer 2010). 
Quota: 4.  Brazil has no quota for the number of people who can enter annually.  
Work Prohibitions: 5.  According to Brazil’s general immigration policy, aliens 
need to have authorization to work. Tourist-, transit-, or temporary-visa holders 
cannot work (Soares 2013). Since the New Migration Law came into effect in 2017, 







temporary visa holders can be eligible for work with or without an employee 
contract. Instead, they only need to prove they have a higher-degree diploma or 
equivalent (Brazil Immigration 2018). 
Family: 4.  Brazil’s law allows a refugee to include many members of the refugee’s 
family as long as the members are economically dependent on that refugee (Soares 
2013). 
Refugee: 3.  The aliens statue of 1980’s Law No. 6,815 defined the legal situation 
of aliens in Brazil and created the National Council of Immigration. Under this law, 
political asylees must abide by international and domestic laws. Brazil also has a 
humanitarian visa for refugees (Soares 2013).  
Of 33,660 asylum applications in 2017, Brazil accepted 546. Brazil was 
selective, allowing in people from Syria, Nigeria, Congo, Guinea, Pakistan, 
Lebanon, Cameroon, Egypt, Iraq, Mali, and Sudan. As of 2015, a total of 713,568 
migrants lived in Brazil (World Data 2017). 
Asylum: 2.  Being granted asylum in Brazil is a difficult process. Decree No. 
42,628, of November 13, 1957, promulgated the Convention of Diplomatic Asylum 
and laid out the asylum process. Each state is not obligated to grant asylum or to 
give reason for refusal. Additionally, asylum may not be given except in emergency 
cases (Soares 2013). Though the process is very difficult and many are not allowed 
in, “[applicants] can appeal to the Minister of Justice within fifteen days from the 
receipt of the notification” (Soares 2013). 
Citizenship: 4.  Gaining citizenship in Brazil is moderately difficult. Decree No. 
6,815, of August 19,1980, laid out citizenship requirements. There is a language 
requirement, and the applicant must have residence for four years, along with other 
requirements, such as having a suitable job and good behavior and health (Soares 
2013). 
Immigrant Rights: 4.  Immigrants in Brazil have many rights, equal to those of 
Brazilian citizens (Soares 2013). Rights include access to welfare and right to 
ownership of property. Non-Brazilian citizens are not able to vote.  
Deportation: 3.  The Ministry of Justice is in charge of deportation, and the Federal 
Police are in charge of arresting and deporting aliens. The Brazilian Penal Code 
(1940) is followed for deportation, and those deported include those who illegally 
enter, who act against national security or public order, or who demonstrate other 
intolerable behavior (Soares 2013).  







Enforcement: 2.  Overall, border enforcement is strong in Brazil. The Northern 
Border Protection’s 1985 Projecto Calha Norte put military units along the Brazil 
border. The Northern Border Protection, Amazon Surveillance, Airspace 
Protection, and the Strategic Border Plan all work together to enforce immigration 
policies and border enforcement (Soares 2013).  
Brazil has more than 10,000 miles of borderland shared with 10 countries. 
Only about 4,000 miles (in the populous and developed southern zone) has been 
defended regularly by the army. Brazil has a total of 23 official border crossing 
points; the rest of the country’s borders are wide open, and many groups have routes 
to smuggle people and goods into Brazil (Cope and Parks 2014). 
China 
Score: 2.6 (See Table B.4) 
Nationality: 4.  China lets in people of almost all nationalities (CIA 2019; Haimei 
2011). 
Skill/Income: 2.  China primarily focuses on obtaining highly skilled workers but 
also looks to the economy and social needs for what kind of jobs are available and 
need to be filled, as shown in the Exit and Entry Administration Law of People’s 
Republic of China (Jintao 2013). 
Quota: 5.  China has no quota for what percentage of the population can enter 
annually. 
Work Prohibitions: 5.  Immigrants welcomed into the country for the labor market 
are not restricted to positions they can hold or by number of immigrants allowed to 
work in a given occupation. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR 2010) 
requires states to allow refugees to work. Article 17 states that each state shall give 
refugees the right to engage in wage-earning employment, including the right to 
self-employment (UNHCR 2010). 
Family: 3.  China’s permanent resident rules (2004) allow for spouses and 
unmarried children under the age of 18 to apply for permanent residence at the same 
time as the alien applying. A spouse who has been married to a permanent resident 
for five years and has a stable income and housing, any unmarried children under 
the age of 18, and direct relatives 60 years old who have no other relatives in China 
are all eligible to apply for permanent residence (Global Legal Research Directorate 
Staff 2014). 







Refugee: 2.  Entering China as a refugee may be very difficult. Article 19 of the 
Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China states that 
foreigners applying for visas “need to provide written invitation issued by entities 
or individuals within China” (Jintao 2013). As of 1982, China does follow the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, adopting the UN definition of refugee (UNHCR 2010). 
As of June 2015, China had 301,057 refugees (Zhang 2016). Refugee 
registration and refugee status are conducted by the UNHCR Beijing office. Article 
46 of the Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China 
allows those applying for refugee status to stay in China while the screening process 
is being conducted (Jintao 2013). 
Asylum: 2.  Article 15 of Order No. 31 (1985) states, “Aliens who seek asylum for 
political reasons shall be permitted to reside in China upon approval by the 
competent authorities of the Chinese Government.” Domestic law regarding 
refugees and asylum is still under development. The 2012 Law on the 
Administration of Exit and Entry allows refugees and asylum seekers to obtain ID 
cards (Jintao 2013). 
Citizenship: 3.  The process of naturalization is very difficult and is rarely granted. 
The Nationality Law of 1980 lays out the process of naturalization. Naturalization 
is not very common other than through marriage or through great contribution; 
however, a foreign national or stateless person who will obey China’s constitution 
and laws and who is a close relative to a Chinese national, has settled in China, and 
has other legitimate reasons may be naturalized (Zhang 2015). 
Immigrant Rights: 2.  Article 46 of the Exit and Entry Law gives refugees and 
asylum seekers the right to ID cards, along with the possibility of the right to work 
and the right to education (Zhang 2016). Chinese law includes nothing about giving 
immigrants the right to welfare, property, or religion (Jintao 2013). 
Deportation: 2.  Articles 4 and 29 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Control of the Entry and Exit of Aliens lay out the guidelines for deportation and 
arrests. Article 4 lays out the rights of aliens on Chinese territory, and Article 29 
lays out the consequences for those who enter illegally. 
Enforcement: 1.  The Public Security Border Control Troops (People’s Armed 
Police Border Control Troops) enforce China’s land and coastal borders and 
maritime security. This includes border inspections to prevent illegal border 
crossings, drug trafficking, and smuggling, and organization of and participation in 
counterterrorist and emergency-management operations (Zhang 2015). 







China has border control stations at all major Chinese airports, seaports, and 
land border stations. The Ministry of Public Security staffed the professional police 
into its border police force. Now, General Border Inspection Stations are in nine 
major cities: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, 
Haikou, and Shantou (Zhang 2015). 
Germany 
Score: 3.2 (See Table B.5) 
Nationality: 4.  Germany welcomes almost all nationalities.   
Skill/Income: 2.  Germany limits acceptance of immigrants to skilled workers 
needed by German employers (Palmer 2013). Section 19 of the Residence Act of 
2004 allows permanent settlement permits for highly qualified foreigners (Bottcher 
2018). 
Quota: 5.  Germany has no quota system.  
Work Prohibitions: 5.  The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees requires states to allow 
refugees to work; Article 17 states that each state shall give refugees the right to 
engage in wage-earning employment, including the right to self-employment 
(UNHCR 2010). Germany has no restrictions on what or how many positions can 
be held by immigrants in any given firm.  
Family: 2.  Section 104, Transitional provisions, of the Residence Act explains 
which family members of immigrants can also become residents of Germany; 
“spouses, registered same-sex partners, minor children, and parents of minor 
children are considered family members” (Global Legal Research Directorate Staff 
2014). 
Refugee: 2.  Germany’s Asylum Act (2008) and the UN definition of refugee 
(Convention of 1951 on legal status of refugees) lay out the definition for refugees, 
and the requirements. The Residence Act of 2004 lays out the current immigration 
system. Before this, Germany was not very welcome to immigrants. The Residence 
Act “promotes integration by shortening the periods of residence required before 
granting permanent status and by requiring language skills and acculturation for 
renewals of residence permits” (Gesley 2016). 
Asylum: 4.  The Acceleration of Asylum Procedures 2015 “amended several laws 
in order to accelerate the asylum process; substitute in-kind benefits for cash 
benefits; reduce the financial burden on the German states and municipalities; 







reform integration policies for refugees.” Asylum seekers receive essential items 
such as food, housing, heat, clothing, health care, and household items in the form 
of vouchers. The Federal Employment Agency assumes costs for integration and 
for language classes for asylum seekers who are likely to be approved. The right to 
asylum is a constitutional right in Germany and is granted to everyone who flees 
political persecution (Gesley 2016). 
Citizenship: 4.  To acquire German citizenship, candidates must qualify via 
naturalization, right of blood, or right of soil. To qualify via naturalization, seekers 
must live in the country for eight or more years, be German-language proficient, be 
financially stable, pass a citizenship test, and renounce any previous citizenships. 
By right of blood, a candidate can only be a direct descendant of German citizens—
only parents. By right of soil, a candidate must be born within the borders of 
Germany (Germany Visa 2019). 
Immigrant Rights: 2.  The Asylum Seeker Benefits Act of August 5, 1997, provides 
refugees and asylum seekers with food, housing, clothing, health care, and 
household items (Gesley 2016). 
Deportation: 3.  On the grounds of public security and order, deportation is allowed 
if someone has entered illegally, hasn’t applied for residence, or needs to return to 
a different member state. It would become necessary to leave the country with the 
denial of residence title (Bottcher 2018). 
Enforcement: 4.  Because Germany is a member of the Schengen Agreement (1985) 
and shares borders with Poland, Czechia, Switzerland, Austria, France, Belgium, 
and Luxembourg, the country does not maintain border checkpoints. Germany 
relies on Schengen countries with external borders to enforce immigration and 
customs laws. Germany’s only external borders are on the coasts of the North and 
Baltic Seas and international airports. The German Federal Police still have the 
responsibility of protecting borders against illegality, such as via random checks of 
the border area (Palmer 2013). 
Rwanda 
Score: 3.2 (See Table B.6) 
Nationality: 4.  Rwanda welcomes people of almost all nationalities. The country 
started issuing visas to Africans in 2013 (Mpirwa 2018). 
Skill/Income: 1.  The National Migration Policy is aimed at attracting skilled 
workers, promoting investment and tourism, and enhancing national security. 







Immigration policy was designed in an effort to merge Rwanda’s development 
strategies with the flow of people into the country (Immigration in Rwanda 2016).  
Quota: 5.  Rwanda has no quota on the percent of the population who can enter 
annually. 
Work Prohibitions: 5.  Rwanda has no restrictions on which positions immigrants 
can hold or how many immigrant workers can be in a given occupation.  
Family: 2.  Law No. 17/99 of 1999 on Immigration and Emigration (Chapter 3) 
focuses on the control of entry in the country, including family entry: “Article 14: 
On returning to Rwanda, wherever they are coming from, Rwandans and members 
of their families must be in possession of a passport or another document replacing 
the passport. Article 15: Entry in Rwanda following the clauses of article 14 of this 
law is also allowed to foreign residents in Rwanda as well as members of their 
families.” In this law, “family” refers to spouses as well as to children aged less 
than 21 years of age. 
Refugee: 5.  The UNHCR provides cash assistance for refugees returning to 
Rwanda after 1999 from the Rwandan genocide. These refugees also receive three 
months of food rations and a year of health insurance. A total of 3,454,864 refugees 
have returned since 1994 (UNHCR 2018a,b). Hosting more than 150,000 refugees, 
Rwanda gives refugees the right to do business, as well as access to health services 
and insurance, banking, and education (Wachiaya, 2019). 
Asylum: n/a.  Asylum is not mentioned in Rwandan law; it therefore is not counted 
as a category in this study.  
Citizenship: 4.  To become naturalized, a person must be over 18 years of age, have 
good behavior, not be a burden to the nation, know Kinyarwanda, and present a 
receipt of payment to the Public Treasury. Natural status is determined by an Order 
of the Minister. A child born in Rwanda from an unknown or stateless parent cannot 
have citizenship (Republic of Rwanda 2004). 
Immigrant Rights: 4.  Refugees have the right to do business and to access health 
services and insurance, banking, and education (Wachiaya, 2019). 
Deportation: 3.  Any undesirable foreign person will be turned back from Rwanda 
as stipulated in Article 13 of Law No. 17/99 of 1999 on Immigration and 
Emigration. Anyone who enters illegally will be deported and may be penalized 
with imprisonment for anywhere from 15 days to 3 months, or with a fine of ten to 
five hundred thousand francs. 







Enforcement: 4.  Rwanda has an open border and secure country policy. Rwanda 
has some border enforcement with 17 border points, but there is little enforcement 
at the borders and screening points. The National Migration Policy described some 
of the nation’s constraints on creating strong staff and borders: there is a lack of 
secure infrastructure, qualified and trained personnel, and equipment for proper 
border clearance. 
Rwanda has been hosting thousands of refugees for decades and today is 
home to more than 170,000 refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from Burundi and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The government supports the 
refugee response through provision of land for reception centers and refugee camps; 
it leads camp management and coordination and has demonstrated a progressive 
approach to refugees by committing to include them in national systems such as 
health insurance and education. 
Sweden 
Score: 3.9 (See Table B.7) 
Nationality: 4.  Sweden allows in people of almost all nationalities. The five largest 
countries of origin among asylum seekers were Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, 
and Somalia (Hofverberg 2016). 
Skill/Income: 3.  Sweden has some preference toward skilled workers, especially 
specialists, but does let in lower-skilled workers (Swedish Migration Agency 
2019). 
Quota: 5.  Sweden has a quota of 1,900 for refugees, which will gradually increase 
to 5,000, but does not have a quota system for immigrants as a whole.  
Work Prohibitions: 5.  The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees requires states to allow 
refugees to work; Article 17 states that each state shall give refugees the right to 
engage in wage-earning employment, including the right to self-employment 
(UNHCR 2010). Sweden does not have any restrictions on what occupations 
immigrants can hold or on the number of immigrants allowed to work in a given 
occupation.  
Family: 2.  Family members who can be brought along are current or future spouses 
or cohabitants, as well as biological children under the age of 18 or children of the 
spouse/cohabitant (Global Legal Research Directorate Staff 2014). 







Refugee: 3.  Sweden adopted the Protocol from the Geneva Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, recognizing the UN definition of a refugee. Sweden has a 
refugee quota starting at 1,900 but will increase that to the 5,000 given by the 
UNHCR program. These quota refugees are first screened by the UNHCR through 
in-person interviews or through a review of documents (Hofverberg 2016). 
Asylum: 4.  In 2015, Sweden received approximately 160,000 applications for 
asylum. Seekers are given free housing, health and dental care, and schooling for 
children ages pre-kindergarten to 20 (Hafverberg 2016). Those seeking asylum may 
be refused if they are deemed a refugee or in need of a subsidiary protection in an 
EU member state or a third country, or if the person can be sent to a country where 
they can apply for asylum (Hofverberg 2016). 
Citizenship: 5.  According to the Swedish Citizenship Act (2001), to be naturalized, 
one must provide proof of identity; be over the age of 18; hold a permanent Swedish 
resident permit; have been domiciled in Sweden for the previous two years if a 
Danish, Finnish, Icelandic, or Norwegian citizen, four years if a stateless person 
under the Aliens Act (2005), or five years for other aliens; and have led and be 
expected to lead a respectable life (Ministry of Industry 2001). 
Immigrant Rights: 4.  Article 3 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees lays out 
nondiscrimination agreements in which the state will not discriminate based on 
race, religion, or country of origin (UNHCR 2010). 
Asylum seekers receive monetary aid (free housing and monetary support 
while their applications are being processed), health and dental care (Health Care 
Act and the Act on Health Care for Asylum Seekers), schooling, housing, passports, 
and priority in schools with waiting lists (Hafverberg 2016). 
Deportation: 5.  Detention orders are most frequently issued by the Swedish 
Migration Agency (Migrationsverket, formerly the Migration Board) or the Police 
Authority. Detainees have access to an oral hearing before each review. The Aliens 
Act provides that migration detainees should be appointed a public counsel after 
three days in detention (Global Detention Project 2018). 
Enforcement: 4.  The Security Police, founded in 1989, can review applications and 
advise against the granting of asylum in certain cases to ensure that those who can 
be potential threats will not be given permanent residency rights or citizenship 
(Hafverberg 2016). 







In November 2015, the Swedish government decided to reintroduce border 
controls at the internal border, meaning borders to other Schengen countries, at 
select border crossings. Persons entering Sweden need to show proof of the right to 
enter and stay in the country (e.g., by providing a passport or national ID card). 
Persons traveling to or from Sweden across an internal border are therefore advised 
to bring a passport or national ID card. The regulations surrounding external and 
internal border control are stipulated in the Schengen Borders Code, regulation 
(EU) 2016/399 (Border Control).  
United States 
Score: 2.7 (See Table B.8) 
Nationality: 3.  Several laws over the years had been created to exclude certain 
nationalities. The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act gave back opportunities 
for Asians to immigrate into the United States. There was a quota of 100 visas per 
year. Executive Order 13780 of March 6, 2017 (Protecting the Nation from Foreign 
Terrorist Entry into the United States) has suspended and limited people of the 
following countries from entering the United States: Chad, Iran, Libya, North 
Korea, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, and Somalia (Trump 2017). 
Skill/Income: 2.  The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act created a preference 
system to prioritize visa applicants in countries with heavily oversubscribed quotas. 
Individuals with special skills of families already residing in the United States had 
precedence. This preference is still enacted today (Office of the Historian N.d.b). 
Temporary visas are available for both high-skilled and lesser-skilled employment, 
but the visa holders must leave once their status expires or if their employment is 
terminated. The permanent employment-based visas are divided into five 
preference categories (American Immigration Council 2016). 
Quota: 1.  The Immigration Act of 1992 was the first act to limit the number of 
immigrants allowed entry into the United States through a national origins quota 
(Office of the Historian N.d.a). The United States has an annual worldwide limit of 
675,000 permanent immigrants, with an additional 50,000 refugee spots (American 
Immigration Council 2016); 140,000 visas are available for permanent 
employment-based immigrants. With a population of 327.2 million, only 0.002% 
of the population can enter annually.  
Work Prohibitions: 5.  Typically, non-U.S. citizens cannot work for the federal 
government.  







Family: 3.  The United States has a family-preference system determined in the 
Immigration Act of 1990. One may bring immediate relatives as long as they are 
spouses of U.S. citizens, unmarried minor children of U.S. citizens under the age 
of 21, and parents of U.S. citizens. The family-preference system includes adult 
children (married and unmarried) and brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens, as well 
as spouses and unmarried children (minor and adults) of a lawful permanent 
resident. There are 480,000 preference-system visas available (American 
Immigration Council 2016). 
Refugee: 3.  Following the Vietnam War, the Refugee Act of 1980 raised the annual 
ceiling for refugees from 17,400 to 50,000 in addition to changing the definition of 
refugee to that established by the United Nations’ 1951 conventions and 1967 
protocols (U.S. Congress 1980). During the Obama administration, the refugee 
ceiling was set at 110,000, but the Trump administration reduced it to 50,000. In 
addition to reducing the refugee admission ceiling, the Trump administration also 
suspended the entire U.S. refugee admissions program for 120 days in 2017 and 
has indefinitely suspended the entry of Syrian refugees (American Immigration 
Council 2018b). 
Asylum: 4.  Those seeking asylum may apply at any port of entry or within one year 
of arriving to the United States. There are no limitations of the number of 
individuals able to be granted asylum in a given year (American Immigration 
Council 2016). To be considered an asylee, one must have credible and reasonable 
fear during the screening processes.  
According to the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act, all individuals who seek asylum at ports of entry will be 
detained and will remain there even after officials have confirmed their claims are 
credible. Some applicants are released if deemed unlikely to flee and as not posing 
a safety threat. The denial rate of asylum cases was at 61.8 percent as of 2017 (Cepla 
2019). 
Asylees can work, can apply for Social Security cards, can petition to bring 
family members to the United States, and may be eligible for benefits such as 
Medicaid or Refugee Medical Assistance (American Immigration Council 2018b). 
Citizenship: 4.  According to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (§1401) 
regarding nationals and citizens of the United States, anyone born in the United 
States is a U.S. citizen, and anyone who is born outside of the United States but has 
a parent who is a citizen is a U.S. citizen. The 1952 Immigration and Nationality 
Act lays out the requirements that one must fulfill to become naturalized in the 







United States. One must have an understanding of the English language (reading, 
writing, and speaking), along with an understanding of the fundamentals of the 
history and the principles and form of government. Additionally, a person must 
have lived in the United States for at least five years with no absence greater than 
six months in a one-year period and must also be of good moral character (Office 
of the Historian N.d.b). 
Immigrant Rights: 3.  The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act established 
the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) Program, “a system for 
verifying the immigration status of non-citizenship applicants for, and recipients 
of, certain types of federally funded benefits … available to federal, state, and local 
benefit-granting agencies” (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2017). 
SAVE could be used for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act for health 
benefits. Immigrants with lawful permanent resident status are eligible for federal 
public benefit programs only after five years; however, immigrants are eligible for 
some state benefit programs (Cerza 2018).  
Asylees can work, apply for Social Security cards, and petition to bring 
family members to the United States, and they may be eligible for benefits such as 
Medicaid or Refugee Medical Assistance (American Immigration Council 2018a). 
Anyone on a temporary work visa must leave the country if they leave or are fired 
from their job. Immigrants do have constitutional rights. 
Deportation: 3.  The United States deports foreign nationals who commit crimes, 
are threats to public safety, or violate their visas. The Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 allows for the deportation of an 
undocumented immigrant who commits a misdemeanor or a felony. According to 
the American Immigration Council (2016), “Temporary work visas allow for the 
deportation of holders if their employment is terminated.”  
Individuals who enter the United States without travel documents may be 
deported without an immigration court hearing or may go before a judge through 
the Immigration Court of the U.S. Department of Justice. Others who are facing 
deportation and feel that their civil rights are being violated may file complaints 
with the Department of Homeland Security. An undocumented immigrant is able 
to go through an adjustment-of-status process to get a green card through a petition 
by a family member or through asylum. Appeal of a deportation order is allowed, 
and those who wish to appeal may seek legal advice through nonprofit 
organizations (United States Government 2018). 







Enforcement: 1.  The Department of Homeland Security was founded in 2002. It 
had a budget of $55.1 billion for 2010. Total staffing for border control was 20,558. 
(U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2018). As of 2019, the projected budget for 
the Department of Homeland Security is $47.5 billion, with an additional $6.7 
billion for the Disaster Relief Fund. This budget is to “focus on strengthening the 
security of our Nation through increased emphasis on border security, immigration 
enforcement, cybersecurity and improving our overall law enforcement and 
national security posture.” Total staffing in 2017 was 19,437 (U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection 2018). 
Results 
Every country had the same value (5) for work prohibitions, so the category 
had to be thrown out because of zero variance. A bivariate correlation test through 
the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was conducted for each country 
to determine if any significant correlation existed between the number of attacks in 
a country and the restrictiveness of policies through the years. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no difference or correlation between the number of terrorist attacks 
and the policy-restrictiveness score.  
The bivariate correlation tests showed no statistical significance for 
Australia, Brazil, Germany, Rwanda, or Sweden (see Tables C.1, C.2, and C.4–
C.6). There is no relation between the number of attacks and the restrictiveness of 
these countries’ policies. Test for both China and the United States showed 
statistical significance (see Tables C.3 and C.7). The test for China demonstrated 
statistical significance at the 0.01 level, showing a correlation between the number 
of attacks and the restirctiveness of China’s policies. The test for the United States 
demonstrated statistical significance at the 0.05 level, showing a correlation 
between the number of attacks and the restrictiveness of U.S. policies. Although 
statistical significance was proven, the kind of correlation is not shown.  
The United States and China showed statistical significance in the bivariate 
correlation tests. To determine what that correlation is, curve estimations in SPSS 
were used to show the linear regression between the number of attacks per year and 
the restrictiveness of policies. The curve estimation for China shows a negative 
correlation: as the restrictiveness score becomes more liberal, the number of attacks 
per year decreases, on average (see Table D.1 and Graph D.1). The curve estimation 
for the United States also shows a negative correlation, in which the number of 
attacks per year decreases on average as the restrictiveness score becomes more 
liberal (see Table D.2 and Graph D.2). 







Australia, Brazil, Germany, Rwanda, and Sweden showed no correlation 
between number of terrorist attacks and their policy scores. I failed to reject the null 
hypothesis for these countries. China and the United States have the two lowest 
current immigration-policy scores, with 2.6 and 2.7 respectively. Both China and 
the United States showed the same results: as the policy-restrictiveness score 
increases, meaning policy is more liberal, the number of terrorist attacks per year 
decreases. I rejected the null hypothesis for both China and the United States and 
accepted the alternative hypothesis that a difference/correlation does exist between 
the number of attacks and a country’s policy-restrictiveness score.  
I combined all the terrorist attacks with their corresponding policy score. 
After a bivariate correlation test was conducted, results showed statistical 
significance at the 0.01 level for the correlation between the number of attacks and 
the restrictiveness-policy score (see Table C.8). To determine what the correlation 
was, a curve estimation test was conducted and revealed the same results as those 
for previous tests for the United States and China: a negative correlation. As the 
policy score increases, the number of terrorist attacks decrease (see Table D.3 and 
Graph D.3). 
According to tests for the United States, China, and the total combined 
countries (Australia, Brazil, China, Germany, Sweden, Rwanda, and the United 
States), the more restrictive border security and immigration policy are, the more 
terrorist attacks there are. Though causation has not been found, a correlation has 
been found between policy/border security and terrorist attacks. On average, the 
more liberal a policy or border security is, the fewer terrorist attacks there will be. 
China and the United States had maximum policy scores below 3, however. It is 
unclear how extreme a policy may get before more terrorist attacks may occur. 
Discussion 
The question I sought to answer was “How do border security and 
immigration policy affect terrorism across borders?” I found that the more 
restrictive border security and immigration policy are, the more terrorist attacks 
there are.  
Previous research done by Choi (2018:14) discussed the struggle that 
countries have in finding a balance between liberal and conservative policies: “On 
the one hand, terrorism is likely to decrease when states impose immigration 
restrictions based on skill or wealth, or when states offer immigrants limited legal 
rights that permit only restricted residence and designated employers. On the other 







hand, terrorism is expected to increase when states allow no special visas or 
procedures to recruit immigrants, or when states give workers citizenship only 
when they are born to a native parent.” The findings from this study have shown 
the more liberal to moderate the policy, the fewer terrorist attacks there are. Choi 
makes a good argument on the balance that needs to be found. This research agrees 
with Choi’s findings.  
There are many variables other than policy and border security that could 
also contribute to the number of terrorist attacks that a country experiences. Some 
include country relations, stability of the government, and political environment, 
among numerous others. Additional research could control for those additional 
factors or for certain aspects of the restrictiveness of immigration policy and border 
security to see if a strong correlation exists between a certain aspect rather than the 
policy as a whole. Furthermore, more countries could be studied to see if this 
correlation continues. Although this research attempted to get a wide variety of 
countries from all over the world, the countries studied did tend to be larger and 
more resourceful. Some countries that could potentially provide more in-depth 
information and have significantly more terrorist attacks may have a lack of 
resources to provide their policies to the public. Future research could also delve 
even more into border security. In this research, the border-security aspect fell 
mostly into the enforcement category of the policy-restrictiveness score. Although 
this information was necessary, there is the possibility that border security could be 
broadened and researched in greater detail. Future research with regard to border 
security could encompass the number of enforcements on the borders, the number 
of apprehensions made, the number of checkpoints located around the country, and 
the types of checkpoints, along with others.  
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Terrorist Attacks 1970–2017 (Global Terrorism Database) 
Year AU BR CH DE RW SE US Year AU BR CH DE RW SE US 
1970 1 6 0 0 0 1 469 1994 8 19 12 79 33 1 55 
1971 1 3 0 0 0 2 247 1995 5 23 8 147 17 1 60 
1972 8 3 0 0 0 3 68 1996 5 18 64 52 15 1 35 
1973 2 5 0 0 0 0 58 1997 4 49 18 12 33 4 40 
1974 1 0 0 0 0 0 94 1998 6 2 2 6 9 0 31 
1975 0 0 0 0 0 1 149 1999 0 1 2 13 0 2 53 
1976 0 5 0 0 0 0 105 2000 1 2 4 8 1 1 32 
1977 0 1 0 0 0 0 130 2001 2 3 12 8 1 0 41 
1978 2 5 0 0 0 1 87 2002 0 1 2 3 0 0 33 
1979 2 6 0 0 0 1 69 2003 0 1 3 2 0 0 33 
1980 6 19 0 0 0 0 67 2004 0 0 2 3 0 0 9 
1981 1 11 0 0 0 0 74 2005 0 0 1 3 1 3 21 
1982 2 4 0 0 0 0 78 2006 2 3 0 4 0 1 6 
1983 0 8 0 0 0 1 44 2007 0 0 0 3 0 0 8 
1984 0 5 0 0 0 0 63 2008 3 0 20 3 1 1 18 
1985 0 1 0 0 0 0 39 2009 1 0 7 4 1 1 11 
1986 2 3 0 0 0 3 49 2010 1 0 1 1 8 3 17 
1987 0 1 0 0 0 0 34 2011 0 0 4 8 2 1 10 
1988 3 2 0 0 0 0 27 2012 0 1 4 5 6 2 20 
1989 2 5 3 0 0 3 42 2013 1 3 12 0 4 0 19 
1990 0 7 1 0 0 6 32 2014 8 3 37 13 2 5 29 







1991 4 24 1 65 2 6 30 2015 14 5 6 65 0 32 38 
1992 4 23 5 156 18 12 32 2016 9 2 6 44 1 16 64 
1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2017 3 2 6 27 2 18 65 
 
Appendix B 
Country Policy Scores 
 Australia Brazil China Germany Rwanda Sweden United States 
Nationality 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 
Skill/Income 1 2 2 2 1 3 2 
Quota 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 
Work Prohibitions 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Family 3 4 3 2 2 2 3 
Refugee 3 2 2 3 5 3 3 
Asylum 4 2 2 4 5 4 4 
Citizenship 4 4 3 4 5 4 4 
Immigrant Rights 3 4 2 2 4 4 3 
Deportation 4 3 2 3 3 5 3 
Enforcement 2 2 1 4 4 4 1 
Average Score 2.9 3.1 2.6 3.2 3.2 3.9 2.7 
Table B.1. All Countries’ Immigration Policy Scores 
Note: Given that the score for work prohibitions was the same for every country, it has 
been removed from the data analysis because of zero variance.  
 
Policy Overview and Preliminary Scores  
Each year presented in the table represents the year a new policy was 











 1951 1958 1994 2007 2014 
Nationality 4 4 4 4 4 
Skill/Income  1 1 1 1 
Quota 1 1 1 1 1 
Family    3 3 3 
Refugee  3 3 3 3 3 
Asylum  4 4 4 4 4 
Citizenship    4 4 
Immigrant Rights 3 3 3 3 3 
Deportation  4 4 4 4 
Enforcement  3 3 3 2 
Average  3 2.87 2.89 3 2.9 
Table B.2. Policy Scale Scores for Australia 
 
 1937 1940 1951 1957 1965 1980 1981 1985 1993 1997 2011 2017 
Nationality 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Skill/Income      1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Quota 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Family           4 4 4 
Refugee    3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Asylum  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Citizenship      4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Immigrant 
Rights 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Deportation  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Enforcement        2 2 2 2 2 
Average  3.75 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.25 3.12 3 3 3.1 3.1 3.1 












 1951 1980 1985 2000 2004 2013 
Nationality 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Skill/Income   2 2 2 2 
Quota 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Family      3 3 
Refugee  3 3 3 3 3 2 
Asylum    2 2 2 2 
Citizenship    3 3 3 
Immigrant Rights 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Deportation      2 
Enforcement       
Average 3 3 2.7 2.75 2.78 2.6 
Table B.4. Policy Scale Scores for China 
 
Table B.5. Policy Scale Scores for Germany 
 
 1999 2004 2005 2014 
Nationality 4 4 4 4 
Skill/Income   1 1 
Quota 5 5 5 5 
 1913 1951 1985 1986 1990 1997 2001 2004 2008 2015 2017 
Nationality 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Skill/Income        2 2 2 2 
Quota 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Family         2 2 2 2 
Refugee   3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Asylum           4 4 
Citizenship 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Immigrant 
Rights 
     2 2 2 2 2 2 
Deportation       3 3 3 3 3 
Enforcement   4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Average  4.3 4 4 4 4 3.67 3.57 3.11 3.11 3.2 3.2 







Family  2 2 2 2 
Refugee  5 5 5 5 
Asylum  -------------- --------------- --------------- -------------- 
Citizenship  4 4 4 
Immigrant 
Rights 
   4 
Deportation 3 3 3 3 
Enforcement   4 4 
Average  3.8 3.83 3.5 3.56 
Table B.6. Policy Scale Scores for Rwanda 
 
 1951 1982 1989 2001 2003 2005 2008 2010 2015 2016 
Nationality 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Skill/Income           
Quota 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Family      2 2 2 2 2 2 
Refugee  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Asylum   4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Citizenship    5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Immigrant 
Rights 
 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Deportation      5 5 5 5 5 
Enforcement   4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Average  3.75 3.83 3.86 4 3.78 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Table B.7. Policy Scale Scores for Sweden 
 
 1924 1951 1952 1975 1980 1986 1990 1996 2001 2002 2006 
Nationality   3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Skill/Income   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Quota 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Family        3 3 3 3 3 
Refugee   3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Asylum         4 4 4 4 
Citizenship   4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 









     3 3 3 3 3 3 
Deportation        3 3 3 3 
Enforcement          1 1 
Average  1 2 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.67 2.71 2.89 2.89 2.7 2.7 
Table B.8. Policy Scale Scores for the United States 
 
Appendix C  
Attacks on Countries Compared to Country Policies 
 
 Attacks Policy  
Attacks Pearson Correlation 1 –.086 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .560 
N 48 48 
Policy Pearson Correlation -.086 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .560  
N 48 48 
Table C.1. Attacks vs. Policy in Australia 
 
 Attacks Policy  
Attacks Pearson Correlation 1 –.150 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .310 
N 48 48 
Policy Pearson Correlation –.150 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .310  
N 48 48 
Table C.2. Attacks vs. Policy in Brazil 







 Attacks Policy  
Attacks Pearson Correlation 1 –.370** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .010 
N 48 48 
Policy Pearson Correlation –.370** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .010  
N 48 48 
Table C.3. Attacks vs. Policy in China 
 
 Attacks Policy  
Attacks Pearson Correlation 1 –.023 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .875 
N 48 48 
Policy Pearson Correlation –.023 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .875  
N 48 48 
Table C.4. Attacks vs. Policy in Germany 
 
 Attacks Policy  
Attacks Pearson Correlation 1 –.397 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .092 
N 48 48 
Policy Pearson Correlation –.397 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .092  
N 48 48 
Table C.5. Attacks vs. Policy in Rwanda







 Attacks Policy  
Attacks Pearson Correlation 1 .260 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .075 
N 48 48 
Policy Pearson Correlation .260 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .075  
N 48 48 
Table C.6. Attacks vs. Policy in Sweden 
 
 Attacks Policy  
Attacks Pearson Correlation 1 –.361* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .012 
N 48 48 
Policy Pearson Correlation –.361* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .012  
N 48 48 
Table C.7. Attacks vs. Policy in the United States 
 
 Attacks Policy  
Attacks Pearson Correlation 1 –.221** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 306 306 
Policy Pearson Correlation –.221** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 306 306 
Table C.8. Total Attacks vs. Policy for All Countries 








Country Curve Estimations and Graphs 
 
Model Summary and Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable: China Attacks 




F Df1 Df2 Sig.  Constant B1 
Linear .137 7.275 1 46 .010 84.886 –28.483 
Independent Variable: China Policy  
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Model Summary and Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable: U.S. Attacks 
Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
Equation R-
Square 
F Df1 Df2 Sig.  Constant B1 
Linear .130 6.873 1 46 .012 860.275 –
297.941 
Independent Variable: U.S. Policy  




Graph D.2. Curve Estimation for the United States 
 
 
Model Summary and Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Total Attacks 




F Df1 Df2 Sig.  Constant B1 
Linear .049 15.635 1 304 .000 68.064 –16.678 
Independent Variable: Total Policy  
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THE MOTIVATIONS AND PERCEIVED BENEFITS OF STUDENT 
PARTICIPATION IN DANCE MARATHON 
 
EMILY G. NETTESHEIM, BUTLER UNIVERSITY 
MENTOR: CHAD KNODERER  
 
Background 
In modern times, demand for nonprofit volunteers frequently exceeds 
supply. The National Center for Charitable Statistics states that more than 1.5 
million nonprofit organizations were registered with the IRS in 2015, a 10.4% 
growth since 2005 (McKeever, 2018). Volunteer and donation rates are not only 
failing to keep pace with this growth but have experienced declines of almost 4% 
and 11%, respectively (Grimm & Dietz, 2018). For this reason, research on the 
motivation of volunteers is more important than ever (Francis, 2011). The U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS; 2015) reports that the national volunteer rate is 
declining, with only about 1 in 4 Americans volunteering at least once in a calendar 
year. According to the University of Maryland’s Do Good Institute, the likelihood 
of volunteering decreases by almost 8% as individuals develop from adolescence 
into young adulthood (Grimm & Dietz, 2018). Despite almost 77.5% of college 
first years rating “helping others” as “essential” or “very important” (Eagan et al., 
2017), volunteer rates were lowest among young adults aged 20–24 (BLS, 2015), 
with fewer than 1 in 5 volunteering annually. Young adults are critical for 
organizations’ expansion and improvement, as it can be thought that those who help 
now will lead in the future (Francis, 2011). 
Although definitions vary slightly throughout the literature, in this study, a 
young adult is defined as someone aged 19–24. Additionally, the majority of the 
studies cited have population samples comprised of the Millennial generation. The 
terms “young adults” and “Millennials” will thus be used interchangeably 
throughout this paper.  
In 2017, annual individual giving in the United States totaled $286.7 billion, 
accounting for 70% of all giving nationally (Giving USA, 2018). Annual giving has 
continued to grow in the past three years, and this growth trend and the magnitude 
of individual giving demonstrates the value that society places on charity. Although 
Millennials make up 25.9% of the population and account for only 11% of total 
charitable giving in the United States, 84% of Millennials give to charitable 







organizations annually (Rovner, 2013). The cohort of young adult volunteers and 
donors, although important, is frequently overlooked in studies aimed to further 
understand motivations behind volunteering. Additionally, the explanation for low 
participation in volunteer efforts but high participation in fundraising or donating 
among young adults remains not fully characterized or understood. 
University students are an even more valuable subcategory of this 
demographic, as volunteering is often closely aligned with future career benefits, 
and these students often have more free time than their fully employed peers 
(Berger & Milem, 2002; Sundeen, Raskoff, & Garcia, 2007). Over the past 30 
years, there has been a change in how young adult college students spend their time. 
Time spent by college students on academics has decreased, while time spent in 
leisure, extracurricular activities, and employment have increased (Babcock & 
Marks, 2011). With this rise in free time, it is increasingly interesting and important 
to understand the motivations behind how students allocate their time. Without an 
understanding of student motivation to participate in philanthropy, it is virtually 
impossible to reverse the decline in participation.  
Miracle Network Dance Marathon 
One of the most successful examples of student philanthropy is the Dance 
Marathon. The Miracle Network Dance Marathon movement began with a single 
dance marathon at Indiana University (IU) in 1991. The original marathon was held 
in memory of Ryan White, who passed away from HIV/AIDS before he was to start 
college at IU. White often spoke out and advocated for HIV/AIDS education. The 
Dance Marathon (DM) organization was started by his friends, in response to their 
promise to keep his memory alive, and was to benefit Riley Hospital for Children, 
where White received treatment.   
The first marathon raised $10,900, but beyond that, it started a movement 
that continues today. Three years after the inaugural marathon, the Children’s 
Miracle Network Hospital (CMN) organization approached the Indiana University 
Dance Marathon (IUDM) and its founder, Jill Stewart, and asked for permission to 
expand the IUDM fundraising model to universities across North America. Today, 
the Miracle Network Dance Marathon movement spans North America, with more 
than 350 participating universities benefitting hundreds of hospitals across the 
country. The typical dance marathon engages students year-round to raise funds 
and awareness for their local CMN hospitals. The year culminates with a “dance 
marathon” event in which students get to meet patient families treated at their local 
hospital, participate in games and dancing, enjoy entertainment, and reveal their 







annual fundraising total. Each DM organization is entirely student-run, and 100% 
of all funds raised go directly to a local CMN hospital (E. Phipps, personal 
communication, April 21, 2017).  
All of the DMs that were part of this study raise money for Riley Hospital 
for Children. Riley serves patients from all 92 Indiana counties, and children from 
all over the world come to Riley to receive treatment. Nationally ranked in all 10 
pediatric specialties, Riley is recognized by U.S. News and World Report as one of 
the nation’s top children’s hospitals. Riley Dance Marathon is the largest and 
highest-fundraising CMN DM program, with more than 24% of CMN’s funds 
raised by Riley DMs. Together, Riley’s 80 DMs raised 6.5 million dollars in the 
2015–2016 school year, with more than 15,000 participants (E. Phipps, personal 
communication, April 21, 2017).  
Millennial Motivations 
Based on the demographic age and class standing of a typical undergraduate 
student, most participants in this study at the time of data collection were born 
between 1994 and 1998. This makes this cohort on the edge of being categorized 
as Millennials or as a part of early Generation Z. Further, the majority of student 
participants over the history of Dance Marathon have been Millennials.  
Millennials and their intrinsic motivations have been studied at great length. 
In general, they participate in philanthropy because of a commitment to their 
community and belief in their ability to make a change. Passion for the cause is 
their primary motivator. They are initially motivated to give by engaging 
storytelling and by seeing the long-term effects of their gifts (Feldmann, 2017). 
As a whole, the nonprofit sector today is facing fundamental issues in 
recruiting and maintaining sufficient volunteer staff and funding (Francis, 2011). 
The Children’s Miracle Network Dance Marathon movement, however, has 
attracted more than one million active student participants nationwide, and it raised 
close to $27 million last year as one of the fastest peer-to-peer fundraising 
campaigns in the nation (Meardon, 2018). With the business of college life, an 
organization that has grown each year to engage the massive current levels of 
participation and success that CMN does must provide some unique reward or 
benefit to participants. The objective of this study is to characterize the motivations 
and perceived benefit of young adult college student involvement in DMs. 
 









A mixed-methods approach was used to examine participants’ perceptions 
and to measure and analyze relationships. Qualtrics Survey software was used to 
build and distribute the survey. The survey consisted of 22 questions divided into 
four categories titled Demographics, What is involvement with Dance Marathon, 
The DM impact, and Perceived benefit of involvement with DM. The demographics 
section consisted of multiple-choice questions about gender, year in school, and 
school. Participants were also asked about involvement with DM before high 
school, and their participation level each year that they have been involved with 
DM. Free-response questions gauged first impressions of DM, how other people 
described DM to them, and expectations before participation, used to categorize 
how initial expectations influenced participant motivations.  
To qualify the motivations and perceived benefits of involvement in DM, it 
was necessary to define DM involvement for the sample group. The second section 
of the survey included questions about the amount of time spent fundraising, 
amount of time per week committed to DM, and personal fundraising goals and 
actual totals. Participants were then asked 20 of the 30 Likert-scale questions 
identified in Clary and Snyder’s (1999) Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI), 
which, with more than 1,200 citations, has become a gold standard for 
understanding volunteer motivations. Questions were limited to increase the 
response rate. Participants were asked to rank their agreement to multiple 
statements that would reveal one of the six motivation types defined by the VFI, 
including “I am concerned about those less fortunate than myself” (Values), 
“Participating in DM makes me feel important” (Enhancement), “Participating in 
DM allows me to gain a new perspective on things” (Understanding), “I 
participated in DM to make my resume look good” (Career), and “I’ve made new 
friends by participating in DM” (Social). Responses for each motivation were 
combined to form a cumulative score for each participant. Participants received 
positive values for questions in which they were in agreement (somewhat agree = 
1, agree = 2, and strongly agree = 3), 0 points for “neither agree nor disagree,” and 
negative points for those with which they were in disagreement (somewhat disagree 
= –1, disagree = –2, strongly disagree = –3). If a statement was skipped or was 
marked “NA/Prefer not to answer,” the participant received no score for the entire 
category in which the statement belonged. Scores were divided by the possible 
number of questions per category of motivation. Average scores for each category 







were then reported for the sample. VFI questions corresponding to the protective 
motivation were left off this section of the survey unintentionally, so only five of 
the six motivations are reported. 
Participants were also asked to rank their motivations for participating in 
DM on a scale from 1 to 6, with 1 indicating their top motivator. They were offered 
the following choices based on themes from the VFI: Values, Protective, 
Enhancement, Understanding, Career, and Social. The motivations were defined in 
the following way: 
• Values: express and act on humanitarian or altruistic tendencies 
• Protective: protect the ego from negative features of the self and 
negative feelings 
• Enhancement: develop and expand the positive aspects of one's ego 
• Understanding: learn and practice life knowledge, skills, and abilities 
• Career: develop, prepare, and maintain career‐related skills 
• Social: be with friends and do something that important others view 
favorably 
Finally, the survey included a series of free-response questions asking 
participants to define how they have matured, what skills they have gained, what 
makes DM different, and their primary motivation in one word. Free responses 
were analyzed using thematic analysis, a method used to find repeated patterns 
within the data set. This study used the six phases detailed by Braun and Clarke 
(2006) to complete thematic analysis: become familiar with data, generate initial 
codes, search for themes, review themes, name themes, and produce report. Each 
response could be categorized in multiple themes if applicable.  
Statistical analysis was conducted using Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences version 23.0 (SPSS v23.0). Continuous data were described using mean 
and standard deviation (SD) for variables considered to be normally distributed, 
and median and interquartile range (IQR) for variables considered to be non-
normally distributed. Groupwise demographic and respondent characteristics were 
compared using independent sample two-tailed t-tests, chi-square analyses, or 
Mann-Whitney tests for nonparametric data. P values < 0.05 were considered to be 
statistically significant. The study was given exempt approval from the university’s 
institutional review board. 
 








The survey was distributed to three IUDM programs. E-mail lists of 
registered DM participants were obtained from two universities and invitations, and 
participation reminders were delivered by e-mail. The survey was distributed to the 
third university by the organization president through an anonymous link because 
of the school’s student privacy policies. School A is a state-assisted residential 
university of 17,000 undergraduate students. School A Dance Marathon is 10 years 
old and currently stands in the second-highest fundraising bracket recognized by 
CMN DM staff: $450,000–$999,999. School B is a private, liberal arts, residential 
university of 4,500 undergraduate students. School B’s Dance Marathon was the 
second DM program in Indiana after the original IUDM. At 18years since it was 
founded, the program is in the middle fundraising bracket ($250,000–$449,999) 
and was recognized in CMN’s top fundraising schools per capita. School C is a 
state-assisted university of 22,000 students, with 89% of students commuting to 
campus. School C Dance Marathon is celebrating its 17th year and fundraises in 
the second-highest fundraising bracket: $450,000–$999,999. Because surveys were 
distributed by anonymous links, it was not possible to send follow-up e-mails to 
participants from School C. This may have resulted in lower response rates. 
Results 
Sample 
The survey was distributed to 1492 participants in total. There were 161 
respondents, for an 11% response rate. The majority of study participants were 
female (85%). Participants were more diverse in their class year, with 
representation from all grades. All participant types were represented, and at 
relative frequencies representative of the population. General members and 
committee members participated at the highest rates. The majority of respondents 
became involved with DM for the first time in college. General demographics are 















 Participants (n) Percent (%) 
Female 136 85.0 
Year 
First Year 42 26.1 
Sophomore 52 32.3 
Junior 32 19.9 
Senior 29 18.0 
Graduate School 2 1.2 
Other 4 2.5 
Participant Type 
General Member 78 48.4 
Committee Member 92 57.1 
Mid-level Leadership 27 16.8 
Executive Board 29 18.0 
High School Dance Marathon Participant 
Yes 37 23.0 
No 124 77.0 
Table 1. Cumulative Participant Demographics from Schools A–C.  
 
What is Involvement in Dance Marathon?  
For survey participants, DM involved a weekly time commitment of about 
1 hour for an average of 4 to 5 months (Table 2). It also was defined by significant 
fundraising commitment. On average, participants set fundraising goals of $741.22 













Table 2. Dance Marathon Involvement 
 
 







Motivations to be Involved 
In response to a free-response question asking what about DM had 
originally interested participants, three themes emerged: DM supported a good 
cause (Values, 71.2%), their friends were doing it or it was a way to make friends 
(Social, 39.6%), and the networking or resume-building potential (Career, 15.3%; 
Table 3).  
 
 Frequency (n = 111) Percent 95% CI 
Values  79 71.2 62.8%–79.6% 
Social  44 39.6 30.5%–48.7% 
Career  17 15.3 8.6%–22.0% 
Table 3. Initial Motivation for Involvement with Dance Marathon 
 
Many participants noted two of the three themes simultaneously, as 
demonstrated by the following participant responses:  
I really wanted to participate to help out kids and have fun with friends. 
 
A lot of my friends were doing it and also I wanted to join a club that focused on 
making a positive difference.  
 
I have always had a passion for helping kids and I have always aspired to go into 
the medical pediatrics field. I became interested in DM because it gives me the 
opportunity to make a huge impact on those kids’ lives even before I have the 
schooling and training to work with them. 
Major themes of respondents’ first impressions of DM before becoming 
involved with the organization included a unique organization atmosphere noted 
specifically as fun, inspiring, and/or passionate. One participant summarized 
general themes among participating, saying, “Dance Marathon was full of 
passionate people who cared about something that was pertinent in my life, Riley 
Hospital for Children. The exec team was great and made me fired up to raise 
money FTK [for the kids]!” Participants also noticed the impact of the organization, 







the large reach of DM across campus and the way it united the campus, and the 
excellent execution of events and meetings (Table 4).  
 
 Frequency (n = 133) Percent (%) 95% CI 
Organization Atmosphere 93 69.9 62.1%–77.7% 
Organization Impact 59 44.4 36.0%–52.8% 
Organization Reach 44 33.1 25.1%–41.1% 
Organization Execution 10 7.5 3.0%–12.0% 
Table 4. First Impressions of Dance Marathon 
 
When using the VFI questionnaire, respondents most experienced the 
Values function (median = 3), Understanding function (median = 2.17), and Social 
function (median = 2), as shown in Table 5. The maximum score was 3. Median 
scores for each statement are reported in Table 6. 
 
 Median IQR 
Values 3.00 2.67–3.00 
Enhancement 1.67 1.00–3.00 
Understanding 2.17 1.67–3.00 
Career 1.50 0.50–2.25 
Social 2.00 1.50–2.75 












Statement Median Agreement Score IQR 
I am concerned about those less 
fortunate than myself. (Values) 
3.0 2.0–3.0 
I feel compassion toward people in 
need. (Values) 
3.0 3.0–3.0 
I feel it is important to help others. 
(Values) 
3.0 3.0–3.0 
Participating in DM makes me feel 
important. (Enhancement) 
2.0 1.0–3.0 
Participating in DM increases my self-
esteem. (Enhancement) 
2.0 1.0–3.0 
Participating in DM makes me feel 
needed. (Enhancement) 
2.0 1.0–3.0 
Participating in DM allows me to gain 
a new perspective on things. 
(Understanding) 
3.0 2.0–3.0 
By participating in DM, I learned how 
to interact and communicate with a 
variety of people. (Understanding) 
2.0 1.0–3.0 
By participating in DM, I explored my 
strengths. (Understanding) 
2.0 1.0–3.0 
Participating in DM helped me make 
new contacts that might help my 
business or career. (Career) 
2.0 0.0–3.0 
Participating in DM allowed me to 
explore different career options. 
(Career) 
1.0 0.0–3.0 
Participating in DM will help me 
succeed in my chosen profession. 
(Career) 
2.0 0.0–3.0 







I participated in DM to make my 
resume look good. (Career) 
2.0 0.0-3.0 
My friends participate in DM. (Social) 2.0 2.0–3.0 
People I am close to wanted me to 
participate in DM. (Social) 
2.0 1.0–3.0 
People I am close to place a high value 
on service and philanthropy. (Social) 
2.0 2.0–3.0 
I've made new friends by participating 
in DM. (Social) 
2.0 1.3–3.0 
Table 6. Modified VFI Scores (maximum agreement score = 3.0) 
 
While all other questions allowed participants to combine multiple 
motivators into their responses, the final question required participants to 
summarize their motivations into one word or phrase. The majority of respondents 
(86.9%) answered this question with a word about the cause or the kids at Riley 
Hospital for Children. The other themes were mentioned at frequencies of less than 
10% (Table 7). Responses mentioning an innate or external responsibility to 
participate were categorized together under the requirement theme. 
 
Motivation Frequency  
(n = 107) 
Percent (%) 95% CI 
Cause 93 86.9 80.5%–93.3% 
Requirement 7 6.5 1.8%–11.2% 
Social 7 6.5 1.8%–11.2% 
Positive Emotions 6 5.6 1.2%–10.0% 
Personal Benefit 3 2.8 0.0%–5.9% 











Perceived Benefits of Participation 
There was general agreement among respondents that they gained new 
skills (93.6%) and matured or developed (86.4%) as a result of involvement with 
DM. More specifically, participants reported developing skills and aptitudes in 
three general categories: social skills, career-related skills, and emotional 
intelligence (Table 8). Some statements about skills are shown below.  
I have learned valuable communication skills from being on a committee. I have 
also learned persistence through our fundraising days. It can get hard to keep 
getting turned down when asking for donations, but you develop that never-give-
up attitude because you are so passionate about the cause. 
 
I have gained increased skills in communication and skills in planning during my 
time especially as a committee member. I have also learned skills in developing 
meaningful relationships as well. This organization really gives you the 
opportunity to connect with people over something amazing beyond superficial 
connections. 
 
Both my ability to communicate and my ability to empathize with others have 
improved. 
 
[I have improved at] working as a team, fundraising, motivational speaking, 
working with corporations. 
 
Skill Frequency  
(n = 110) 
Percent (%) 95% CI 
Any Skills 103 93.6 89.0%–98.2% 
Social Skills 49 44.5 35.2%–53.8% 
Career-Related Skills 44 42.7 33.5%–51.9% 
Emotional Intelligence 31 30.1 21.5%–38.7% 
Table 8. Skills Developed through Involvement with Dance Marathon 
 
 







Respondents noted improved emotional intelligence, development of 
transferable aptitudes, and improved life outlook or gratitude for their health or 
lives (Table 9). Transferable aptitudes mentioned included leadership, confidence, 
creativity, and communication skills. The impact of this development is best 
understood through the following direct quotes: 
I believe I now have a different outlook on life. I never take being healthy 
for granted. I am a more positive individual. I wake up every morning 
thankful and I say prayers for those who do not have the opportunity to wake 
up in the comforts of their own bed. 
 
I feel like I have heard stories and saw videos that have shown me that life 
could be much worse. I have learned to complain less and to live more. 
 
My communication skills have significantly developed thanks to DM. By 
constantly fundraising, I become comfortable talking/approaching 
strangers, developing passion, and becoming more confident in who I am 
and my purpose for this world. 
 
Development Frequency  
(n = 108) 
Percent % 95% CI 
Any Development 95 86.4 79.9%–92.9% 
Emotional Intelligence 49 44.5 35.1%–53.9% 
Transferable Aptitudes 31 28.2 19.7%–36.7% 
Improved 
Outlook/Gratitude 
29 26.4 18.1%–34.7% 
Table 9. Developments or Maturation through Involvement with Dance Marathon 
 
What Makes Dance Marathon Different from other Organizations? 
When participants were asked what made DM different from other 
organizations, many respondents (58.3%) mentioned the large impact the 
organization can have, as well as being able to directly see that impact (Table 10). 







For example, one participant stated, “It is an all-in or all-out thing. If you choose to 
participate, you have to be fully committed and all FTK. We also truly make an 
impact, and by interacting with all of the Riley families, we can really see that.”  
 
Differences Frequency (n = 108) Percent (%) 95% CI 
Impact 63 58.3 49.0%–67.6% 
Community 57 52.9 43.5%–62.3% 
Passion 39 36.1 27.0%–45.2% 
Longevity 11 10.2 4.5%–15.9% 
Table 10. Major Differences between Dance Marathon and Other Organizations 
 
Another major theme was the inclusivity and community aspect of the 
organization (52.8%):  
Dance marathon accepts everyone for who they are, and we’re all a bunch of 
people with one really important goal. 
 
It has a better sense of joy and a bigger internal result than any other organization 
I am in. It is more of a family than an organization. A family that fights, disagrees, 
cries together, but in the end, make each other better and love always. 
 
Finally, participants mentioned the energy and passion present (36.1%). For 
example, one participant stated, “I truly believe that Dance Marathon is different 
from others because of the passion level that everyone brings to the table. It shines 
through more than anything I have ever seen.”  
Discussion 
In general, the study sample was representative of the DM population. Most 
DM programs nationally are female-dominated. The sample had a moderate 
involvement level demonstrating a significant time commitment and effort in 
fundraising. This level of commitment is consistent with the drastic differences I 
noticed between DM involvement and other nonprofit involvement. The effort put 







forth is significant enough to require a degree of prioritization that demands the 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations that I was interested in studying. 
All measures characterizing types of motivations to participate reveal that 
DM appeals to all different kinds of volunteer functions simultaneously. Most 
closely aligned to the DM model are the Values, Understanding, and Social 
functions. This demonstrates that most DM participants in this sample participate 
to express or act on important values, to learn more about the world or exercise 
skills that are often unused, or to strengthen social relationships (Francis, 2011). In 
other questions revealing motivations, participants usually mentioned more than 
one motivation type. When asked to choose their primary motivation to participate, 
however, the overwhelming majority indicated the cause or impact on the cause. 
Further, most participants used the program’s national slogan, “For The Kids,” or 
“FTK.”  
Most participants reported that they developed skills or matured as a result 
of participation, revealing that DM programs are able to massively influence not 
only the cause but also participants themselves. Interestingly, only about 15% of 
participants mentioned desiring these developments in their original interest in DM, 
implying that personal benefit is usually not a motivator to participate, although it 
is an added benefit. 
The differences noticed by participants between DM and other 
organizations align closely with what is known about Millennials’ motivations. All 
DM programs surveyed include families affected by the hospital in their event. 
Participants can meet families and directly see the fruits of their efforts. More, with 
inclusive environments and relationship building, communities can form. Previous 
studies demonstrate that Millennials feel a responsibility to help the communities 
to which they belong.  
It is not surprising that an organization structure created by Millennials and 
sustained by Millennials is able to attract and retain their peers at rates superior to 
those of other nonprofit organizations. The attractiveness and success of DM 
programs can be applied to recruitment and retention within the nonprofit sector. 
First impressions are critical. Using enthusiastic and passionate recruiters could be 
successful at creating initial engagement and developing interest in college 
students. Desired outcomes must be specific, clear, and visible when possible. 
Finally, with a calendar and an environment that fosters the creation of community 
through inclusivity, familiarity, and accountability, Millennial participants are 
more likely to feel a responsibility to the cause. 








Because some DM programs consider their participants donors, 
confidentiality and donor privacy rules limited recruitment to this study. Including 
programs from other hospital markets could reveal different findings. Riley 
Hospital and Dance Marathon are household names for many in Indiana, and there 
may be important differences between Indiana DM participants and DM 
participants across North America.  
The bulk of the data in this study was taken from a thematic analysis of free-
response questions. All responses were analyzed by only one researcher. 
Additionally, because the questions were open-ended, it is possible that participants 
experienced different developments or motivations that they did not articulate. 
The missing data from the protective section of the VFI within the DM-
impact section limited analysis of the consistency between participant responses 
and the overall analysis of sample motivations. Moreover, participants were asked 
to rank their motivations from 1 to 6, which was difficult to analyze collectively; 
only primary motivations (those marked 1) were able to be analyzed. 
Further Directions 
To date, no other studies have been published on the phenomenon that is 
the success of Dance Marathon. A larger sample size including a wider variety of 
program sizes from across the country could help better characterization of DM 
participants’ motivations. Many of the free-response questions could be made 
multiple-choice after this initial sampling, hopefully increasing response rates and 
completion rates. Finally, the decrease in completion time achieved by reducing the 
number of free-response questions could allow for the complete VFI to be used. 
Conclusion 
Despite the overwhelming agreement that participants do benefit as a result 
of participation with DM, participants do not seem to be driven by these perceived 
benefits. College students’ primary motivations to participate are altruistic values 
and the cause itself: Riley Hospital for Children. The DM model includes aspects 
that align with what is known about Millennials’ motivations to volunteer. 
Continuing to better understand the motivations of volunteers and donors in the 
nonprofit sector is critical for the sector to survive. Better categorizing motivations 







to participate in DM and Dance Marathon’s attractiveness for the Millennial 
generation could lead to profitable applications for other nonprofit companies.
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A MATTER OF PERSPECTIVE: REPORTAGE STYLE IN 
DISTRICT 9 (2009) 
 
M. MERT ÖRSLER, BILKENT UNIVERSITY 
MENTOR: COLLEEN KENNEDY-KARPAT 
 
Abstract 
District 9 (2009) demonstrates an intriguing exemplar of contemporary 
science-fiction filmmaking by drawing on interesting aesthetic strategies, also 
extended to the narrative. This essay explores the allegory and its broader resonance 
in District 9, which uses remediation and a subcategory of intertextuality to unfold 
its meanings. These aesthetic strategies unpack the use of reportage rhetoric that 
critiques specific news media practices connected to a societal illness: racism. The 
strategies reflected in the narrative also play an essential role in the film’s marking 
of an ideologically significant departure from the convention in the genre. The 
aesthetic strategies and its extension thus constitute the essence of this discussion 
of District 9. 
Key words: film, genre, science fiction, news media 
 
“Realities of working-class life are reorganized, reconstructed and 
reshaped by the way they are represented.” 
—Stuart Hall, Notes on Deconstructing ‘the Popular’ 
 
As a genre, science fiction generally contains a significant degree of movie 
spectacles, producing films appreciated for both their immersive stories and their 
spectacular images. They also depict their own metaphorical “world” whose logic 
points to social criticism. District 9 (2009) is an example of this sci-fi social 
criticism, creating an allegory where humans live on Earth alongside an alien 
population in ways that echo a persistent social issue: racism. Set in South Africa, 
known for its history of extreme systemic racism called apartheid, the film figures 
its aliens as stand-ins for people of color. What is unique about District 9, however, 
is less its use of science fiction to critique a social ill than the fact that it achieves 







this by drawing on the aesthetics of documentary or, rather, mockumentary at key 
points in the narrative. This essay will discuss how reportage style makes meaning 
in District 9 and, in this sense, the relationship between its use and the film’s 
marking of an ideologically significant departure from established convention in 
the genre. 
Reportage Style: Aim and Perspective 
Reportage style complicates narration and even the foundational notion of 
diegesis. Do these handheld-camera movements, voice-overs, and graphic elements 
resembling a news broadcast function as fiction within the diegesis of the film, or 
might they be used to present “facts” that are (also) true outside it? Reportage style 
appears many times throughout the film; however, the reports in the first five 
minutes of the film offer key exposition to introduce main characters, conflict, and 
setting. The tone of the reportage from the beginning serves a dual purpose: it helps 
create the film’s xenophobic atmosphere, and it increases the verisimilitude of 
science fiction by drawing on mockumentary aesthetics. For Cynthia Miller (2012, 
p. 16), mockumentaries create nuanced narratives in which rueful humor coexists 
with subtle sociocultural critique about mundane reality. In other words, discomfort 
is the mockumentary’s central tool for confronting the conventions of everyday life. 
In the filmic world of District 9, reportage style critically comments on how mass 
media presents a distorted reality to its audience. 
Reportage style represents the world of the diegesis both to spectators of the 
film and to the characters within its fictional world. In this regard, it is 
representation twice over, reframing a diegesis to emphasize its own presumed 
facts, and manipulating the truth using its own formal conventions for both 
characters and spectators. This multilayered mediation works as if the “mass-
mediated” perspective of characters overlaps with the perspective of spectators. 
Thus, due to the doubling, spectators of the film are simultaneously exposed to the 
same represented perspective of the characters.  
The film’s first act mocks the news media by exaggerating how the news 
media mediates the facts around it. In this regard, it is not new to link the news with 
the portrayals of ideological biases, which are even occasionally prioritized. The 
reportage sequences ironically resemble daily news in their content and use of 
visual convention, thus enhancing the verisimilitude. This reportage style in 
District 9 can be defined characteristically as remediation, which is “the 
representation of one medium in another” (Bolter & Grusin, 2000, p. 45). The 
conventional form of televised news is ultimately incorporated into the narrative 







film. Even more specifically, this use of pseudo-intertextual references can be 
called mendacious intertextuality, where an intertext—in this case, the news 
reportage—is crafted to resemble a separate text but exists only within the 
framework of the supertext and has no separate existence of its own (Harries, 2000, 
p. 28). Remediation thus allies with intertextual influences to make a social 
commentary on the specific real-life issue of ideological news.  
Mass-communication scholar Teun A. van Dijk argues that the news is a 
prominent avenue for “convey[ing], enact[ing] and confirm[ing]” racism, and 
District 9 uses the reportage style to underscore and critique this aspect of the news 
media (in Ballesteros, 2015, p. 11). The reportages are embellished with the bulletin 
crawl and logos in the style of cable TV news channels, a formal construction of 
verisimilitude. The first reportage within the first act [04:29–04:35] has its spot: 
“alien weapons caches seized” with the subtitle “alien crime rises” (Figure 1). The 
tone reveals anti-alien bias, showing two aliens putting their hands up without any 
trouble, while the news insists on referring to the aliens as career criminals. While 
a policeman treats one of them harshly, the newscaster implies that District 9, where 
the aliens of the city reside, is a troublesome place. That is, here, being an alien is 
directly associated with being a troublemaker or even a criminal. This sort of 
presupposed association indicates how the news can discriminate. Racism in the 
remediated intertext shows how the news can be ideologically biased; hence, the 
film critically comments on the xenophobic tune of news media, especially when 
the matter is political.  
 
 
Figure 1. The news treats two aliens as convicted criminals, despite no convincing 
criminal evidence (Jackson & Blomkamp, 2009). 
 







From a more political-economy perspective, all media, including 
journalism, is embedded in power relations. Here, the film’s fictional, government-
linked technology firm Multi-National United, abbreviated MNU, illustrates its 
operations within the film world of District 9. The MNU is officially responsible 
for evicting aliens from their homes. Its resemblance to corporate operations 
reflects its economic power, while its armed security forces indicate its military 
power; the MNU thus stands for the confluence of economic and governmental 
racism. Van Dijk (1995, p. 10) claims that to comprehend news media messages, 
one should also consider the role of these other social institutions; that is, despite 
some supposedly common moral values of the society, news media professionals 
may do their jobs in accordance with certain political/ideological beliefs of such 
institutional powers. In District 9, MNU serves this purpose, and the reportages in 
the first act demonstrate the same racism and xenophobia that MNU does. In this 
sense, District 9 illustrates how the news can echo the biased ideology held by 
powerful social institutions beyond the news media itself. 
Two more reportage sequences in the first act further indicate how the news 
aligns ideologically with MNU. They show aliens attacking humans and brutally 
screaming. While these very short clips are shown, a reporter voices over that “the 
residents of the city are trying to ‘remove’ all the aliens from their township.” The 
racism here frames human residents as heroic and the aliens as invaders to be 
removed. These reportages show the aliens inflicting violence on the human 
environment, but they strike a clearly ironic tone; while a reporter implies that one 
bystander has been hurt because of aliens, a policeman fires his gun at an alien 
without any warning. And the xenophobic stand that the reportages take remains 
the same. Because these reportages do not show or dwell on enough information 
for the facts of these events to be analyzed with any certainty, they raise more 
questions than answers as to which side is actually the provocateur. These examples 
acknowledge that only views in accordance with MNU’s ideology are conveyed 
through the news media and that a selective kind of reporting shapes facts to that 
ideology. 
In the film’s second act, what the reportages communicate highlights how 
news media can side with political power in a more immoral way. The reportages 
falsely accuse Wikus—the only one whose genetics successfully fuse with alien 
DNA, and who is thus chased by MNU—of having a sexual relationship with an 
alien and publish a fake photo. The news bulletin furthers the accusations by 
claiming that Wikus carries a contagious virus that can turn everyone into 
“monsters.” Because a free Wikus is strictly opposed to MNU’s economic interests, 







related to its plans for extreme experiments with the only alien hybrid, Wikus is 
targeted by these reports. By aiming to humiliate and isolate Wikus, the news media 
works for the benefit of a powerful social institution. Although Wikus has not been 
involved in any major crime, as he flees MNU and voices opposition to it, the news 
calls everyone to phone a special “Wikus-crime-report-line.” In this regard, the 
news media takes their side in line with political power. Consequently, the 
reportages underscore the ideological news; it is mocked, through aesthetic choice. 
The main purpose of using mockumentary aesthetics, which opens up a 
particular critique of the news, is discussed. The rest of the reportages suggest that 
the double logic of remediation is still at work, aligning with intertexts. Mendacious 
intertextuality here relies on fake yet familiar use of newsreels, as Harries (2000, p. 
28) mentions. In this regard, the ironic content of reportage style is visually made 
to resemble televised news, and the combination of unreal content with verisimilar 
visual style underscores the ideological critique. District 9 thus questions how the 
news media promotes xenophobia with fearmongering and selective reporting, 
most evidently in the reportage sequences that frame events as terror attacks (Figure 
2). Although violence is executed by Wikus and Christopher, to call it terrorism is 
certainly an exaggeration. Their aim is not to use a sort of systematic violence 
against anyone; they agree not to shoot anyone unless the other shoots first. Their 
goal is to retrieve from MNU what belongs to Christopher. In this sense, reportage 
style appeals to people’s fears by labeling the violence unjustly as terrorism. In 
other words, fearmongering here can easily be connected to a deliberate effort to 
influence people’s ideas and beliefs; hence, it is the way public attention is 












Figure 2. Although the explosion does indeed give Wikus and Christopher a chance to 
escape from MNU forces, the news labels it as a terrorist action against a respected 
social institution (Jackson & Blomkamp, 2009).  
 
Reportages such as these function in tune with a deceptive aspect of the 
news. It is not new to associate news media with fearmongering in terms of how 
the news media manipulates people’s opinions; by using fearmongering, news 
media aims to grab the public’s attention. District 9 stresses and critiques it by using 
reportage style. Fearmongering is presented as a technique of persuasion, 
deliberately and manipulatively promoting fear to influence public opinion. Barry 
Glassner (2004, p. 823) claims that fearmongering relies mainly on three attributes: 
repetition, treating rare events as trends, and misdirection. That is, fearmongering 
helps set the “agenda” for the public so they see things according to how the news 
media wants them to be perceived. All three of these aspects shape the reportages 
in District 9, although mockumentary aesthetics introduce enough irony to question 
this practice.  
The reportages later in the film particularly use aesthetics to mock 
fearmongering in the news media. In addition to the reportage illustrated above 
[1:14:04–1:14:09], another reportage just after this one continues to comment on 
the attack as a terrorist attack. This sort of continuity of news insisting on terrorism 
demonstrates the repetition inherent to fearmongering. It also uses testimony from 
an MNU executive, who persists in claiming a defeated terrorist attack, reflecting 
the close relationship between misdirection and fearmongering. There is also a live 
broadcast of a conflict between the MNU and the ship that Wikus controls, as if the 
chaos is caused only by Wikus. This live broadcast of violent conflict between a 







declared terrorist and the legal armed forces also contributes to the fearmongering 
aspect of the news.  
Terrorism news bears a perceptible degree of relationship with 
fearmongering. It is worth mentioning here Barry Glassner’s ideas in that regard. 
According to Glassner (2004, p. 823), the narrative of terrorism easily declares a 
[chaotic] decline of the society/civilization where villains are domestic, and only a 
few heroes fight against them. That is, fearmongering rapidly writes a dystopian 
scenario such as the one used to describe the conflict between Wikus and the armed 
forces; it relegates both parties to good and evil in simple terms. With fear and 
tension aroused, the public agenda is directed to think of what is shown as an 
increasing trend, and the rhetoric used in these live reportages targets emotional 
response. The newscaster’s voice over the live broadcast resembles commentary on 
a sports competition rather than combat; in this way, both events are treated as a 
spectacle, as entertainment. The speaker’s voice sporadically shows extra 
excitement when anticipating an extraordinary act such as a clash, working to 
maintain enough attention to redirect the public agenda toward a disorder. The 
remediated intertext thus conveys the idea that nothing is under control, which 
ironically resembles the fearmongering techniques of the news media as Glassner 
considers. As well as exaggerated bulletins and subtitles with “fear words” 
connoting the extreme deadliness of the district, fearmongering portrays a social 
life and its components, individuals, and places, as well as their interactions, as 
increasingly hostile to one another. With the reportages in Acts I and II, District 9 
critiques this kind of fearmongering by using a reportage style that highlights the 
mechanisms at work in its ideological biases. 
A Departure from the Genre-Monster and Reportage Style 
In District 9, reportage rhetoric directly extends into one of the main 
elements of the diegesis, the protagonist; in other words, it frames Wikus in specific 
ways. Hence, the faux-reportage style can be further explored if the film’s challenge 
to the science-fiction genre is particularly focused because District 9 rethinks the 
“monsters” that the audience expects. Enmeshed in conventions of broad sci-fi 
along with the subgenres of alien invasion and monster films, cinematic monsters 
have always been the focal points of spectacle. The film attempts to critically 
question this and plays with our perception of the established genre monster. 
District 9 calls for engagement with Wikus’s internal world; in contrast, a 
conventional movie monster has no interior psyche to explore, yet the repeated 
appearance of reportage style of District 9 aims to block this identificatory process. 







To illustrate this distinction, this paper will briefly compare the monster in District 
9—that is, Wikus himself—to how the monster figure emerges in Star Trek (2009), 
released the same year as Blomkamp’s film. This comparison will lead to a 
discussion regarding the specific relation between reportage rhetoric and Wikus, 
which contributes to the allegory in a certain way. 
Within the discourses of race in sci-fi, Christine Cornea (2007, p. 176) 
regards the image of an alien monster as a visual code of otherness, associated with 
such notions as fear and anxiety. That is, the monster serves as a visually striking 
element of mise-en-scene that also acts as an unmotivated (or flimsily motivated) 
agent of disruption. Although the monster causes chaos that can build up tension or 
excitement, spectators of the movie are not invited to engage with its internal 
aspects or changes. This is, for example, the case for Star Trek. As a long-running 
and well-rooted sci-fi franchise, Star Trek has long created monsters, and one of 
the newest—Hengraugg (Figure 3)—may be the most gigantic. Hengraugg is not a 
protagonist. Its limited appearance condenses its narrative function into creating 
tension and advancing the protagonist onto the next phase of the plot. Hengraugg’s 
huge size, reddish color, extremely brutal movements, and scary-deep voice define 
its spectacle, but it has no character development. Spectators are invited to engage 
with its destruction, but not with its internal world. 
 
 
Figure 3. Hengraugg pursues its enemies (Abrams & Lindelof, 2009).  
 
Regarding alien-invasion films, Jay Telotte (2001, p. 36), falling into line 
with Cornea, recognizes a historical connotation of the alien monster as a physical 







threat to humanity according to long-standing genre conventions. Major narrative 
conflict thus implies and reinforces a dichotomy between humans and the alien 
monster, yet one of the key points distinguishing District 9 from other alien-
invasion films is the eliminated division between human and alien monster. To 
frame this using Altman’s dual concept of film genre, the semantic elements such 
as alien characters and mothership setting in District 9 are coded in parallel with 
the genre-specific conventions; however, the syntactic signals that point to the 
human-alien hybrid monster demonstrate innovation. This hybridity confounds 
distinction; the racial (or even arguably racist) division between human and alien 
monster is ultimately damaged. Despite this antiracist subtext, how the ironically 
contrary tone of reportage style frames the human-alien hybrid will be discussed 
further below. 
Contrary to Star Trek, District 9 frames the genre monster differently, by 
linking the concept to the protagonist himself. In the beginning, Wikus (Figure 4) 
is neither a “monster” nor a sympathetic character. After the inciting incident in 
which he is poisoned, Wikus physically becomes a monster by undergoing such 
external changes as losing fingernails and finally developing a monster arm. 
Although these transform Wikus physically, however, they also invite sympathy. 
Such changes are shown as an orderly life falling into catastrophe: as a result of the 
changes, Wikus must leave his home and family, and he is isolated from society 
and unfairly labeled as an outlaw.  
Jonathan Crane (in Fischoff, Dimopoulos, Nguyen, & Gordon, 2003, p. 4) 
discusses how a spectator can identify with a monster, claiming that monsters that 
are misunderstood outcasts are generally pitied and are even occasionally found 
attractive. Wikus comes to fall into this category; he invites engagement with his 
internal world as he faces his own transfiguration and the resulting isolation, 
betrayal, and abuse. Also, in terms of internal changes, character development 
indicates an ideological change to parallel the physical process. Wikus’ gradual 
transfiguration might seem fearsome, but his path to antiracist hero creates positive 
space for the viewer to identify with Wikus. To exemplify both the point and 
Wikus’s character development, in the climax of the structure, Wikus as old-
xenophobic/racist, or at least a brutal figure, fights for his alien-partner Christopher 
against MNU. This is basically where the spectators take side with Wikus, 
identifying with him in his heroic battle alone, despite Wikus’s increasingly alien 
appearance. The monster of District 9 in this sense claims a departure from the 
conventional monster. 








Figure 4. Wikus gradually transforms into an alien monster (Jackson & Blomkamp, 
2009). 
 
After a challenge by District 9 to the conventional genre monster is 
considered, its depiction through mockumentary aesthetics can be more confidently 
revisited. The relationship between reportage rhetoric and the monster makes a 
valuable contribution to the allegory, in which the news media is the instrument of 
ideological bias, by placing the protagonist in a racist frame. In contrast to the main 
narrative arc, Wikus is a conventional genre monster for the reportages; how they 
frame Wikus is incapable of commanding identification. As with the eliminated 
dichotomy between human and alien, the racial distinction, concealed, is subtly 
revealed using remediation signals and intertextual influences.  
In line with the evident bias and fearmongering aspects brought forth in the 
reportage style, Wikus is also depicted in the reportage, which emphasizes his 
external condition over his inner thoughts and feelings. That is, the reportages resist 
identifying with Wikus and even work against engagement with him. The formal 
aspects of these footages are not compatible with identification. Graphical elements 
such as bulletins and titles, creating an extra-diegesis, zoom-ins/outs and bird’s-eye 
shots that distort how the human eye would view the subject, are additional barriers 
for such a process. Authoritative voice-overs with the voice of another person 
instead of with the subject’s, along with lack of non-diegetic sound, are not 
consonant with identification here. This is especially valid for the sound, because 
of the potential quality of non-diegetic sound to create a more dramatic atmosphere 
and reinforce key themes.  







The reportages do not simply allow for the subjective-internal sound, which 
would have been a potential invitation for the inside of Wikus’s mind. Thus, a 
possible engagement via auditory means is also blocked by the reportages. These 
elements therefore emphasize the monster’s external qualities rather than give a 
chance to the monster’s internal word. Consequently, in line with fearmongering 
and racism, mentioned above, the genre-challenging aspects of Wikus are not 
depicted by the reportages, especially because of the way formal elements are used. 
By framing the monster in specific ways, reportage rhetoric plays an important part 
in the allegory in which the relationship between racism and the news media is 
underscored.  
 Conclusions 
The reportage style in District 9 resembles everyday news that people 
encounter through TV news channels. This verisimilar reportage style, its 
remediation underscoring the ideological bias and fearmongering in screen news 
media, is ironic and satirical. These two controversial aspects are mocked as they 
have direct or indirect connections with racism. This makes a significant 
contribution to the meaning-making of the apartheid allegory in that ideological 
news and fearmongering are as dangerous and socially damaging as racism 
precisely because they are themselves racist. Simultaneously, a departure from the 
genre contributes to the antiracist subtext of the apartheid allegory. The genre-
challenging protagonist whose internal aspects the spectators are at least potentially 
invited to engage with is ultimately an alien, but his transformation, which provokes 
this engagement by turning the protagonist into an “antiracist hero” with whom 
spectators identify, is blocked by the reportages; hence, reportage rhetoric 
contributes to making sense of the allegory in which the news media is a tool of 
systematic racism. Reportage style and its relationship with the departure from the 
genre marks an important juncture and innovatively contributes to contemporary 
sci-fi filmmaking.  
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DROWNING IN DEPRESSION: A READING OF WILLIAM 
COWPER'S "THE CASTAWAY" 
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Depression can feel like drowning in the agitated waters of a stormy sea. 
The unavoidable grip of mental illness can take hold of a person and pull them 
under in a turmoil of unstable emotion that can seem impossible to survive; some 
do not. Such is the case in William Cowper’s elegiac poem “The Castaway,” which 
takes the reader on a chaotic psychological journey of the literal and emotional 
meanings of drowning by the fictional sailor and the poet himself to understand the 
power that depression can wield over the afflicted. “The Castaway” is a metaphor 
for William Cowper’s unstable mental state in the last year of his life and imposes 
the idea that the hopelessness and despair of depression could befall anyone. 
Britannica Encyclopedia hails William Cowper as the upper echelon of 
English poets of the eighteenth century, the most widely read of his time, and one 
of the best letter-writers in the English language. The injections of his own tortured 
emotions into his writing contribute to our understanding of depression within 
Romantic literature, and his significance as a poet has been sustained through 
centuries. For future generations of poets, Cowper was to become an iconic figure 
because of, rather than in spite of, his madness (Darcy). The discoveries of his 
mental instability and frailty have shed light on the dominance of literary discourse 
over medical understandings of melancholy and madness in the 1800s. 
William Cowper was a remarkable prose writer; he was also plagued by a 
lifelong severe affective disorder thrashing him about in waves of intense 
depression and brief moments of religious enlightenment. His mental illness thrust 
him into “serious bouts of depression and attempted suicides, with his life ending 
in emotional despair” (Lake 36). Prior to 1773, when the first mental health hospital 
was opened, doctors were predominantly concerned with minimizing the disruption 
on the general public by the mentally ill. Professionals in the medical field during 
Cowper’s lifetime lacked the knowledge necessary to diagnose or effectively treat 
mental conditions; as a result, Cowper’s poetry acts as a journal for the natural 
progression of depression. The fear and isolation of his vacillating mental illness 
were exposed notably in his poem “The Castaway,” which lacks a fixed or unified 
position and point of view, revealing the internal uproar that Cowper experienced 







through most of his life because of unsuccessful treatments for his condition. The 
frailty of the poet poured onto the pages of his writing, revealing the extent his 
desolation reached, as well as his consciousness that there was to be no cure for his 
suffering. 
Further breakdown and “‘reading the text against itself’ produce a sense of 
disunity, of a text engaged in a civil war with itself” (Barry 81). A person who is 
entrapped in the throes of depression will feel as if a war has been waged within 
the confines of their mind. If they do not seek the necessary assistance, they can 
drown in a metaphorical sea of anguish, despair, and isolation. Unfortunately, what 
a person suffering from depression reveals to the outside world can be in direct 
opposition to the terror and loss they are experiencing on the inside. Analysis of 
“The Castaway” discloses a stark contrast between what is professed in the poem 
and what is expressed in the meaning and tone of the words. A commonality among 
individuals suffering from depression is an inability to profess or acknowledge 
precisely what they are suffering through, as the disorder leads to significant 
difficulties in social functioning. Much like the poem, the afflicted may profess 
their own stability while those around them begin to see the expression of a life 
falling apart. 
The Encyclopedia of Social Psychology defines depression as “a common 
disorder primarily characterized by either a low or depressed mood or a loss of 
interest or pleasure in nearly all activities.” Depression profoundly affects an 
individual’s thoughts and feelings, having severe consequences, including the risk 
of suicide. Interpersonal behaviors, combined with negative life experiences, can 
clash and contribute to an uncontrollable negative cycle of depression that can be 
difficult to escape. Cowper’s depression was amplified by the loss of his mother 
when he was six years old and was further fueled by the loss of his close friend 
Mary Unwin, from which he never fully recovered. The present-day understanding 
that mild symptoms of depression can increase over time in response to opposing 
factors helps us to interpret the downward spiral of Cowper’s mental state as he 
suffered devastating disappointments and losses throughout his life. 
“The Castaway,” in an almost elegiac form, tells the story of a sailor who is 
washed overboard during a particularly stormy night at sea just after his ship has 
left Great Britain. Much of the poem is told from the perspective of the helpless 
and abandoned sailor, onto whom Cowper projects his own helplessness and 
despair, “a transition that I have made so often,” into what he ponders the sailor 
would be thinking and feeling (Cowper 254). The fierceness of the storm prevents 
the sailor’s crewmates from saving him, and they are forced to flee for their own 







safety, leaving their shipmate to die at the hands of the open ocean. As early as the 
end of the first stanza, it is no secret that the sailor is going to lose everything, 
including his own life: “Of friends, of hope, of all bereft” (line 5). Though he is at 
first confident in his swimming abilities, his confidence falters, bitterness passes 
briefly, and he then is overcome with hopelessness as he realizes how dire his 
situation is. When he can no longer hear the cries of his fleeing shipmates, he gives 
up, allowing the ocean to take him, and he drowns in the crashing waves.  
In all of the men Cowper describes in the poem, strength gives way to 
weakness. Initially, the crewmates are robust in their attempts to save the sailor, 
and he is described as an expert swimmer; however, strength and confidence both 
dissipate when the sailor experiences helplessness and an emotional breakdown at 
realizing the physical impossibility of his crewmates saving him. 
Although medical professionals in the eighteenth century thought that 
religious radicalism caused madness, it was not yet medically reasoned whether 
Cowper’s spiritual beliefs caused his depression. The daily life and the spiritual life 
“cannot be compartmentalized. They ride parallel with each other. The issues of 
life influence spirituality and spirituality influences life” (Lake 41). Cowper 
suffered fluctuating periods of depression as early as 1743, when he was just a 
child. In the 1760s, during the immense wake of the Evangelical Revival, Cowper 
converted to Calvinism. The ensuing religious fanaticism convinced Cowper that 
he was damned by God, as he wrote to a friend: “As to myself, I have always the 
same song to sing—Well in body, but sick in spirit; sick, nigh unto death” (Cowper 
345). During a time when medical science had not discovered the root of mental 
illness, an individual with a mental disorder could feel strongly that God was the 
ultimate judge, their sins against him unforgivable, and that God was the source of 
their mental anguish. Cowper was convinced that he was plummeted into the 
darkness of his mental illness by God because of his sinfulness, despite having lived 
a pious and reclusive life; he expressed in a letter to his spiritual mentor, John 
Newton, “for my spiritual props have long since been struck from under me” 
(Cowper 249). In 1763, he attempted one of numerous suicides and was placed in 
an institution. Despite regaining a stable state of mind, he experienced bouts of 
depression in 1787 and 1792, and his mental anguish was persistent from 1794 until 
his death in 1800.    
Cowper’s case represents a pivotal point in the politics of madness and 
religious fanaticism, however (Darcy). Just after his death, the medical field began 
to accept that insanity and other forms of mental suffering were not caused by 
theological extremism but, in fact, quite the opposite. Jane Darcy, in a test case of 







William Cowper and religious melancholy, documented that in the seventeenth 
century, a “new generation of physicians insisted that religious melancholy was a 
mental symptom, indicative of a diseased brain.” By the eighteenth century, 
religious melancholy had already begun to dissipate as a medical diagnosis, in favor 
of concrete psychological understandings that were emerging. Medical interest in 
Cowper’s case peaked in the nineteenth century after publications of his biography 
exposed the language he used to self-report his mental condition in letters to his 
friends.  
Today, mental illness is understood to a much greater extent, though a 
degree of stigma still surrounds its causes and treatments. In the 1700s, however, 
mental illness was not scientifically understood. As a result, “prevailing treatments 
included solitary confinement, conditioned fear of the doctor, powerful but 
minimally effective drugs, bleeding, shackles, and plunge baths. It was thought that 
the patients had chosen a life of insanity and need[ed] to decide to change their 
ways” (Coy). Treatment facilities were barbaric, and further damage was done to 
the patients therein. Cowper was a victim of those popular yet ineffective 
treatments, and, given the numerous and devastating losses he suffered, along with 
the religious fanaticism that had a firm grip on him, he was never truly able to 
release himself from the damaging emotions that entrapped him for most of his life.   
Through analysis of Cowper’s poem, we can suggest interpretations of his 
intentions and meanings, but the most hearty evidence of his dejected mental state 
can be found in his personal letters to his friend and mentor, John Newton, 
published in The Private Correspondence of William Cowper Esq., with Several of 
His Most Intimate Friends. Within these personal letters, Cowper lays bare his 
awareness of his mental deterioration after years of expressing his vehemently 
religious beliefs. He confessed that he was “overwhelmed with the blackest 
despair,” counterpointed by feelings of elation, for eleven years, these always 
coming and going as the rushing waves of the ocean. This emotional turmoil 
changed with the seasons, with Cowper always expressing more depression in the 
winter (Cowper 243). Seasonal affective disorder (SAD) is a mood disorder that 
most often recurs in autumn and winter, triggered by the increased number of dark 
hours as the daylight grows progressively shorter. Cowper experienced some of the 
symptoms of SAD: fatigue, difficulty concentrating, withdrawal from family and 
friends, and reclusion from social activities. Cowper seemed aware of the 
metaphorical waves of his depression many years before writing “The Castaway” 
in 1799, one year before his death. This cognizance is evidenced by his expression 
to Newton in a letter dated May 1785 that he has experienced feelings of 







hopefulness, “though they have been of short duration; cut off, like the foam upon 
the waters” (Cowper 406). Having suffered from depression from a young age, 
Cowper was no novice to the feelings of emotional ups and downs that accompany 
mental illness, and he likely felt those waves of emotional chaos crashing over 
himself long before he composed his poem of the sailor who felt the waves of the 
stormy sea crashing over him. 
In “The Castaway,” Cowper laments the last hours of the doomed sailor and 
conveys his own dejected state of mind as likened to the situation the sailor finds 
himself in. In line 6, the speaker refers to “[h]is floating home,” alluding to both 
the ship and the unstable ground of mental illness. From the poem’s evocation of 
this poignant impermanence, the reader can feel the sense of hopelessness and 
helplessness that the sailor experiences, which align strikingly with the feelings that 
consume those suffering from depression. Through the words of Cowper and those 
spoken by the narrator as the plight of the sailor is laid out on the page, it is apparent 
that no one is insusceptible to the horror that is depression. Much like Cowper, the 
sailor is powerless to change his predicament, as is anyone lost in a sea of mental 
instability. 
Cowper hints at the inspiration for his overboard sailor by referencing 
George Anson in line 52, who wrote of his expeditions in A Voyage Round the 
World in 1748. “The Castaway” is based on a particular incident in the book, in 
which one of the sailors was washed overboard as the ship rounded Cape Horn in 
the middle of a terrible storm (Packer n5). At first glance, the poem appears to be 
integrated and flowing coherently, yet contradictions between life and death, hope 
and despair, and closeness and isolation begin to emerge as the narrator draws the 
sailor from a life full of hope and companionship on shore to abandonment, 
isolation, and, ultimately, death at the hands of the open ocean. Cowper singles out 
an unknown sailor from Anson’s expeditions for his poem and intermingles his own 
hope and despair, and life and death, with those of the sailor: “But misery still 
delights to trace / Its semblance in another’s case” (lines 59–60). The line is blurred 
between Anson’s journaled recounts of his expeditions and Cowper’s poem when 
the speaker acknowledges the resemblance between the two. Such a reference also 
suggests that Cowper is presenting himself and his own life as the semblance to the 
abandoned and drowning sailor, as the poem is suggestive of his own depressive 
state. 
The oppositions throughout the poem appear to create opposition in the 
sailor and Cowper as well, yet both are drowning and facing looming death. This 
lack of a fixed position lends itself to recognition of the psychological battle the 







sailor endures when his confidence swiftly dissipates and is replaced by 
helplessness and despair:  
Expert to swim, he lay;  
Nor soon he felt his strength decline,  
Or courage die away; 
But wag’d with death a lasting strife, 
Supported by despair of life (14–18). 
Much as the poem seems to fluctuate between the thoughts and emotions of 
Cowper, his speaker, and the drowning sailor, depression can also feel as if the one 
suffering lacks a fixed position. The afflicted individual’s mood, thinking, and 
behavior often shift drastically, creating feelings of instability, confusion, and 
helplessness, all symptomatic of depression, and those around the individual are 
powerless to save them. This helplessness is echoed in the crew members aboard 
the ship, whose attempts to save their crewmate are thwarted by the rough storm 
and the vicious Atlantic sea. The sailor is able to hold himself above water for a 
time, but ultimately, his fate cannot be escaped, and Cowper is no exception. Waves 
overtake them both; one drowns in the sea, the other in depression.  
Analysis of this intensely personal and dramatic narrative poem divulges a 
stark contrast between what is said in the poem and what is expressed. Lack of unity 
and consistency can be found throughout the poem, from the fluctuations in tone, 
perspective, and point of view. Even the title suggests that the protagonist in the 
poem is “cast away,” implying that he is abandoned by his ship when, in truth, he 
is washed overboard by the storm and unable to be saved by his crewmates, despite 
their best efforts. Cowper felt cast away in a very literal sense and connected with 
the sailor’s plight. Depression can cause the afflicted to feel as if they have been 
cast away from society, caught in their own internal storms until they drown in the 
emotional upheaval that overtakes them. Though the sailor does not blame his 
crewmates for leaving him and he recognizes “that flight, in such a sea / Alone 
could rescue them” (lines 33–34), he implies that they desert him in their efforts to 
save themselves. In fact, his feelings of resentment and desertion begin to appear 
in lines 23 and 24, when the speaker informs that “[t]hey left their outcast mate 
behind” (my italics), a clear indication that, although understanding was originally 
professed, the expression is not as positive. The entire sixth stanza is rife with 
descriptions of his bitterness; words such as “cruel,” “condemn,” “haste,” “bitter,” 
and “deserted” pepper the stanza and expose true feelings of resentment, which 







often accompanies depression. By electing to use these terms, Cowper shows that 
his own experiences reside well within the norms of universal human suffering. 
The perspective of speakers throughout the poem destabilizes the identity 
of whom we are receiving the narrative from: the sailor, the narrator, or Cowper 
himself. The poem implies that Cowper is injecting his own feelings about his 
depression into the narrative and relating directly with the drowning sailor, his 
depression amplifying his feelings of being cast aside by family and friends in his 
life. Depression causes negative feelings in individuals, which can result in 
isolation, avoiding situations that could potentially bring the perceived negativity 
to the forefront. The speaker in the poem acknowledges, on behalf of the sailor, that 
the crew had no choice but to flee the storm, yet the sailor expresses bitterness that 
more is not done to save him: “Whate’er they gave, should visit more” (line 30). 
His understanding turns to feelings of isolation, amplifying his dire situation when 
he realizes that, as close as his crewmates are in proximity, they are powerless to 
save him. 
Cowper’s presence can be felt at the beginning of the poem, as well as at 
the end. The chosen pronouns throughout the poem create a lack of a singular, fixed, 
point of view. The speaker at once refuses to identify with the sailor’s plight yet 
melds his own emotions, fears, and isolation in nearly seamless alterations between 
the surface story of the sailor and the more in-depth story hiding beneath it: 
Cowper’s own mental breakdown. Throughout the poem and the shifts between life 
and death, and between hope and despair, Cowper maintains the sailor’s anonymity, 
allowing only glances at the metaphors between the drowning sailor and the poet 
himself. The shift from “I” to male pronouns in the first stanza indicates that 
Cowper immediately sees the narrative poem as a metaphor for his own life. Just 
as quickly, he abandons self-identity and refers to the sailor using male pronouns. 
He again shifts back to the use of self-identification in the tenth stanza, by saying, 
“I therefore purpose not, or dream” (line 55). The poem reveals two very individual 
layers, but the shifts are so erratic that the amalgamation creates a relationship 
between the imaginative story of the sailor drowning and Cowper’s own feelings 
of isolation, abandonment, and loss. By viewing these destabilized borders between 
Cowper, his narrator, and the sailor, one can see how depression could befall 
anyone.   
The last stanza entangles the loneliness felt by both Cowper and the sailor, 
a feeling so deep that even divine intervention cannot save either of them: “We 
perish’d, each alone: / But I beneath a rougher sea, / And whelm’d in deeper gulfs 
than he” (lines 64–66). In moments of crisis, the elasticity of time makes minutes 







seem like hours: “He long survives, who lives an hour” (line 37). The last hour of 
the drowning sailor provides a striking metaphor for the last year of Cowper’s life, 
in which he struggled to keep from drowning in his own depression and fear, 
imagining himself “as a castaway on an even deeper sea than the one in which the 
sailor perished” (Packer). Profoundly alone and hollow of all hope, the speaker 
knows as early as line 11 that death is imminent for the sailor, and Cowper knew 
that his time was drawing near as well. “Pain and gloom were the first and last 
chapters to the story of William Cowper,” and Cowper projected that sentiment 
onto the sailor in his narrative poem at both the beginning and the end (Lake 44). 
He professed that the sailor loved Albion, or Great Britain, and the ship, but that 
love was in vain, as all would be lost to the sailor in the end, including the sailor’s 
own life. In an eerie prophecy of Cowper’s own demise, the lack of a happy ending 
in the poem reverberates with anyone who has experienced hopelessness through 
depression.   
In 1792, just eight years before his death, Cowper succinctly expressed in a 
letter the instability he had felt for much of his life, an instability that reverberates 
with the drowning sailor: “The future appears gloomy as ever; and I seem to myself 
to be scrambling always in the dark, among rocks and precipices, without a guide, 
but with an enemy ever at my heels, prepared to push me headlong. Thus I have 
spent twenty years, but thus I shall not spend twenty more years” (Cowper 331). 
These same gloomy, scrambling, lost, and lonely feelings are universally shared by 
anyone afflicted with depression. Through the words of the speaker describing the 
sailor’s last moments, Cowper, consumed by his own fears of his imminent death, 
gives palpability to his own despair and abandonment, and he will soon drown as 
well. Waves eventually overtake both the sailor and Cowper, and neither survives 
the storm. 
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Abstract 
Pediatric hearing loss presents many spoken-language learning issues that 
can affect parent-infant interaction. Moreover, additional disabilities are likely to 
increase stress, which could have cascading effects on communication. The purpose 
of this study was to examine interactions between mother-child and father-child 
dyads with and without hearing loss and/or autism spectrum disorder (ASD), 
cytomegalovirus (CMV), and global delay. Recordings of the parents speaking with 
six infants were analyzed: an infant with cochlear implants and ASD (low 
socioeconomic status [SES]), two infants with cochlear implants and normal 
development (high SES and low SES), one infant with a cochlear implant and CMV 
(average SES), one infant with a cochlear implant and global delay (average SES), 
and one infant who was typically developing and had normal hearing (high SES). 
After analyzing the results for communication measures, such as vocalization 
attempts, turn-taking in utterances, mean length of utterances, and type-token ratio, 
it was concluded that maternal and paternal interaction were negatively affected 
only because of the difficulty of the hearing loss and/or additional disability, but 
because of a combination of factors including the disability, SES, maternal and 
paternal education, and home environment.  
Little if any research to date has been conducted on the influence of 
maternal and paternal interaction when an infant has both hearing loss and 
additional disabilities (Beer, Harris, Kronenberger, Holt, & Pisoni, 2012; Meinzen-
Derr, Wiley, Grether, & Choo, 2011). Beer and colleagues (2012) studied the 
language development of children with cochlear implants and additional disabilities 
ranging from cognitive or learning delays to autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), 
developmental delays, and other syndromic conditions. Understanding that typical 
testing would not be as effective for individuals in this population, the researchers 
created a battery of tests specific for testing children with disabilities. Beer et al. 
(2012) tested for functional auditory skills, which assesses the infant's ability to 
respond spontaneously to sounds in the environment, using the Infant Toddler: 







Meaningful Auditory Integration Scale (IT-MAIS; Zimmerman-Phillips, Robbins, 
& Osberger, 1997); receptive and expressive language, using the Preschool 
Language Scale, 4th Edition (PLS-4; Zimmerman, Steiner, & Pond, 2002); adaptive 
behaviors such as communication abilities, daily living skills, socialization, and 
motor skills, using the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale (Sparrow, Cicchetti, 
Balla, 2005); and cognitive functioning, using the Bayley Scales of Infant and 
Toddler Behaviors (Bayley, 2005). After assessing the 23 children in the study with 
a pre-test, before cochlear implantation, and post-test, Beer et al. (2012) found that 
overall, the participants with hearing loss and additional disability made progress 
in functional auditory skills, receptive and expressive language, and adaptive skills 
after one year of implantation. The data were compared to those for children who 
also had cochlear implants at the same age at implantation who did not have 
additional disabilities. Beer et al. noted that the children with cochlear implants and 
additional disabilities did not see the same level of progress as their cochlear 
implant-only peers but still made some progress in language development. This 
research is important for the current study because it suggests that there is 
development of language skills in children with hearing loss and additional 
disabilities.  
Studies from the two different fields suggest that having a disability in 
addition to cochlear implantation would affect mother- and father-infant 
interactions in many forms. When parents interact with an infant with a hearing 
loss, previous studies have suggested different methods of communication to 
maximize speech and language outcomes, such as being direct with the infant 
during the interaction and reinforcing the infant’s vocalization attempts (Choo and 
Dettman, 2016). Focusing more on the interaction to ensure the infant is both 
understanding parental speech and trying to create a conversation of their own 
might also be beneficial. Being attentive to the conversation is very important, and 
something most parents of typical-hearing infants would not naturally focus on as 
thoroughly. When additional disabilities are added to the mix, communication 
attempts could possibly be more difficult. As such, it is hypothesized that parent 
interaction will be negatively affected because of the added difficulty of the 
conversation.   
Caregiver Interaction and Cochlear Implants 
Previous research done by Fagan, Bergeson, and Morris (2014) has 
examined how maternal interaction differed before and after an infant received a 
cochlear implant. The researchers compared mother-infant vocal synchrony, 







maternal complexity, and maternal directives and found that mothers adapted their 
speech to try to conform to the hearing loss, rather than using communication 
similar to that used by mothers speaking to infants with typical hearing. For 
example, mothers’ mean length of utterances (MLU) was less complex than that of 
speech to hearing infants the same age, and mothers’ utterances overlapped the 
infants’ speech more than with hearing infants, rather than typical turn-taking. 
Fagan and colleagues suggested that infants’ ability to perceive sounds after 
cochlear implantation contributes to their mothers’ increasing awareness of the 
infants’ auditory abilities, which results in changes to mothers’ reciprocal 
communication. Many mothers change their communication habits to better fit 
infants’ emerging vocabularies; for example, they may use simple utterances and 
less back-and-forth conversation when dealing with infants with cochlear implants. 
Fagan et al. suggest that it is important to enhance interactions to help with infants’ 
language learning.  
It is important for parents of infants with hearing loss and cochlear implants 
to be educated on how to best promote language learning and communication. Choo 
and Dettman (2016) examined the effect that maternal interaction has on the 
communication of an infant with a cochlear implant, as well as strategies to best 
promote interactions. Most parents and infants who have cochlear implants interact 
with an aural-oral approach, which focuses on visual interaction and spoken 
language. Choo and Dettman suggest that additional interaction might help advance 
the infant's communication and language learning. That is, interaction techniques 
can differ based on whether the focus is on the parent input or on encouraging 
reciprocal communication. Parent input is focused on using interesting voices, 
increasing frequency and consistency of the interactions. This can be done by sitting 
closer to the infant or using more facial expressions and gestures. Reciprocal 
communication involves finding ways to be more attentive and interactive in 
communication attempts, such as creating a back-and-forth interaction with the 
infant. The goal of the approach with infants with cochlear implants would be to 
use a combination of techniques, encouraging parents to use these strategies to not 
only improve their own interactions but also help their infants interact and 
communicate more efficiently. The more focused the interaction, the better chance 
the infant has at acquiring language, learning to interact well with others, and 
carrying out an interactive sequence.   
 
 







Autism Spectrum Disorders  
For more than 75 years, research has been evolving to better understand 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD). According to Faras, Ateeqi, and Tidmarsh (2010), 
ASD is categorized by three main deficits, including impaired communication, 
impaired social interaction, and restricted and repetitive patterns of behavior and 
interest. Because autism is a spectrum disorder, the impairments range in severity 
and can change through acquisition of additional developmental skills (Faras et al., 
2010). With the characteristics of ASD in mind, the inability to communicate 
socially can influence the caregiver-infant interaction, creating more-stressful 
communication attempts because of the deficits mentioned previously. As such, the 
ability to understand characteristics of ASD is important for any parent who has to 
partake in such interactions. 
Before the official age of diagnosis, signs of autistic behavior have been 
observed in research during play or personal interaction. These cues can range from 
lack of eye contact to more specific aspects, such as limiting their focus. According 
to Bentenuto, De Falco, and Venuti (2016), infants who were later diagnosed with 
ASD showed signs of limited symbolic play, or of shortening their play sequences 
and not creating pretend scenarios with their dolls or toys. The researchers also 
noticed infants limiting their selection of toys, choosing to focus on a single object 
rather than switching attention to more than one toy. Another behavior during infant 
play that has been shown to be a cue to ASD is “sticky attention,” or what Sacrey, 
Bryson, and Zwaigenbaum (2013) describe as a child taking “longer to disengage 
their attention toward a second, peripheral target” (p. 442). “Sticky attention,” or 
staring, is a cue present in many infants but is usually outgrown by the end of the 
first year (Sacrey et al., 2013). When that behavior continues for infants past one 
year old, it could be a sign of autistic behaviors.  
Global Delay 
Mithyantha, Kneen, McCann, and Gladstone (2017) describe global delay 
as a delay in two or more developmental domains. Domains can include gross or 
fine motor skills, speech and language, cognition, and social or personal skills, most 
commonly affecting children under the age of five years old (Mithyantha et al., 
2017). Global delay can be classified as mild, moderate, or severe. As global delay 
affects more than one area of developmental domains, the additional impact of 
hearing loss can cause major difficulty in communication with the infant.  
 








Cytomegalovirus (CMV) is the most common congenital infection that can 
cause disease in infants, according to Zuylen et al. (2014). Infants are infected by 
CMV during pregnancy, as the maternal infection crosses the placental barrier 
(Zuylen et al., 2014). Although a relatively mild infection for the mother, it can 
have devastating effects on the infant. Infants with CMV can have varying 
symptoms, including but not limited to unilateral or bilateral sensorineural hearing 
loss, vision loss, jaundice, seizures, and mental disability (Zuylen et al., 2014). 
According to Zuylen and colleagues, CMV is the leading cause of sensorineural 
hearing loss in developed countries. As such, the possibility of infants with CMV 
wearing cochlear implants is high. This can affect maternal and paternal interaction 
with infants, as hearing loss is just one of many symptoms that would affect the 
conversation. Understanding how best to interact with the infant will be most 
beneficial to parents as they try to navigate communication when cochlear implants 
and additional disabilities are involved.  
Infant-Directed Speech and Later Language Learning 
Infant-directed speech (IDS) is classified by slower rate, greater pitch 
variations, longer pauses, repetition, and shorter sentences (Ma, Golinkoff, 
Houston, and Hirsh-Pasek, 2011). Individuals can use IDS to gain an infant’s 
attention or, as research has suggested, encourage language acquisition (Ma et al., 
2011). Ma and colleagues investigated whether 21-to-27-month-old children 
gained a larger vocabulary when taught with IDS compared to adult-directed 
speech. The results suggest that IDS facilitates language learning, particularly for 
younger infants who have a lower vocabulary. Ma et al. concluded that presenting 
infants with IDS shows greater gains than adult-directed speech in language 
acquisition in young infants. It is therefore important for the current study for 
parents to implement IDS early during interactions.  
Together, these studies suggest that implementation of IDS in interaction in 
the early stages of development has a positive effect on language acquisition—but 
when interacting with an infant with a hearing loss or additional disabilities, how 
does IDS compare across infants? It is hypothesized that parent interaction in the 
current study will be negatively affected by the difficulty of the conversation. 
 
 







Parental Stress Associated with Hearing Loss 
Parental stress can be seen in any parent-child relationship due to the 
obstacles that appear when raising a child. These stressors, however, can be 
heightened when a child has a hearing loss. When parents discover that their child 
has a hearing loss, they often undergo a grieving process, which can be triggered as 
the child continues to grow and as new hardships surface (Sarant and Garrard, 
2013). Sarant and Garrard state that parents will also face “ongoing practical 
challenges,” such as increased medical appointments, education about hearing loss 
and management of cochlear implants, learning how to come to terms with their 
child having a disability, and learning how to best advocate for their child’s needs. 
Additional factors examined to cause stress include child age, age of diagnosis, 
social support, parental education, and parental income (Sarant and Garrard, 2013).  
Although parental stress was not specifically studied in this research, 
understanding the stressors that surface when a parent has an infant with a hearing 
loss is important when observing the parent-infant dyads in the study. It was 
understood when observing the dyads that the stressors mentioned above are 
present in the interactions, further affecting the communication beyond the hearing 
loss or other disabilities present.  
Methodology 
Participants 
In the study, LENA audio recordings were analyzed for six infants who 
participated in an NIH-NIDCD-funded research study with collaborators at The 
Ohio State University. The LENA is a recording device that the infant wears 
throughout the day. It records all interactions that take place and is used to pull out 
information about the infant's language abilities and communication skills. For this 
study, the LENA audio recordings were completed in each infant's home and 
included interactions with the infant's mother as well as select interactions with 
both the mother and father. This study analyzed recordings of the parents speaking 
with six infants: one infant with cochlear implants and ASD (low SES), two infants 
with cochlear implants and normal development (one high SES and one low SES), 
one infant with a cochlear implant and CMV (average SES), one infant with a 
cochlear implant and global delay (average SES), and one infant who was typically 
developing (high SES). The LENA recordings were filtered, pulled from 
interactions during mealtime, playtime, story time, or bedtime routine, a segment 







of the day that would yield high interaction and language content. These 
interactions were chosen because of the amount of time required to analyze the 
audio recordings, making sure specific and informative data were retrieved. This 
time was chosen because of to the consistency in daily interaction, as well as 
consistency across participants.  
Procedure 
The first phase of the study focused on transcribing the maternal and 
paternal interactions. For the infant with cochlear implants and normal 
development (low SES) and the infants with cochlear implants and an additional 
disability (ASD, CMV, global delay), the LENA recordings were transcribed at 
three-, six-, and nine-month intervals  after activation of the infant's cochlear 
implant (or after the first recording session). For the infant with cochlear implants 
and normal development (high SES) and the infant with normal development and 
normal hearing, the LENA recordings were analyzed for three months  after 
activation of the infant’s cochlear implant and three months of age, respectively. 
Most of the audio recordings had two to three days of recordings per monthly 
interval, meaning at each month interval, two to three days of LENA recordings 
had been recorded in the infant’s home, allowing about 16 hours of audio recording 
per day. The audio recordings were first timed out to determine what type of 
interaction would provide the best depiction of the communication occurring 
between the infants and their parents. After the audio file was listened to (and timed 
out), the transcription took place, which entailed the conversation between the 
infant and parent being typed out. During the transcription, codes were included 
that would allow for an easier understanding of the interaction that had taken place. 
For example, if the parent used any type of repetition or imitation of the infant's 
speech, a code was recorded, which can be used to understand what type of 
interaction the infant preferred, as well as how the parents used different strategies 
to elicit vocalization from the infants (see Table 1). This process was repeated for 













[IMITATE] Parent imitated child’s vocalization 
[LAF] Laughing 
[SENM] Sound effect, no meaning 
[SEM] Sound effect, meaning (i.e., woof for dog barking) 
[REP:n] Repetition of a sound 
[UREP] Repetition of an utterance 
[PUREP] Partial repetition of an utterance 
[EUREP] Expanded utterance repeated 
[IV] Infant vocalization 
[IC] Infant crying 
[NRC] No response from child 
[NRP] No response from parent 
[TARn:n] Target word: number of times used 
[IDS] Infant-directed speech 
[SU] Unintelligible speech understood by parent 
Table 1. Codes Used During Transcription of Parent-Infant Interactions 
 
 
Once the transcripts were complete for each infant at each month interval 
mentioned above, the transcript was processed through software called Systematic 
Analysis of Language Transcripts (SALT; Miller, Andriacchi, & Nockerts, 2015), 
which provided detailed analyses based on the language used during the 
conversation. During the three-month interval, the analyses focused on vocalization 
attempts (parent initiating a conversation with the infant or responding to the infant-
initiated conversation), turn-taking in utterances (“switching between 
comprehending the partner’s utterance and producing an appropriate and timely 
response”; Corps, Gambi, & Pickering, 2018), MLU (calculated by the number of 
morphemes, or smallest element of language, in each utterance—e.g., “I like dogs” 
is an MLU of 4 because of the –s added to dog; Williamson, 2014), and type-token 
ratio (total number of different words divided by the total number of words; 
Templin, 1957) for the parents and the infant. When comparing the infants with 
cochlear implants and additional disabilities, with cochlear implants, and with 
normal development, SALT analysis was further used to determine the target-word 
repetition (how many times the parent would specifically repeat a word to try to 
provide a language-learning opportunity—e.g., repeating the word “milk” so the 
infant would associate the word with the object being discussed), repetition (the 
number of times the parent repeated what the infant said during the conversation), 
IDS, electronic use (amount of media used daily in the home), and American Sign 
Language (ASL) use for the parent and infant across the six- and nine-month 
intervals (see Tables 2–4).  








The Role of Additional Disabilities 
When considering the role of additional disabilities in the study, no 
differences across groups were discovered (Tables 2–4). Although there are no 
differences, noting that the additional disabilities did not affect parent-infant 
interactions is an important result.  
The Role of Socioeconomic Status 
Specific details about the communication attempts of both the parents and 
infant were analyzed using SALT. When comparing the averages acquired across 
the six dyads (Table 2), the families with high SES had a higher number of 
vocalization attempts, had more turn taking, and used more utterances in their 
interactions than those with low SES. For example, two dyads have infants with 
cochlear implants and normal development, but one of those dyads has a high SES 
and the other has a low SES. Concerning their vocalization averages, the dyad with 
high SES had an average of 98 attempts, while the low had an average of 
approximately 22 attempts. Because the infant diagnosis is the same, the family’s 
SES is a key contributor in how the communication between the parents and the 
infant is affected. It was assumed that the dyads that have a cochlear implant and 
an additional disability would have similar results, but that is not the case. The 
dyads with CMV and cochlear implants and those with global delay and cochlear 
implants both have an average SES, while the dyad with ASD and cochlear 
implants has a low SES. The average-SES dyads have vocalization and turn-taking 
attempts more than double those of the low-SES dyad, as well as a higher MLU, 
with averages more similar to those of the high-SES dyads. Because the ASD-and-
cohclear implant dyad was so much lower than the others, it is assumed that SES 





































ND/NH High 43.5 16 4.39 1.58 7.65 1.00 0.42 0.16 
 
 M I M I M I M I M I 
ND/CI High 98 106 1.94 1.87 4.87 1.04 0.41 0.16 
 
 M&F I M&F I M&F I M&F I M&F I 
ND/CI Low 21.67 36 2.16 2.24 2.79 1.12 0.51 0.40 
 
 M&F I M&F I M&F I M&F I M&F I 
ASD/CI Low 16.5 29.3 1.63 2.59 3.13 1.00 0.55 0.06 
 
 M I M I M I M I M I 
GB/CI Average 47.5 15.5 3.00 1.29 4.46 1.00 0.57 0.14 
 
 M I M I M I M I M I 
CMV/CI Average 83 24 4.31 1.18 4.19 1.00 0.31 0.11 
          
Note. ASD = autism spectrum disorder; CI = cochlear implant; CMV = cytomegalovirus; GB 
=global delay; I=infant; M = mother; M&F = mother & father; MLU = mean length of 
utterances; ND = normal development; SES = socioeconomic status; TT = turn taking; TTR = 
type-token ratio. 
 
Table 2. Comparison of Average Infant and Parent Communication, 3 Months after 
Activation of Cochlear Implant 
 
The Role of the Environment  
For six and nine months, averages were documented in terms of 
vocalization attempts, turn taking in utterances, MLU, type-token ratio, target-word 
repetition, repetition, IDS, electronic use, and use of ASL (Tables 3 and 4). For 
both time intervals, each dyad had similar averages for vocalization attempts, unlike 
in the three-month results. This similarity could be due to the parents becoming 
more familiar with their infants’ hearing loss and disability, the parents learning 
how to better communicate with their infants, or due to the therapy that both the 
parents and infants were receiving, causing interactions to come with more ease. 
The ASD-and-chochlear impant dyad was still lower in certain aspects of the 
interaction, however, such as lower MLU and IDS at six months post-activation, 
and lower turn taking and target-word repetition at nine months post-activation. 







This infant was also exposed to three times the amount of media and electronics 
use than those in other dyads were, which can drastically affect language and 
communication. These factors combined showed that the environment can have a 
significant impact on the interaction, demonstrating that the interaction is affected 
by more than the infant having a hearing loss and additional disability as originally 
hypothesized.   
 
 SES Vocalization TT  MLU TTR 
 M&F I M&F I M&F I M&F I M&F I 
ND/CI Low 44.2 33.6 2.12 1.66 4.26 1.10 0.47 0.38 
 
 M&F I M&F I M&F I M&F I M&F I 
ASD/CI Low 32.3 47.3 1.61 1.72 4.10 1.00 0.53 0.05 
 
 M I M I M I M I M I 
GB/CI Average 44.00 22.00 2.27 1.47 4.71 1.00 0.48 0.12 
 
 M I M I M I M I M I 
CMV/CI Average 23.00 14.00 2.06 1.47 5.23 1.00 0.51 0.14 
 
 TWR Repetition IDS Education Level ASL Use 
 M&F M&F M&F M&F M&F 
ND/CI 3.8 5.6 5.0 HS/GED 0 
 
 M&F M&F M&F M&F M&F 
 
ASD/CI 0.7 7.67 1.5 
9th grade and 
HS/GED 0 
 
 M M M M M 
GB/CI 7.5 4.0 8.0 HS/GED 0.5 
 
 M M M M M 
CMV/CI 1.0 1.5 4.5 Associates Degree 2.5 
 
 Age Electronic Use     
 I I     
ND/CI 25 months 5%     
 
 I I     
ASD/CI 21 months 22%     
 
 I I     
GB/CI 23 months 4%     
 







 I I     
CMV/CI 19 months 8%     
Note. ASD = autism spectrum disorder; ASL = American Sign Language; CI = cochlear implant; 
CMV = cytomegalovirus; GB = global delay; HS/GED = high school diploma; I = infant; IDS = 
infant-directed speech; M = mother; M&F = mother & father; MLU = mean length of utterances in 
words; ND = normal development; SES = socioeconomic status; TT = turn taking in utterances; 
TTR = type-token ratio; TWR = target-word repetition. 
 
 
Table 3. Comparison of Average Infant and Parent Communication, 6 Months after 
Activation of Cochlear Implant 
 SES Vocalization TT  MLU TTR 
 M&F I M&F I M&F I M&F I M&F I 
ND/CI Low 46.00 30.67 2.09 1.66 4.51 1.49 0.50 0.46 
 
 M&F I M&F I M&F I M&F I M&F I 
ASD/CI Low 57.30 54.30 1.25 1.04 5.41 1.05 1.02 0.46 
 
 M I M I M I M I M I 
GB/CI Average 48.5 13.00 3.8 1.04 4.88 1.00 0.29 0.16 
 
 M I M I M I M I M I 
CMV/ 
CI Average 78.00 20.50 6.40 1.05 4.65 1.00 0.34 0.09 
 
 TWR Repetition IDS Education Level ASL Use 
 M&F M&F M&F M&F M&F 
ND/CI 4.33 6.67 3.33 HS/GED 2.67 
 
 M&F M&F M&F M&F M&F 
 
ASD/CI 0.25 14 7.5 
9th grade and 
HS/GED 0 
 
 M M M M M 
GB/CI 2.5 1.5 5 HS/GED 4 
 
 M M M M M 
CMV/ 




 Age Electronic Use     
 I I     
ND/CI 28 months 7%     
 







 I I     
ASD/CI 24 months 29%     
 
 I I     
GB/CI 26 months N/A     
 
 I I     
CMV/ 
CI 22 months N/A     
Notes: ASD = autism spectrum disorder; ASL = American Sign Language; CI = cochlear implant; 
CMV = cytomegalovirus; GB = global delay; HS/GED = high school diploma; I = infant; IDS = 
infant-directed speech; M = mother; M&F = mother & father; MLU = mean length of utterances in 
words; ND = normal development; SES = socioeconomic status; TT = turn taking in utterances; 
TTR = type-token ratio; TWR= target-word repetition. 
 
Table 4. Comparison of Average Infant and Parent Communication, 9 Months after 
Activation of Cochlear Implant 
 
Discussion 
It was hypothesized that parent interaction would be negatively affected by 
the added difficulty of the conversation when an infant has a hearing loss and an 
additional disability; however, the findings suggest that the interactions were not 
affected by the additional disability alone but rather by other factors influencing the 
interaction.  
Socioeconomic Status Effect 
As described previously, maternal interaction with an infant with a cochlear 
implant and an additional disability can cause stressful communication attempts; 
however, results of this study indicate that the disability is not the sole cause of the 
stress. One major component of the stress was the SES of the family observed. 
When evaluating maternal interaction with an infant with a cochlear implant and 
ASD, it is important to understand the environment that the infant has grown up in, 
as well as what resources and treatments the infant has had access to before or after 
diagnosis. To acquire the most accurate information, the parents’ SES can be taken 
into consideration.  
There are varying views and opinions in the research about how SES and 
rate of ASD in infants are related. According to Rai and colleagues (2012), 
epidemiological studies in the United States often find a relationship between 







higher SES and a diagnosis of ASD, whereas studies from other countries with 
universal health care, such as Sweden, reveal a correlation between lower SES and 
a diagnosis of ASD. Rai and colleagues discovered that infants with ASD were 
more than likely to come from families with lower income, as well as from families 
with parents that work in manual occupations or unskilled manual labor. The study 
was administered in Sweden, so the population that was studied is an important 
factor in the results. Swedish parents and infants have access to free universal health 
care, which includes routine screenings and easier access to diagnosis and treatment 
of disorders, such as ASD. Similarly, Fujiwara (2013) found a correlation between 
lower SES and ASD in Japan, another country with access to free universal health 
care. After seeing the results from the Japan study compared to results in the United 
States, Fujiwara associates the findings of the U.S.-based studies (higher SES and 
ASD) with the healthcare system. Families of higher SES often have higher 
education levels, higher income, and better access to diagnosis and treatments of 
ASD at earlier ages than do those of a lower SES. With those comparisons in mind, 
it is understandable that the United States would see a relationship between higher 
SES and ASD, as many infants with lower SES could have never been diagnosed, 
which would exclude them from any studies or research compiled in the United 
States.  
SES can also be indicative of the infant's ability to process skills for 
language development and the infant’s access to therapy or strategies to combat 
issues pertaining to ASD and issues pertaining to hearing loss and cochlear 
implants. According to Fernald, Marchman, and Weisleder (2012), significant 
differences in vocabulary and language development exist between children of low- 
and high-SES families by 18 months of age, and a gap of 6 months’ development 
exists between the two groups by 24 months of age with regard to language 
development. When adding in the difficulty of hearing loss and ASD, this 
discrepancy can become even more apparent in an infant's ability to communicate 
effectively with his or her parents, lowering the ability to have a successful parental 
interaction. 
Environmental Factors 
Extended television and media use in the home negatively affected the 
communication attempts made by parents during the study. Previous research has 
suggested that the effect of media usage can vary based on SES of the family, as 
well as on the age at which the infant is exposed. Mendelsohn and colleagues (2008) 
completed a study on the impact of infant television use on interactions in low-SES 







households. The goal of the study was to determine the percentage of infants who 
watched television in low-SES households compared to high-SES households, as 
well as how the interactions between the infant and parent were affected by the 
early exposure to television. Although television use is not recommended until at 
least two years of age, according to the American Academy of Pediatrics, many 
parents allow their infants to watch television because of the entertainment and 
perceived educational programming shown on child-centered television stations 
(Mendelsohn et al., 2008).  
In their study, Mendelsohn and colleagues (2008) found that 96.8% of the 
low-SES mothers reported daily media exposure in their household, with the 
average exposure being at least 60 minutes per day, and exposure of television seen 
most in parents with lower levels of education and familial income. The results also 
indicated that interactions were reported most during educational child-oriented 
programs (42.8%) and that about half of the infant’s exposure was toward programs 
not aimed for children. Even with a higher interaction based in educational child-
oriented programming, however, the study determined that infant-directed 
educational programming was not a good substitute for co-viewing and verbal 
interaction, claiming that increased television use (even when it seems educational) 
is not beneficial to the infant's overall development. Even when infants watch 
education-based programming, the need for increased interaction and discussion 
during the program exists. For example, it would be more beneficial for the infant’s 
development if the parent watched the program, too, allowing a conversation and 
educational opportunities to emerge around the program, than if the parent allowed 
the infant to view the program alone. Increased television use without measures to 
counteract the potential developmental issues (i.e., decreased verbal interaction, 
loss of focus to other objects or people due to focus on television, limited exposure 
to reading and play) can have a negative effect on an infant's language and social 
development. Low SES is only one factor related to increased television use, 
however, and is not always indicative of delayed development or of acquisition of 
disorders.  
All disabilities observed in the study (ASD, CMV, and global delay) can 
adversely affect communication and an infant’s ability to interact with others. Early 
exposure to media usage can therefore cause a delay in development and acquisition 
of language. Heffler and Oestreicher (2016) demonstrated how media affected 
infants with ASD: Since increase of television access starting around the 1980s and 
the even higher level of acces in the 1990s and 2000s, ASD diagnosis in infants has 
risen, potentially demonstrating the correlations between ASD and increased 







television use. Infants are naturally attracted to media, without having an 
understanding of social interaction. For example, Heffler and Oestreicher (2016) 
state, increased television exposure creates a lack of understanding of real-life 
social interaction, which means that when the infant watches the actor on the 
television screen and tries to smile, coo, provide joint attention (sharing focus), or 
interact with a conversation (turn taking, eye contact, etc.), the infant experiences 
no interaction back. This lack of back-and-forth interaction can both confuse and 
discourage the infant, resulting in the infant stopping attempts at social interaction 
and lacking the motivation to communicate with the television actors or real-life 
people, such as their parents. The authors state that the “socially disengaged infant” 
would continue to lose shared attention opportunities and lack the ability to learn 
from his or her environment and develop language. Interest in interactive speech 
would be diminished, and eventually, the infant would stop attending toward 
parents or other individuals in social interactions, resulting in a bigger 
developmental delay in language (Heffler and Oestreicher, 2016). Heffler and 
Oestreicher continue to explain that an infant who did not orient during a social 
interaction would be unlikely to partake in imitation and turn taking, which are key 
cues when evaluating ASD. 
Parental Interaction and Cochlear Implants 
When evaluating paternal interaction, research from Broesch and Bryant 
(2017) suggests, it is important to understand the differences and variation in 
paternal interaction, as it can affect later language outcomes, similar to maternal 
interaction. When mothers speak to infants, they often change their speech 
compared to how they talk with adults; however, in fathers’ speech, differences 
arise because of societal factors rather than age of the communication partner. The 
researchers determined that when communicating with infants, fathers often 
modified their acoustic features of speech (e.g., pitch) based on their SES (low, 
average, or high). Broesch and Bryant suggest that fathers in small-scale societies 
“emphasize relationships and emotional attunement” while fathers in urban 
societies “focus on language learning and formal education.” These findings 
indicate that fathers use IDS differently based on their own upbringings or on the 
cultural groups with which they are currently associated. Although Broesch and 
Bryant’s study does not involve infants with hearing loss, it is still important to 
understanding the basis of parental interaction and how fathers may differ in 
interactions based on their societal situation, which can affect how the infant 
receives and acquires language. Whether the mother or father is communicating 







with the infant, when hearing loss is involved, it is imperative that the parents learn 
effective ways to communicate to provide optimal language learning.  
Conclusion 
Parent interaction was not negatively affected by only the difficulty of the 
additional disability but rather by a combination of factors, including the disability, 
SES, maternal and paternal education, and the home environment. The prominent 
example in the study was the ASD-and-cochlear implant dyad. The family had a 
low SES, lower maternal and paternal education (the mother completing only ninth 
grade and the father with a high school diploma or GED equivalent), extensive 
media and television use in the home, and a disability that has proven to affect 
language and communication. The parental interaction also played a role, as the 
father was more involved in the daily interaction than the mother because he stayed 
home with the infant. The combination of factors caused the parental interaction in 
this dyad to be less engaging than in their similar cochlear implant and additional 
disability counterparts. The factors have been shown in research to have a negative 
effect on language and vocabulary growth, further stunting an efficient interaction 
between the parent and infant. 
Because this study is based on a selective and limited number of 
participants, further research would need to be done to determine if the results stem 
from the factors included or if the small sample size and limited disabilities play a 
role. In the future, it would be beneficial to compare the ASD-and-cochlear implant 
dyad of low SES to a similar dyad of high SES and caregiver education to see if 
those factors did indeed cause the decreased communication. As of the time of this 
paper’s publication, however, no dyad in the NIH-NIDCD funded research study 
at The Ohio State University meets that criterion, though that would be the ideal 
next step. 
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Between 2011 and 2015, more than 30,000 foreigners, including more than 
4,000 Westerners, have joined the ranks of ISIS in the Syrian conflict (Schmitt & 
Sengupta, 2015). Between 2000 and 2018, 91% of the total victims of terror attacks 
in Europe were accounted for by Islamic terrorists, causing a total of 753 fatalities 
in that time frame (Le Figaro, 2019). Numerous studies have statistically 
demonstrated a continuous surge of new recruits in Islamic terrorist groups such as 
ISIS since the beginning of the millennium. Carter, Maher, and Neumann (2014) 
attribute this trend to the expansion of technological possibilities in the 
cybersphere. They claim that the conflict in Syria is arguably one of the first live-
documented conflicts on social media and video streaming platforms: “In the minds 
of the foreign fighters, social media is no longer virtual: it has become an essential 
facet of what happens on the ground” (Carter et al., 2014, p. 1). Propaganda and 
recruitment encompass only a portion of the online Islamic extremism threat, 
however. Training also represents a significant role that Islamic terrorism has on 
the cybersphere (Pawlak, 2015). Digital tools are increasingly used to train foreign 
recruits. This is most prominently illustrated by the Al-Qaeda-created online 
magazine Inspire, which led to the making of two bombs that killed three and 
injured approximately 300 in the Boston Marathon in April 2015 (Lemieux, 
Brachman, Levitt & Wood, 2014). In this paper, we review and analyze the three 
above-mentioned major components of online Jihad: propaganda, recruitment, and 
training. Through related work, we propose a formal description and explanation 
for the reasons of past superiority of online Islamic terrorism.  
The fight against Islamic terrorism is extremely complex and requires 
historical understanding of the roots of current conflicts in the Middle East. 
Understanding why new recruits join the ranks of Islamic terrorist groups is crucial 
for efficiently fighting online terrorism (Rosenblatt, 2019); thus, we provide a brief 
historical review of ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the emergence of 
radical groups.  
Although fighting online terrorism is often neglected, the need to do so is at 
an all-time high. Overlooking this necessity has undeniably contributed to the 








recent surge of attacks and has perpetuated the formation of powerful groups such 
as Al-Qaeda and ISIS (General Intelligence and Security Service, 2012). Although 
most nations, organizations, and even independent hacking groups called 
“hacktivists” have considerably increased their attention toward online terrorism, a 
significant amount still needs to be done to gain the upper hand in the online war 
of terror (Ghost Security, 2015). Brantly (2017) notices that a significant challenge 
faced by nation-states and governments lies in the innovation and adaptation of 
extremist groups’ digital security. In this paper, we discuss several methods to 
surveil and fight online terrorism. We identify challenges and promising aspects 
concerning the future of the fight against online terrorism. Finally, we offer a model 
of potential future threat landscapes related to Islamic radicalization in the 
cybersphere.  
Background and Definitions 
Islamic Terrorism Terminology and Definitions 
Terrorism can be defined as the systematic use of violence to achieve 
political objectives. It is a tactical asymmetric fight to compensate for the incapacity 
of the weak to win over a stronger state opponent. Islamic terrorism includes a 
strong religious component derived from an extreme interpretation of the Quran, 
Sharia law, and various Hadiths, in which Islamic supremacy (i.e., establishment of 
a new worldwide Islamic caliphate) is viewed as the ultimate goal.1 This goal is 
attained by conducting a Jihad (literally translated as “struggle” or “striving”), or 
holy war, against unbelievers (kafir). Islamic terrorism takes different forms and 
has multiple roots and origins going as far back as the 11th century CE.  
Historical Review 
To gain support from Arabic movements during World War I and to help 
defeat the Ottoman Empire, France and the United Kingdom promised to support 
the creation of an Arabic state after the war ended. Simultaneously, the British 
government issued the so-called Balfour Declaration supporting the establishment 
of “a national home for Jewish people” in Palestine (Kepel, 2004). After the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire, France and the United Kingdom betrayed their promise by 
secretly agreeing to partition the Arabic territories of the former Ottoman Empire 
under their respective colonial control. The period between World Wars I and II is 
consequentially characterized by the emergence of an Arabic nationalism and 
Islamism as well as by the development of Zionism (via different waves of 








migration of Jewish people in Palestine). After World War II, the important oil 
resources of the region became a major component of the subsequent Cold War 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. The creation of Israel in 1948 
ignited the war between the new Jewish state and its Arabic neighbors in support 
of the Palestinian people. This period was dominated largely by Palestinian 
terrorism.  
An important development is the change of power in Iran in 1979 with the 
arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini. For the first time in the region, an Islamic Shia state 
was created, which introduced a new form of Islamic terrorism against Western 
states. Concurrently, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan constituted a turning point 
in the development of modern Islamic terrorism. Weakened by the fall of the Shah 
in Iran, the United States would not allow the creation of a USSR satellite state in 
the region. Together with Saudi Arabia, the United States started supporting 
Muslim opponents and Afghan mujahideen (Islamic fighters) factions. The 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 resulted in the fall of the Soviet Union and 
the end of the Cold War. During the following years of civil war in Afghanistan, 
different Islamic groups were trained with the intention of exporting their newly 
gained skills to other parts of the world (notably Algeria, Bosnia, and Chechnya). 
Not gaining enough recognition, some groups—Al-Qaeda in particular—turned to 
global terrorism, September 11 being the most representative moment of this 
evolution.  
The succeeding “War on Terror” on countries associated with Al-Qaeda, 
along with the killing of Abu Abdallah Usama bin Laden, has reduced the influence 
of this movement but has also given rise to a new and more violent group called 
ISIS/ISIL. In 2014, ISIS/ISIL, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, established a caliphate 
over a significant part of Iraq and Syria. During this period, the Islamic group 
conducted terrorist attacks on numerous countries, particularly in Europe (Paris, 
Brussels, Nice, London, Stockholm, etc.). 
Online Jihad 
The use of the online sphere as a platform for Jihad is endemic to Islamic 
terrorism and has exponentially increased in the past decade (Brantly, 2017). In 
2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri (2nd General Emir of Al-Qaeda) openly denoted the 
media to be an inclusive part of the battlefield (Carter et al., 2014). Terrorist groups 
have successfully learned to use complex online tools that ensure anonymity and 
protection to communicate and coordinate their affairs. We recognize the 
materialization of this development through three main fundamentals: propaganda, 








recruitment, and training. For each of these points, we identify several attack 
vectors exploited by Islamic terrorists, which have contributed to their ascendance 
in the online war of terror.  
Propaganda  
Based on related work, we detect a number of tools used by jihadists as 
means for diffusing motivational material, such as social media, media centers, 
online magazines, and video games. From the infamous video of American hostage 
Nick Berg’s beheading by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2004, to the use of social 
media and the creation of online magazines, Islamic extremists have exploited 
many different techniques to rally individuals to their cause. For instance, as 
Pawlak (2015) notes, Al-Qaeda has “openly encouraged cyber Jihad as a sacred 
duty of every Muslim and called upon its followers to hack western websites” (p. 
1). This call has quickly been answered by a prominent British-Islamic figure called 
Abu Hussain al-Britani, also known as “TriCk,” most notorious for hacking Tony 
Blair’s account and joining the ranks of ISIL in 2013. Jihadi groups have quickly 
understood the influence of social media. Platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and 
Instagram have allowed jihadists to share and promote their views. Berger and 
Morgan (2015) estimate that in September 2014, between 46,000 and 70,000 
Twitter accounts were linked to ISIS. Several of these profiles reached thousands 
of followers, one particular example being the ISIS-affiliated Twitter account 
@reyardiraq, with more than 90,000 followers (Brantly, 2017).  
Social media is also used as an outlet for newly emerged centralized media 
centers such as “al-Hayat,” “al-Sahab,” and “al-Furquan.” These media centers 
often exhibit well-edited Islamic propaganda videos, using advanced technological 
cameras and drones to depict often severely contrasted sceneries. For instance, 
amongst the shocking films of beheadings, ISIS has crafted impressive video series 
such as Harvest of the Soldiers, which include almost weekly releases and updates 
of pure military advertising material (Zelin, 2019). The Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) 
often contrasts its videos of strength and violence with displays of peace, happiness, 
and prosperity in its controlled cities. ISIS’s efforts to portray a form of utopia to 
undermine the humanitarian crisis occurring in its occupied cities is verified 
through a study led by Tarabay, Shiloach, Weiss, and Gilat (2015), in which the 
authors found that 45% of the Islamic State’s propaganda focuses on its endeavors 
to build and sustain the caliphate by portraying hospitals, charity work, agricultural 
projects, and roadworks.  








Media outlets and forums have also allowed terrorist groups to publish new 
types of propaganda material, such as online magazines and video games (Al-Rawi, 
2016). One of the most notorious examples is Al-Qaeda’s online magazine Inspire, 
thought to be the work of English-speaking jihadi Anwar al-Awlaki, also known as 
the “bin Laden of the Internet” (“Online Preachers,” 2011). Figure 1 depicts 
instructions given in the magazine relating to propaganda and wide distribution of 
the media.  
 
Figure 1. Propaganda message given in the eighth issue of Al-Qaeda’s online magazine 
Inspire (Zelin, 2019). 
 
For the first time, Islamic extremist groups have implemented impressive 
technological tools to modernize their propaganda campaigns. As established in a 
study led by Al-Rawi (2016), groups such as ISIS base most of their marketing 
strategies on emphasizing simple ideological appeals,2 greatly facilitated through 
the use of the cybersphere. Islamic terrorists build their media strategies on three 
main traits, as explained by Haroro J. Ingram (2014): the use of multidimensional 
and multiplatform approaches to instantaneously target individuals and enhance the 
scope and importance of messaging; the organization of narratives and deeds to 
amplify operational and strategic outcomes in the field; and the centrality of the 
Islamic State brand. 
Recruitment 
Patryk Pawlak (2015) notes that “the internet has not only altered traditional 
channels for radicalization and facilitated a two-way communication between 
terrorist organizations and their supporters, but also allowed for a change in 
planning, coordination and execution of attacks” (p. 1). The distribution of 
propaganda through social media is only the first step toward successful 
radicalization and recruitment (Al-Rawi, 2016). Jihadists tend to distrust platforms 
for direct communication and rely on more developed digital operational security 
(OPSEC) techniques to target specific individuals (Brantly, 2017). As soon as the 
first contacts have been made, jihadists rely on mobile messaging applications like 
Viber, Telegram, and Redphone to directly communicate with their potential 








targets. Brantly (2017) observes in his study that high levels of online 
“safeguarding” are required for a potential recruit to make his way into terrorist 
groups. Through the analysis of thousands of posts in forums and social media, 
Brantly establishes a list of communication tools that are either positively or 
negatively regarded by extremists. The list of applications that are considered “safe 
to use” by jihadists includes but is not restricted to Signal, Linphone, Vimeo, Gmail, 
and Telegram. Unsafe tools include Skype, iCloud, and Tor Mail. A strong 
recognition is made on the Silent Phase software, which is often considered to offer 
“secure solutions for voice, browsing and messaging” (p. 91).  
ISIS also regularly uses video games as a measure to radicalize younger 
individuals. Shooting game Arma 3 includes a specific ISIS mod,3 easily accessible 
via online download (Scimeca, 2015). In addition, an adaptation of Grand Theft 
Auto V called “Salil al-Sawarem” (The Clanging of the Swords) was popularized 
in 2014. In this adaptation, the user takes control of a jihadist in his struggle to 
restore the caliphate and combat the infidels. Such means are clearly intended to 
target a younger set of individuals and idealize the daily life of an Islamic fighter. 
Al-Rawi (2016) notes that with high-definition video games and entertaining 
missions, the user is lured into believing that ISIS is a technologically advanced 
group fighting for genuine and authentic beliefs. Finally, ISIS also introduced a 
self-made Android application available for free download on the Google Store. 
“Dawn of the Glad Tidings” was a Twitter-based application that automatically 
posted ISIS-related tweets on the user’s account. Although the lifetime of this 
application was quite limited, Berger and Morgan (2015) and Stern and Berger 
(2016) noted that the application reached a peak of 40,000 tweets a day. 
Training 
Through the expansion of the online sphere, jihadists have rapidly 
discovered that the Internet is not only a place for radicalization, recruitment, and 
propaganda but also for knowledge sharing. In this section, we recognize two main 
attack vectors used by Islamic groups to train recruits in the cybersphere: digital 
protection vectors and military threat vectors. 
Digital Protection Vectors. 
 Most of the general techniques required to maintain anonymity and privacy 
over the Internet are not generally known by the average user. Developing some 
techniques to preserve online security requires a minimum amount of training, 








which, as Brantly (2017) notes, is often promoted by social media accounts linked 
to terrorist groups. For instance, the Telegram account @Software_ENG, also 
named Tiqani al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah,4 has been known to post hundreds of 
training documents on forums and websites linked to implementing strong digital 
OPSEC techniques. Another instance is depicted by Mula’ib al-Assina’s response 
to a question related to the use of Skype through Tor on the Minbar forum: “Skype 
is insecure, and Americans are recording every single call since 2008” (Brantly, 
2017, p. 86). It is important to note that most of the material covered and questions 
asked on such platforms are quite trivial and do not dig deep into digital operational 
security. Nevertheless, such activity clearly indicates a high interest and concern 
from jihadists about digital OPSEC and illustrates that the online sphere and 
cybersecurity techniques have become a crucial asset for their operations.  
Military Threat Vectors 
The emergence of certain media outlets and online document-sharing 
platforms has allowed the creation of so-called do-it-yourself terrorism (Pawlak, 
2015). This modern practice of Jihad is most prominently illustrated through online 
journals and magazines released in several volumes by groups such as Al-Qaeda 
and ISIS. Al-Qaeda is one of the first groups to release easy-to-access online 
training documents, like the journal al-Battar,5 which served predominantly as a 
virtual training camp, encouraging weapons of mass destruction and teaching 
explosive handling and kidnapping techniques, amongst many others (Cohen-
Almagor, 2016). A more notorious example of Al-Qaeda’s online training tools 
relates to the 17-volume online magazine Inspire. Inspire became influent 
throughout the world as it was fully aimed at English readership (i.e., Western 
recruits). Studying the influence of Inspire, Lemieux et al. (2014) note that the 
magazine seems to target a “less intellectually engaged audience” around the world, 
particularly in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Lemieux et 
al. (2014) also note that one of the reasons for the magazine’s infamy relates to the 
“Open Source Jihad” section. This section of Inspire covers in great detail a variety 
of skills to learn—from weapon handling to bomb making—and was allegedly used 
by Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and his brother, Tamerlan, in the 2013 Boston Marathon 
bombings. Figure 2 illustrates an extract from the step-by-step process of making 
an acetone peroxide bomb in the “Open Source Jihad” section of Inspire’s sixth 
volume. The primary explosive material used in the Paris and Brussels bombings 
was triacetone triperoxide, a trimer form of the mixture of acetone and hydrogen 
peroxide (Alfred, 2016). The aforementioned arguments clearly illustrate the fact 








that today, to pursue Jihad, modern terrorists require only a sufficient Internet 
connection.  
 
Figure 2. Extract from the step-by-step procedure of the making of an acetone peroxide 
bomb. This figure appeared in the sixth issue of Al-Qaeda’s online magazine Inspire 
and was part of the “Open Source Jihad” section (Zelin, 2019). For security purposes, the 
rest of the instructions have been omitted here.   








The Fight against Online Islamic Terrorism 
Since the early 2010s, the threat of online terrorism has become publicly 
acknowledged and many entities have significantly increased their digital 
counterterrorism measures. To analyze the fight against online Islamic terrorism, 
we focus our research on three main actors: governments and international 
organizations, companies, and independent groups. For each of these groups, we 
discuss policies and measures taken to tackle online terrorism. We also consider 
newly emerging groups that have considerably helped nation-states improve their 
trailing position in the online war of terror. 
Governments and International Organizations 
The international coalition against online terrorism is structured around 
three main pillars: “constraining the use of the internet by jihadi organizations,” 
“strengthening de-radicalization efforts,” and “limiting access to funding” (Pawlak, 
2015, p. 2). Nation-states’ efforts to combat online terrorism via several platforms 
have drastically amplified over past years. Initial government responses included 
social media campaigns6 and unsuccessful countermessaging techniques (“Digital 
Counterterrorism,” 2018). Although many of these attempts have been unable to 
compete against the propaganda tactics implemented by jihadists so far, 
international initiatives continue to grow and challenge the spread of online 
terrorism.  
Many nation-states recognized that cutting Islamic extremist groups’ 
financing would ultimately result in those groups’ extinction. This led to the 2015 
UN Resolution 2199, which condemns any form of trade associated with groups 
such as Al-Qaeda (“Unanimously Adopting,” 2015). A few government initiatives 
and offensive responses to Islamic terrorism have proven successful, however. For 
instance, in 2016, the National Security Agency and the United States Cyber 
Command successfully conducted a joint offensive operation called Glowing 
Symphony, with the purpose to disrupt and deny ISIS’s ability to coordinate and 
conduct attacks against the United States and its allies (Martelle, 2018). This 
operation is considered one of the most significant and successful cyber offensive 
operations undertaken by the United States.  
 
 









A most recent initiative, called the Christchurch Call, led by New Zealand’s 
prime minister Jacinda Ardern and French president Emmanuel Macron, aims to 
encourage all major tech companies to eliminate any form of terrorism and violent 
extremist content online (Roy, 2019). Major companies are playing a crucial role 
in the fight against cyber Jihad. As most of the propaganda content flows through 
social media, many of these companies recognize the fight against online 
extremism as a responsibility and a duty. In 2015, Twitter announced the 
suspension of 10,000 ISIS-linked accounts in one day (Gladstone, 2015). Two years 
later, YouTube announced the removal of the lectures and sermons of prominent 
Islamic preacher Anwar al-Awlaki (Wallace & Townsend, 2017). Furthermore, 
Google’s recent Jigsaw Project presents a modern face in combatting Islamic 
propaganda and dismantling extremism networks. This project aims to be “a 
platform for former violent extremists to collaborate, in order to prevent young 
people from joining extremism groups” (“Jigsaw,” n.d). 
Independent Groups 
The rise in online Islamic terrorism has also resulted in the enlisting of 
independent hacking groups, also called hacktivists. Following the Paris Charlie 
Hebdo attacks in 2015, hacktivist group Anonymous publicly declared war on ISIS 
through the #OpISIS campaign and removed 20,000 ISIS-related Twitter accounts 
(Rogers, 2015). Another prominent group engaged in the battle against 
cyberterrorism is Ghost Security Group. To date, Ghost Security Group claims to 
have identified more than 100,000 extremist social media accounts used primarily 
for recruitment, and to monitor more than 200 known violent extremist websites 
(“Ghost Security,” n.d). 
Ways Forward 
Beyond a more stringent international and national legal order and the 
effective involvement of online platforms and social media, the increasing level of 
threat sophistication of the cybersphere and its mastering by terrorist groups require 
constant adaptation. Since the 2013 Snowden leaks, companies have significantly 
increased their use of robust encryption methods in their consumer-communication 
technologies, which has strongly challenged authorities to efficiently track 
terrorists online (“Digital Counterterrorism,” 2018). Brantly (2017) described the 
necessity behind jihadists’ adaptation and innovation on current online 








technologies. Strong digital OPSEC has become a vital need for groups such as Al-
Qaeda and ISIS to exist. It is therefore natural to assume that the future war on 
terror will occur mainly online. Social media and forums are only a small part of 
the danger that Islamic terrorist groups represent, and as technological means 
expand, so does the jihadi threat landscape.  
Recent findings and developments seem to suggest that artificial 
intelligence will become a major asset for tracking, monitoring, and surveilling 
Islamic extremism activities on the Internet. According to a report published by the 
Capgemini Research Institute, 56% of 850 surveyed senior executives in 
cybersecurity claim that their security analysts are overwhelmed by the increasingly 
sophisticated threat levels (Tolido, Van Der Linden, Thieullent, & Frank, 2019). 
The need to further incorporate automation and artificial intelligence as tools for 
detection and response to cyber threats has become crucial. Through the 
development of machine learning and data-mining algorithms, companies and 
public authorities could potentially classify data collected from past attacks to 
model trends that would determine high-risk scenarios and prevent future attacks 
(Beuchelt, 2020). Beuchelt (2020) notes that, “using temporal analytics as well as 
structured and unstructured data analysis and integration, companies can build 
complex social media and other open source intelligence models to predict future 
attacks” (para. 10). Counter Extremism Project’s eGlyph technology and Google’s 
recent Jigsaw Project both illustrate new types of automated mass-tracking 
algorithms, which, if used properly, could lead to astonishing positive results 
(“How CEP’s eGLYPH Technology Works,” 2016). 
Link analysis (defined as a method to evaluate relationships between nodes 
in a network) is an interesting technique used to study information surrounding 
high-stake targets (Carafano, 2005). This method could allow efficient large-scale 
analysis of a suspect’s relationships as well as his or her links to a terrorist 
organization. All of the aforementioned implementations, however, require a 
significant dependence on available and structured data. Although the fields of 
machine learning, data mining, and data analysis are exponentially growing, they 
still face challenges when trying to process natural languages or when manipulating 
nonstructured data such as images, text mixtures, videos, and sensor information 
(Carafano, 2005).  
Online security is often considered a “cat and mouse” game. As security 
strengthens, so do threats and attacks. Although artificial intelligence and data-
analysis algorithms could be used to secure systems and fight online terrorism, 
these techniques could also be used by Islamic terrorists to widen their online range 








and social-engineering techniques. For instance, artificial intelligence could be 
deployed to enhance terrorists’ online propaganda campaigns by implementing an 
algorithm that sends tweets faster and with a higher success rate than a human could 
(Tolido et al., 2019). The need to recognize that the threat vectors of terrorist attacks 
will drastically change in the future is of paramount importance (“Cyberterrorism,” 
2009). Because of the interconnectivity revolution of the past few decades, critical 
infrastructures such as hospitals, power plants (specifically nuclear plants), 
transportation infrastructures, and banks are prone to becoming terrorists’ next 
targets of value. There is no definite answer to ensure protection against terrorist 
threats in the cybersphere, but cooperation and intelligence sharing will be critical 
for the containment of such threats (Collins, n.d).   
The need for public and law enforcement authorities to design adequate and 
reactive cross-border cooperation tools has been highlighted by the European 
Union after the series of terrorist attacks that hit a number of its member states in 
2015 and 2016. In September 2018, the European Commission adopted a legislative 
proposal on “preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online” (European 
Commission, 2018). The regulation introduces a removal order that can be issued 
as an administrative or judicial decision by a competent authority in a member state. 
In such cases, the hosting service provider is obliged to remove the content or to 
disable access to the content within one hour. The regulation requires hosting 
service providers, where appropriate, to take proactive measures proportionate to 
the level of risk and to remove terrorist material from their services, including 
through the deployment of automated detection tools. Failure to act within an hour 
after a removal order has been placed by a member state could result in fines of up 
to 4% of the hosting service provider’s annual revenue (“European Parliament,” 
2019).  
Opponents of this proposal—such as Tim Berners-Lee, founder of the 
World Wide Web—claim that the proposed regulation is an attack on freedom of 
speech and would impair the Internet in Europe without strengthening the fight 
against online terrorism (Baker, Berners-Lee & Cerf, 2019). The proposal is still in 
discussion between the European Union’s colegislators because of concerns 
expressed by the European Parliament about possible abuses of removal orders and 
restriction of freedom of speech (Creighton, 2019).  
Despite these criticisms, adoption of the regulation could represent a major 
milestone in the fight against online Islamic terrorism. Lucinda Creighton (2019), 
Senior Advisor at the Counter Extremism Project, explained: “Of the 1.5 million 
videos of the attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, that were detected and 








eventually removed by Facebook, only 1.2 million were screened and blocked by 
Facebook’s software before being uploaded. This left 300,000 videos uploaded to 
the platform for users to see” (para. 2). 
The way companies and public authorities shape new regulations and 
approach technical advancements will undoubtedly be crucial for the future of 
online counterterrorism. Collins (n.d) argues that the way we approach online 
counterterrorism must change, as we need to adapt to new rules, new technologies, 
and new players. Ultimately, technical developments and legal frameworks will 
need to properly balance public security needs with freedom of speech and 
individual data-protection requirements. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have provided a cohesive narrative of the way Islamic 
terrorists use the cybersphere to conduct their Jihad and how nation-states have 
reacted to the threat posed by such groups. We have selectively reviewed online 
methods used by Islamic groups in the “Online Jihad” section by analyzing three 
key components to their success—namely propaganda, recruitment, and training. 
Our analysis illustrates that Islamic terrorist groups’ influence over the cybersphere 
is as significant as it has ever been and has undeniably led to major attacks over the 
past decade. Our findings also indicate that Islamic groups were evidently leading 
the online war of terror over the past few years as most nation-states failed to 
recognize the online threat that Islamic extremism represents. 
We then focused our study on ways in which the fight against online 
terrorism is conducted, in the section called “The Fight against Online Islamic 
Terrorism,” by identifying three major attack vectors: governments and 
international organizations, companies, and independent groups. Our findings 
suggest that international response to online jihadism has significantly increased 
over the past decade, considerably decreasing the gap between nation-states and 
terrorist groups in the cybersphere.  
Finally, we have identified, in the section “Ways Forward,” several 
challenges and threats that online terrorism will pose in the future. Although 
findings and newly built tools to counter online terrorism offer reason for optimism, 
new threats emerge at a similar rate through the expansion of technological 
advancement. Future work will have to efficiently recognize the importance of 
cybersecurity related to the online war of terror and the impact that neglecting it 
has had on the world. Containing online resources that advance terrorism is an 








increasingly critical task, since a simple video, a brief message, or a single tweet 
could represent an individual’s turning point between peace and terrorism.  
Notes 
1 It is important to note that Islamic terrorism is based on a radical interpretation of 
the Quran that is, in general, not representative of the Islamic religion. The term 
“Islamic terrorism” is highly politicized and should by no means serve as a 
reference to Islamic tradition. It is used throughout this article exclusively as a 
means to describe violent groups who claim religious motivations behind their 
attacks.  
2 One example includes the use of a black banner. The black banner contains many 
different Islamic references. For instance, it is assumed that a black banner was 
used when Abu Muslim led the Abbasid Revolution in 747 CE. 
3 Video game mods are defined as “short modifications” of the game by external 
parties such as fans or players. 
4 Also known as Islamic State Tech. 
5 Also known as The Sharp-Edged Sword. 
6 One notable example relates to the “Think Again Turn Away” social media 
campaign, launched by the US Department of State, which accumulated a modest 
44,000 followers on Twitter and Facebook combined (General Intelligence and 
Security Service, 2012). 
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Abstract 
Butler-Tarkington, a neighborhood within Indianapolis, has undergone 
some recent renovations, especially a noticeable change of the Butler-Tarkington 
community park. Such investments are often seen as much-needed changes to the 
community, but some people worry that this modification signals the initial threat 
of gentrification. Gentrification is a widespread phenomenon occurring throughout 
cities across the country. Two schools of thought have arisen about gentrification: 
that it is a beneficial process that redevelops low-income communities, and that it 
displaces old residents and creates a class and racial conflict. This study examines 
this process through the ground level by utilizing in-depth interviews as a means of 
clarifying this often-complex phenomenon. Through interview data gathered from 
longtime residents, newcomers, and stakeholders, we discovered attitudes toward 
this perceived gentrification of the Butler-Tarkington neighborhood. We believe 
our study offers an often-unheard voice in the scientific literature regarding 
gentrification. 
Introduction 
In the fast-paced globalizing world, urban communities struggle, almost 
universally, with the issue of segregated income, race, and ethnicity as a result of 
communities grappling with methods to manage racial, ethnic, and cultural 
diversity (Grier & Perry, 2018). Consequently, at times, the process of 
gentrification is introduced in which a community changes its demographic 
landscape and economic values (Williams & Needham, 2016). Many highlight 
these community changes that gentrification sparks; for example, the composition 
and neighborhood character are shifted—negatively or positively—once a gentry 
class returns (Kellogg, 2015). The social changes occurring within the gentrifying 
communities indeed spark debate among residents (both long- and short-term), 
policymakers, stakeholders, scholars, and concerned citizens.  








According to research done on the 50 largest cities in the U.S., 
approximately 20% of lower-income neighborhoods have experienced 
gentrification since 2000, compared to 9% between 1990 and 2000 (Maciag, 2015). 
The need for scholarship on the interpretive accounts of all peoples involved in the 
process of gentrification is great; therefore, in this paper, we will find the two 
primary focal debates of gentrification. The first school of thought argues that 
gentrification is beneficial to struggling communities, while the second school of 
thought argues that gentrification shifts the urban layout that was once common to 
the original residents and sparks class and racial conflict. We conducted an 
exploratory study on the attitudes of residents and stakeholders according to their 
perceptions of gentrification in an Indianapolis, Indiana, neighborhood in order to 
explore the merits of each of these two different perspectives on gentrification. A 
lack of studies exist utilizing the voices of community members, and this is why 
we performed a project that is quite parallel to participatory action research; we 
decided it was best to have an exhaustive account from all members involved in the 
local community, thus further expanding the study of gentrification from a unique 
lens. To examine the phenomenon, we utilized a qualitative (open-ended) interview 
approach and a snowball sampling method, in which a community center in the 
local community assisted us in finding an array of interested participants.   
Review of the Literature  
Since the term “gentrification” first appeared, its meaning and significance 
have been ever-changing within the literature of the social sciences (Sheppard, 
2012). Coined in 1964, the term was introduced to academia during London’s 
gentrification phase of the 1950s and 1960s (Glass, 1964). Social research has 
documented even earlier instances of gentrification dating back to the 1940s in 
Brooklyn, in which the historical “brownstoning” took place (Osman, 2011); 
however, the way the social sciences study gentrification is influenced now by the 
foundations set by Glass’s effort. With the realization that gentrification is such a 
complex social issue, scholars have utilized a wide range of methodological 
approaches to understand the phenomenon since the term’s original use (Zuk, 
Bierbaum, Chapple, Gorska, & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2018). 
The salience behind gentrification is politically loaded (Davidson & Lees, 
2005). By its very nature, gentrification evokes strong stances from different 
political parties within the affected community, and from bystanders external to the 
phenomenon. To many, the process of gentrification is a savior of crumbling 
communities, and to many others, it is riddled with class conflict and the 








displacement of culture (Smith, 2005). In academia, gentrification is therefore seen 
as a dichotomy rather than a subject of complexity (Atkinson, 2002). This 
dichotomy is reflected in the two main schools of thought regarding gentrification: 
gentrification as a tool to uplift communities and gentrification as a catalyst of class 
and cultural conflict. 
Without question, gentrification has parties that propose the process of 
gentrifying, and those who disapprove the movement. Many who support 
gentrification see it as a tool that reinvigorates the economic and social standing of 
areas that would often be left neglected otherwise (Meltzer & Ghorbani, 2017). 
Those against gentrification see it as a force that displaces residents, usually of 
ethnic minorities, and profoundly changes the cultural character of the community 
to adhere to the tastes of the gentry class (Langegger, 2016). 
On balance, some scholars argue that gentrification is not harmful to the 
gentrified zone but is beneficial for both parties involved (Byrne, 2003; Meltzer & 
Schuetz, 2012). The increase of well-educated and affluent residents, according to 
research, is excellent for communities. For example, Byrne (2003) argues that 
residents who can pay taxes, purchase the goods and services, and support the 
political structure of the city, state, and federal processes can in return help both the 
gentrifiers and those in displacement. Consequently, cities that can attract more 
affluent members can aggressively push for affordable housing.  
Some scholars argue that gentrification is not harmful and in fact has the 
possibility of providing job opportunities for the community. One study found that 
while regional job decline was found in the gentrified area in the form of low- and 
moderate-wage positions, local residents saw gains in higher-wage jobs in 
proximate areas, with lower-wage jobs being established slightly farther away 
(Meltzer & Ghorbani, 2017). While the local job losses initially appeared to be 
negative, the introduction of more goods-producing jobs and higher-wage jobs 
within only a mile of the gentrified neighborhood offered optimism in the 
gentrifiers’ ability to bring in better-paying work. The gain in new employment 
more than compensated for the localized losses that occurred during the 
gentrification process (Meltzer & Ghorbani, 2017). Not only are jobs introduced, 
but gentrifiers can attract new services that had not existed before the gentrification 
process (Meltzer & Capperis, 2014; Meltzer & Schuetz, 2012).  
In another argument regarding gentrification, literature has underlined 
enclaves attracting urban innovation (Zukin & Kosta, 2004), as in, far from the 
detriment of communities through commercial gentrification, the introduction of 








high-end businesses may create a neighborhood of innovation in the city’s 
economy, producing an attractive and social neighborhood interchange. 
Additionally, the gentrified community may bring increase in the public-service 
sector, such as sanitation and the introduction of public libraries (Byrne, 2003). 
Furthermore, the relationship between crime and gentrification lacks 
consensus in academia. Some scholars find a positive association with crime and 
gentrification (Boggess, Lyndsay, & Hipp, 2016), while others see a negative 
association (Barton, 2016; MacDonald, 1985). Thirdly, other scholars find both 
positive and negative associations (Papachristos, Smith, Scherer, & Fugiero, 2011). 
Moreover, according to McDonald (1986), gentrification can account for the 
reduction of crime, especially violent crime. Some may argue, however, that 
gentrification may cause an increase in property crime within the gentrified 
community, at least in the short run, because of the tempting newcomers in the 
community. Further, the process of gentrification, through the ends of the gentry 
class, can be of more success in obtaining secure policing from the city, and the 
gentry class will pay the taxes to increase the possibility (McDonald, 1986).  
Interestingly, we found studies that discovered higher crime in gentrifying 
areas; more interesting is their finding that fewer people were pulled over by police 
in gentrified areas but more were stopped in neighborhoods near the gentrified 
communities (Laniyonu, 2018). This finding may suggest that both an increase and 
a decrease in crime can occur, but in different places around and in the gentrified 
zone.   
Moreover, research reveals neighborhood change on educational 
attainments during the process of gentrification. Schools that reflect diverse 
socioeconomic backgrounds and education levels among parents have been shown 
to have a positive impact on students, contrary to the effect in schools in which all 
the families are poor (Heise & Ryan, 2002). Affluent parents fighting for higher 
standards of education, or affluent students understanding that if they work hard in 
school, they will receive benefits in the future are both reasons for an increase in 
education quality (Byrne, 2003). 
Despite the scholarship that gives a round of applause to gentrification as a 
process of community safety, neighborhood revitalization, and the integration of 
communities (Byrne, 2003; McDonald, 1986; Meltzer & Schuetz, 2012), many 
scholars are critical of the process of gentrification because of the termination of 
culture, the detrimental effects on the communities’ original residents, and the 








physical and physiological displacement of the once-community (Danley & 
Weaver, 2018; Kellogg, 2015).    
When the original residents communicate their fear of gentrification, they 
do not always revolve the dialogue around displacement through housing (Danley 
& Weaver, 2018). Instead, literature has found that residents also worry about the 
new developments being exclusionary toward them, a feeling of unwelcome known 
as the white space (Anderson, 2015). The creation of white space is a representation 
of a white invasion in a given community: the space is informally “off limits” to 
the original ethnic-minority residents (Anderson, 2015). Of argument, however, 
research has contested that the gentry class promotes a good “neighbor ethos” 
(Tissot, 2014): The gentrifiers not only claim their openness but also try to use their 
values to implement diversity among newcomers and different groups. Gentrifiers’ 
commitment to diversity is itself linked to their ability to control that diversity, 
however (Tissot, 2014). 
The symbolic language of arriving businesses can spark cultural tension. 
Other research has discussed, similar to Anderson’s (2015) “white space” concept, 
the racial tension among spaces in gentrified neighborhoods. That is, the new retail 
sector offers goods and services to supply the gentry class, changes the prices 
according to the income of the newcomer class, and creates Anderson’s “white 
space” that attracts the arriving class yet alienates longtime residents (Patch 2008; 
Zukin 2008; Zukin et al., 2009). Moreover, scant studies take an interpretive 
account by interviewing community residents (Monroe Sullivan & Shaw, 2011). 
Of the available literature, they confirm that long-term residents feel that the new 
services and products lack representation of the once-community and make the 
residents uncomfortable, and residents are resentful about the original businesses 
being displaced by newly arriving ones (Deener, 2007; Freeman, 2006; Maurrasse 
& Bliss, 2006). Monroe Sullivan and Shaw (2011) empirically support this, but they 
uncovered the racial tension among involved parties in the gentrified neighborhood. 
Of their study, many people of color not only viewed the process of gentrification 
negatively but also used explicit racial language when describing the new retail 
stores in their community as dissatisfying for their community needs. 
The transition of public space to privatized space is another issue that arises 
within gentrification. Neoliberal urbanism occurs when stratified economic and 
cultural resources produce inequality or unevenly developed public amenities, 
which can range from elite privatized public parks in wealthy neighborhoods to 
downtrodden parks in poor neighborhoods (Loughran, 2014). The creation of 
entrepreneurial parks has become common throughout contemporary cities across 








America. The idea of commodification can be introduced as well in regard to the 
use of diverse authenticity as a means of expunging money from incoming 
gentrifiers. Cities are increasingly using entertainment as a driver for gentrification, 
which ultimately commodifies the neighborhood character (Langegger, 2016). 
Elite actors in gentrified areas spur economic growth in public spaces that 
promote leisure and in consumption that represents their tastes. Spatial privilege is 
derived from neoliberal urbanism and helps us understand the phenomenon of 
gentrification. Spatial privilege is the hegemonic ability to make claims on public 
space; this privilege is derived from having a high-standing position in the socially 
constructed hierarchies of gender, race, class, and national origin. These social 
advantages are reproduced in a process that affirms existing cultural capital for 
individuals; it also enables the practice of consumption that encourages 
communities to adapt even more types of areas that incorporate consumption as a 
main function of their existence (Loughran, 2014). This brings in the idea that 
public spaces must be financially self-sustaining rather than sustained by the state 
and by taxpayer money; parks can therefore be exclusionary in their policies, 
through either direct discrimination or, in most cases, indirect discrimination. For 
example, renovated parks may include more workers that make sure recycling bins 
are empty at all times to remove the presence of lower-class bottle collectors 
scrounging through the bins and showing a form of social disorder that is 
unattractive to the gentry (Loughran, 2014). 
According to the theoretical basis of symbolic interactionism, cities and 
places can have identities that are fluid and dynamic, just as an individual or 
collective group can. Essentially, places are social in nature in the sense that they 
change over time because of external factors. Changes in demographics of the 
surrounding area and the movement of industry can drastically change the cultural 
context and collective memory of a certain area (Borer, 2010). Thus, to understand 
that certain areas change their collective memories because of demographic 
changes over time can further our knowledge on gentrification. As everyday 
interactions of certain public places change, symbolic boundaries of neighborhoods 
are redrawn, dictating which group has claim to the neighborhood, thus changing 
the future of that place. This urban culturalist approach can provide an insight into 
the demand side of gentrification.  
The search for authenticity can be a driving factor for the influx of capital 
and the displacement of the older population by the gentry; collective memory is 
the dominant force driving this conflict (Brown-Saracino, 2013). The cultural 
norms of the gentry can be supported by the local institutions as the right way of 








doing things, thus cleansing the old neighborhood of individuals associated with 
the old decay (Brown-Saracino, 2013). Research has shown that an ideology of 
diversity is persistent with gentrifiers. Affluent gentrifiers boast about their diverse 
neighborhoods, hence describing themselves as tolerant and progressive 
individuals; it is argued, however, that this maintains a system of inequality because 
the guise of diversity simply represents the interests of the gentry.  
Essentially, gentrification occurs within the cultural framework based on 
the idea that a fragmentation in the collective memory is the catalyst for 
gentrification. The combination of the historicizing of a former working-class 
neighborhood, in addition to the delocalized celebration of diversity, leads to an 
ability of gentrification to take hold of this cultural taste. Once an area is gentrified, 
the meaning and cultural context of that area can be shaped to the tastes of the 
gentry, completely changing the environment. Areas that previously represented 
the old population culturally can be shifted to represent the cultural values of the 
gentry, thus making old residents feel alien in their own communities. This issue 
was termed “cosmopolitanism” by another research project and is what happens 
when gentrifiers create “authentic” restorations of the community that they believe 
represent the former demographic. Often, the original population sees these 
renovations as out of touch and not an accurate representation of their community 
(Langegger, 2016). 
Gentrification changes the urban ecology of communities. At times, the 
process of gentrification is slow and unseen, sometimes not noticed at all (Williams 
& Needham, 2016). Moreover, gentrification is often seen in academia as harmful 
or beneficial in its outcome. The focus of this study is not on the consequences but 
rather on the perceptions of community residents living within the gentrifying 
community. This approach is an attempt to illuminate a voice that may not be heard 
otherwise. Neutral in stance, we sought to hear the meaningful accounts of Butler-
Tarkington community members through an exploratory study.  
Our research shined a light in the gaps of the present literature. That is, few 
studies include interpretive accounts gained from interviewing residents of the 
gentrified communities under examination (Danley & Weaver, 2018; Monroe 
Sullivan & Shaw, 2011). Further, many researchers have called attention to the 
displacement of residents caused by gentrification. Fewer, however, have examined 
how displacement affects the residents—particularly lower-income residents—at 
the ground level (Betancur, 2011). Additionally, little research has been completed 
on the perspective of the gentry class and the ways gentrifiers think of the new 
places they are moving into (Donnelly, 2018). In hopes of filling in the gaps, we 








explored opinions about the gentrification process through hearing the accounts of 
all residents and playing actors. Importantly, we emphasize not only displacement 
when residents discuss gentrification; unwelcomeness and exclusion are also key 
focal points, both of which are often associated with the initial stage of 
gentrification (Danley & Weaver, 2018).  
Butler-Tarkington 
The Butler-Tarkington community is predominantly residential 
neighborhoods located on the near northwest side of Indianapolis, Indiana 
(Wheeler, 1999). The triangularity of the community is created by 38th Street to 
the south, Meridian Street to the east; and Michigan Road and Central Canal to the 
west (Figure 1). The name of Butler-Tarkington originates from Hoosier (Pulitzer 
prize-winning) author Booth Tarkington, who lived on Meridian Street from 1923 
to 1946, and from the Butler University campus, which has been in the middle of 
the Butler-Tarkington community since 1920. Butler-Tarkington covers 
approximately 930 acres of Indianapolis (Polis Center, 2020; Wheeler, 1999). 
 
 
Figure 1. The Butler-Tarkington neighborhood. 
Source: “Butler-Tarkington Homes, History, Facts & Photos,” by Amasters, 2015, M. 
S.Woods Real Estate, https://www.mswoods.com/blog/butler-tarkington-homes-
history-facts-photos/. 
 








By the turn of the 19th century, the farms that had once been operated by a 
German diaspora in the Butler-Tarkington area shifted to “suburban houses.” The 
development of the original homes is described as “small and narrow,” and these 
houses were built close to the streetcar line operated during the earlier decades of 
Indianapolis, an establishment known as a streetcar suburb (Wheeler, 1999). 
Simultaneously, the electric railways spawned North Meridian Street, an area well-
known as a historic district in Indianapolis. Emerging as the location of choice for 
the Indianapolis elite, the locality is regarded as one of the most exclusive 
residential neighborhoods in the city of Indianapolis (Wheeler, 1999). Furthermore, 
in 1928, Butler University purchased a 300-acre Fairview campus; the 
establishment of the college campus catalyzed the second wave of middle-class 
residents. By the 1940s, the Butler-Tarkington community had a population of 
12,244 people: 96.3% Caucasians and 3.6% African Americans (Polis Center, 
2020). The community—a middle-class residential area—was thus considered a 
developed location in the city. 
From the 1920s to the 1950s, Butler-Tarkington was a predominantly white 
middle-class community (Wheeler, 1999). During the 1950s, the community’s 
population began to shift. Because of the Civil Rights Movement, primarily white 
neighborhoods such as the Butler-Tarkington community started to open to people 
of color. As mentioned in by Wheeler (1999), the population south of 38th Street 
began to move northward. In response, the long-term community members of 
Butler-Tarkington started to move out toward the west and further north, a move 
known as white flight. Wheeler’s (1999) study describes the phenomenon as 
“realtors attempt[ing] to profit from the ignorance and fear of white residents, 
relying on peer pressure and encouraging whites to move so they could sell new 
property to them and their property to blacks” (p. 16). Thus, the population of the 
community gradually shifted. By the 1970s, the Caucasian population had 
decreased by 30% and the African American community had increased by 30%. 
According to Zip Data Maps, the neighborhood now comprises 68.5% white 
Americans and 28.99% African Americans. 
Methods 
The focus of this study was to reveal if gentrification is happening in the 
Butler-Tarkington neighborhood. To do this, we prioritized the voices and accounts 
of residents and stakeholders involved in the community. Urban renovations and 
reforms often coincide with worry and fear of gentrification, often leaving residents 
feeling powerless and as though they have no say in their community (Danley & 








Weaver, 2018). In contrast, renovations can be seen as a revival of a disabled 
community, which brings optimism to residents (Byrne, 2003). Thus, our research 
focused on illuminating community voices and their perceptions. Our method of 
research was derived from Danley and Weaver (2018) and consisted of observation 
in addition to interviewing local residents and stakeholders. Importantly, we 
separated participants into two groups of two each: (1) longtime community 
members and newcomers and (2) residents and stakeholders. We defined 
community members to incorporate these groups. These classifications allowed us 
to determine whether contrasts exist due to differences in time spent in the 
community, as well as whether stakeholders’ viewpoints differ from residents’ 
viewpoints. 
Our study is qualitative, and thus inductive in nature. We interviewed 16 
participants, ages 18–74 (Figure 2), who were involved in the Butler-Tarkington 
neighborhood as either residents or stakeholders. These participants were further 
sorted into strata of nine newcomers and seven old members; three stakeholders; 
and four renters and nine homeowners. Longtime members are defined as having 
lived for 10 years or more in the community, while newcomers are defined as 
having been engaged in the Butler-Tarkington area for fewer than 10 years. 
Stakeholders are defined as individuals who do not live within the community but 
have an impact or investment—for example, as a teacher or a community 
leader/activist. Of the interviewed, eight are black, seven are white, and one 
identified as Latino (Figure 3). In regard to gender, eight are male, and the other 
eight are female. Thirteen (13) participants described themselves as homeowners 
or residents who lived within the community, while three considered themselves 
stakeholders (Figure 4). Of the participants, nine were considered newcomers and 
seven were considered old members.  
 
 





















Figure 3. Race and ethnicity of study participants  
 
 
Figure 4. Types of community members in the study. 
 
 
To find participants, we utilized a convenience-snowball sampling method. 
This sampling method attempts to gain varied perspectives in response to changes 
within the community; our questions and discussions capture different elements 
that intersect with gentrification. These elements consist of perceptions of crime, 
observed changes in one’s community, and overall satisfaction in the community. 
In conjunction, questions regarding the newly renovated Butler-Tarkington park 
were asked to derive a starting point for discussion, especially regarding the topic 
of gentrification. 
Structurally speaking, our interviews were open in nature, and 
semistructured. The questions we used are modeled from the interview guide of our 
mentor, Dr. Kenneth Colburn, a Butler University liberal arts professor, and can be 
found in Appendix A. Our data collection was based upon recurring themes in the 
interviews that arose. The themes were defined by similar elements that occurred 






















called Nvivo12. We arranged quotes directly from the interviews into themes, then 
organized subcategories within the themes. For example, one of our themes is two 
neighborhoods in one, and within this theme, one can find subcategories such as 
segregation, food deserts, and home values. This process allowed for themes to 
emerge through the recurrence of certain phrases and words while further enriching 
the themes by creating subcategories for each theme; ultimately, we ended up with 
three themes: neighborhood change, the good and the bad of the park, and two 
neighborhoods in one. 
The Institutional Review Board reviewed our research methods and 
approved our methodology. Before proceeding with the interview, every participant 
in the study was informed that his or her responses would be completely 
confidential and anonymous, and this was finalized by participants signing an 
anonymity agreement preceding the interviews.  
Findings 
The results reveal that being a community member in the Butler-Tarkington 
neighborhood is not a simple conceptualization. Many community members argued 
against the change in their neighborhood; simultaneously, quite a few appreciated 
the transformation. We observed that sections of the Butler-Tarkington 
neighborhood are evidently different in terms of socioeconomic and racial 
diversity. Indeed, literature has mentioned the latter (Brabant & Braid, 2009; 
Wheeler, 1999). The analysis revealed three subordinate themes related to (1) 
neighborhood change, (2) the good and the bad of the park renovations, and (3) the 
division in Butler-Tarkington (Table 1). 








Superordinate themes Subthemes 
1. Neighborhood Change “I am scared that these new housing 
development initiatives could destroy the 
uniqueness.” 
 
“I am glad the homes are being 
renovated. … I just want the racial 
diversity to be maintained.” 
2. The Good and the Bad of the Park 
Renovations 
“I’m at odds. … There was not enough 
inclusion in the process.” 
 
“The Tarkington Park is an excellent way 
to bring the neighborhood together.” 
 
“It is a beautiful sight to see the diversity 
and all the kids play together.” 
 
“I think they’re excessive (renovations), a 
little bit like an embarrassment of 
riches.” 
3. Two Neighborhoods in One “It’s not a Butler-Tarkington; there’s a 
Butler community, and there is a 
Tarkington community.” 
 
“Racial division … as mixed as the 
neighborhood is, there is no close-knit 
connection.” 
 
“Your property is valued more if you are 
north of 42nd Street whereas less south 
of 42nd Street.” 
Table 1. Themes Revealed in the Study 
 
 
Neighborhood Change  
An overwhelming majority of community members noted a change in the 
neighborhood. As explained in the literature, termination of the previous culture, 
detrimental effects on the original residents, and physical and physiological 
displacement in the neighborhood all occur (Danley & Weaver, 2018; Kellogg, 
2015). Often, the original population also argues that these renovations are not an 
accurate representation of their community (Langegger, 2016). Furthermore, 








through our analysis, we have come across statements from community members 
that reflect the concerns mentioned in the literature review. For example: 
 
I do not know … it concerns me that there is less people of color in the 
neighborhood … that bothers me. People [are] buying housing that were 
once owned by people of color, people [white Americans] are taking over 
the neighborhood. … I have this reoccurring dream that white people are in 
our front yard … so I guess this is a concern for me. 
 
Change in the neighborhood is not solely physical; rather, it also has a 
psychological impact on residents, which was made evident by a resident of more 
than 25 years in her statement (above) about a reoccurring dream of white people 
standing in her front yard. The demographic change in the neighborhood coincides 
with her fear of alienation and the possibility of her displacement. Her fear is not 
unwarranted, as other respondents have observed these demographic changes as 
well. A former resident who was born and raised in the Butler-Tarkington 
neighborhood mentioned, “I remember it being much more urban, more blacker.”  
 The abovementioned issue illuminates the possibility of a “white 
space,” which consists of a white invasion in a given community; the space is 
informally “off limits” for the original ethnic-minority residents in certain areas 
(Anderson, 2015). A stakeholder and resident of more than 30 years mentioned 
residents “looking out for their history of what is going on … need to remember 
where we come.” The resident made it known that his history and culture in the 
Butler-Tarkington community should not be altered because of gentrification. 
Consequently, the change, according to many interviewed, is the presence of 
“young Caucasian couples with families.”    
 Our study found that the neighborhood character was an important 
attribute for some residents of the Butler-Tarkington community. Langegger (2016) 
made a similar discovery through his study: that the change of neighborhood 
character was not an authentic representation of the studied community. The 
majority of respondents within our study did not oppose the renovations, however; 
most respondents were neutral about the renovations, and a few supported the 
housing renovations. We nevertheless find it essential to mention, since the 
possibility of more housing renovations may spark more opposition. Housing 
renovations were a concern for a small minority of the interviewees, as illustrated 








by a long-term resident expressing her admiration for the unique style of housing 
in her neighborhood:  
 
I love the uniqueness of every house. … I am scared that these new housing 
development initiatives could destroy the uniqueness. … I have seen the 
destruction of old homes being replaced by new … replaced with homes 
twice the size and cost … the raising of taxes that comes with this forces 
people [to] sell … the housing is switching to young couples with families.  
 
Because respondents were given the agency to define gentrification, the 
definition of the term varied according to the community member. The most 
prominent reasons for gentrification in Butler-Tarkington are based on race and 
housing renovations; thus, certain respondents concentrated on race and not 
housing renovations, and vice versa. In result, all but three respondents mentioned 
that gentrification is happening (10) and somewhat happening (3).  
The Good and the Bad of the Park Renovations  
 Adjacent to the Martin Luther King Multi-Community Center and 
38th Street lies the newly six-million-dollar-renovated Butler-Tarkington 
neighborhood park. As observers, we recognized the beauty of the park amenities, 
which community members did as well. After simply being asked what they 
thought about the park renovations, many participants (13/16) immediately 
commented on the beauty of the park. Moreover, half of the respondents noted that 
park renovations offer more community growth. Many participants explained this 
community growth as an aspect of propelling diversity through a public space 
serving as a foundation for community interactions. In addition to the diversity 
aspects, many participants stressed the importance of the park and economic 
growth. The park is seen as a beacon of redevelopment and serves as a magnet for 
businesses to open up shop, according to some community members. We observed, 
however, that a brewery was open for only a brief time, illuminating the issue that 
certain economic tastes initiated by the park are not yet supported by the 
community.  
Some respondents offered the following: 
 








Things like the Tarkington Park are an excellent way to bring the 
neighborhood together. … My kids play with kids they probably wouldn’t 
get a chance to play with any other time, and vice versa. 
 
I have state senators and city counselors tell me that black kids won’t play 
on that equipment and they have since come and told me that they were 
wrong. … It is a beautiful sight to see the diversity and all the kids play 
together … to me, the whole park being built for white kids was highly 
offensive. 
 
I see the park surely bringing in growth on Illinois Street … more 
businesses. … The park serves as a catalyst for this stuff. 
 
Many respondents acknowledged the beauty of the park and what it is—as 
well as what it could possibly bring—yet some participant members of Butler-
Tarkington (6/16) still mentioned controversial opinions about the park. The 
noticeable price tag attached to the renovations on the park is evident through 
observation, and through the paperwork; one source lists the park renovations as 
costing $6 million. Because the park is located in a community where many of our 
respondents mentioned a food desert and the injustices challenging the residents in 
the area, some respondents questioned if the initiative could have been best used 
somewhere else, not focused solely on the neighborhood park, as other locations 
“need more attention.” A community member of more than 50 years mentioned, 
“My biggest concern is around the corner … on Illinois Street, 7-Eleven used to be 
there (next to the park) … still need to improve that area, that area needs attention 
… renovate what is there.” Another participant observed, “Best use of resources, 
that can be questionable. … I heard some numbers, multi-millions. … I don’t know, 
I guess people are trying.” 
Community members also highlighted the process of the park’s renovation 
being top-to-bottom; there was no inclusion, some argue. Prior to the park 
renovations, some passionately mentioned, predominantly African Americans used 
the park amenities but they were not included in the process of developing the park:  
Yeah, because we knew everybody. … It is the coolest place [the park]. … 
You never seen the whole hood this tight. … We be at the park now, and 








they act that like we be terrorizing the park … and we didn’t have a say in 
the park’s upgrades. … They changed it [the park] to make us go away; they 
only built that for the white people and Butler [University]. 
 
Yes … I think they’re pretty and would be good for the front of a magazine 
[park renovations], but I think they’re excessive a little bit, like an 
embarrassment of riches … process of it was very outside-in … people are 
supposed to just appreciate it. 
 
I’m at odds. … A lot of the improvements pushed our football practices to 
where we are now. … There was not enough inclusion in the process. … As 
far of the look, it looks good. … A lot of people who were not using the 
park were the ones making the decisions. … We don’t have a grocery store, 
we used to have a 7-Eleven, so mostly a food desert over here and a nice 
park. 
 
Two Neighborhoods in One 
Twenty years prior to our current research, an ethnographic study was done 
on the Butler-Tarkington neighborhood. Interestingly enough, the voices of the past 
echo to this day; the study reveals no change between the northern and southern 
halves of the Butler-Tarkington neighborhood. Cultural and financial differences 
between the northern part and the southern part have been long-standing. Wheeler 
(1999) observed, “It seemed to me that the African-American population was 
concentrated in the southern end of the neighborhood, with the northern end being 
primarily inhabited by white residents” (p. i). 
We argue that the contemporary division in Butler-Tarkington still contains 
remnants of the past. As a key stakeholder of the community mentions, there is a 
“racial divide in the neighborhood … unofficially a north Butler-Tarkington and a 
south Butler-Tarkington.” Additionally, a long-term community member who has 
called Butler-Tarkington home for more than 30 years stated, “Racial division … I 
think a lot of blacks don’t interact with the whites, and a lot of the whites don’t 
interact with the blacks … as mixed as the neighborhood is, there’s no close-knit 
connection … it’s not blended.” 








Residents who expressed concern regarding the racial divide in the 
community said this aspect of Butler-Tarkington was synonymous with segregation 
(4/16). As we conducted the interviews, we simultaneously spent numerous hours 
engaged in the Butler-Tarkington community. Observing the division firsthand, we 
could not help but notice the stark contrast in market value of the properties when 
only walking a few blocks. Some interviewees (5/16) noted the stark contrast in 
property values between the two halves of Butler-Tarkington. One longtime 
resident mentioned “lines of demarcation … and that kind of thing … where your 
property is valued more if you are north of 42nd Street whereas [valued] less south 
of 42nd Street.” Indeed, the housing stock shows a stark contrast between the 
“northern part with homes valued up to 2,000,000 dollars and homes in the south 
which can value as low as 30,000,” as a former community member mentioned.  
Moving toward the southern part of Butler-Tarkington, many community 
members commonly stress the issue of inadequate food services and commercial 
options. A stakeholder involved with the community made it evident through our 
interview that he has a lack of food options during his work lunch break: “Lack of 
access … I don’t eat McDonald’s or Burger king. … I have a 20-minute window 
for lunch. … I drive to [Broad] Ripple … more healthy access to foods.” A separate 
stakeholder explained the situation in Butler-Tarkington in this way: “There’s no 
grocery store … it’s a food desert.” A longtime community member’s statement 
further fortifies the idea of this food desert: “We don’t have a grocery store; we 
used to have a 7-Eleven, so mostly a food desert over here.” With these current 
findings, we note the struggles of certain residents to obtain adequate food.  
Discussion 
This qualitative study has sought to gain a clearer idea of the relationship 
between community attitudes and gentrification. Disclosure of the attitudes of 
many of the black participants of this study has clearly shown more of a racial 
perspective of the process of gentrification. These participants emphasized the 
division between the north and south of Butler-Tarkington similar to racial 
segregation of the past. Consequently, when the park renovations occurred toward 
the south side of the community, residents questioned why there was a lack of 
inclusivity. While these interviewees admired the new renovations, many who lived 
in the southern part of the community emphasized the need for adequate businesses.  
Symbolic interactionism is a theoretical framework that applies to our 
research. Residents spoke about the issue of the changing demographics of the park. 
This relates back to the idea that physical locations can have shared social meaning 








and character and that this social meaning can be changed by external factors. 
Residents who visited the park before renovations noticed a change in the racial 
demographics from predominantly black to more diverse. Respondents who raised 
this issue were not opposed to the changing demographics of the park; they just 
noted that this diversification was catalyzed by the renovation. Changing these 
demographics can lead to a change in the cultural context and collective memory 
of a location. In this case, the park was initially a predominately homogeneous 
cultural space for black visitors but has since diversified (Borer, 2010).  
The conflictive nature with this change of cultural space arises with 
symbolic boundaries being redrawn to fit the needs of the gentry, that the change 
in the collective memory in a location can drive out the older residents of the 
community (Brown-Saracino, 2013). Based upon our interviews, residents did not 
feel as if the renovation and change in the culture were threats to them staying in 
the neighborhood. Furthermore, our study does not have the merit to generalize this 
park as a “white space,” as exclusion was not felt, according to the respondents.  
While these interviewees stated that gentrification was occurring, only three 
respondents argued gentrification happening. These respondents focused on the fact 
that displacement was not occurring because of their view of a strong diverse 
community. The white respondents who agreed that gentrification was occurring 
focused more on aspects involved with housing renovations and home pricings, 
contrary to a racial perspective, which was predominant in the African American 
respondents. This was the only noticeable difference between black and white 
respondents. The length of involvement in the community and the type of 
community member did not have noticeable differences in viewpoints; however, 
the only participants to say gentrification was not happening were new members. 
Also, all four stakeholders mentioned that gentrification was happening and offered 
exhaustive responses.  
Methodological Limitations 
The biggest limitation of our study was the small sample size of 16, which 
means that the results cannot be generalized to all people of the Butler-Tarkington 
community. Additionally, a vast amount of the participants were contacted through 
the Butler-Tarkington Neighborhood Association; the possibility of a skewed result 
is evident, since these participants wanted their voices heard; others did so, too, but 
were not involved in the neighborhood association. To contact the latter, we 
randomly selected people from the neighborhood park, yet many did not have the 
time for meetings or never replied to requests for scheduled meetings.  









The second-to-last question in our interview guide concentrated on how to 
deal with community change. A significant number of respondents mentioned the 
need for community members to participate in the Butler-Tarkington 
Neighborhood Association. Ultimately, this boils down to an aspect of inclusivity 
in decision-making, which was mentioned in some way by all participants. 
Essentially, having a seat at the table is desirable for residents. Through our 
analysis, this is the most profound implication that ought to be considered, as we 
wanted to hear and analyze what the residents were saying about what they want 
implemented. 
Further Research 
Studies to explore the relationship between Butler-Tarkington residential 
attitudes and gentrification, paying particular attention to the racial differences, are 
needed. It would also be helpful to explore the attitudes deriving from residents 
from the southern and northern ends of Butler-Tarkington. It would beneficial to 
Indianapolis communities to better understand the depth of racial perspectives 
related to the community members and the ways to resolve the conflict among 
people who see gentrification as a negative, as unjust, and in some contexts a racist 
way of improving neighborhoods. It would also be helpful to understand the 
relationship between them and those who approve of gentrification in Butler-
Tarkington, to see where their underlining premises are set. A longitudinal study 
could explore the relationship at an impressive account. 
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Appendix A. Interview Guide 







Race and Ethnicity: 
______________________________________________________  
Type of Community Member (i.e. Renter, stakeholder, homeowner): 
_________________ 
Years living/or involved with Butler-Tarkington: 
_________________________________ 
Family living in the area (yes or no) 
_______________________________________ 








Home and Neighborhood 
 
1. How important was the neighborhood (Butler-Tarkington) to your 
decision to buy/or get involved in? 
 
Very important____     
Somewhat Important______                        



















2. Now that you have lived/or been involved here awhile, have your initial 
impressions or views about the neighborhood changed?  











3. How many residents in the neighborhood do you know on a first name 
basis? 
  ____________________ 
 









4. Have you or your family ever had any concerns about your personal safety 



















5. Do neighbors and residents here tend to look out for each other? Yes: 














6. Have you or your family ever used the Butler-Tarkington park? Yes: ____ 
No: _____ 
 












7. Has neighborhood crime ever been a concern to you?  


















8. How would you rate your overall level of satisfaction living/involved in 
Butler-Tarkington neighborhood? 
Very Satisfied______   
Somewhat Satisfied_______            























Understanding the neighborhood perceptions  
 




















The impacts of Gentrification  
 






















13. Have you heard the term gentrification?  
Yes: ________ No: __________  
 









































































17. Finally, is there anything you would like to add or say that we may have 
left out, forgotten to ask or mention, that you think would help us 












Definition used for question #13 
 
The fear of displacement, loss of community icons—such as parks, businesses, 
and/or homes—and do you see exclusions from certain spots in your 
neighborhood because of renovations? 
 
*Definition influenced by Danley and Weaver (2018).    
  








WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT OR EXPLOITATION OF 
WOMEN? EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC 
EMPOWERMENT PROGRAMMING  
 
BILLIE WHITE, MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE 
MENTOR: KARIMA BORNI 
 
Abstract 
This paper demonstrates how international development institutions often 
overlook the subjective lived experiences of the women they are trying to help. It 
examines the prevailing economic perspectives on the relationship between fertility 
rates and poverty, and explores how within a neoliberal economic system, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often prioritize economic empowerment 
programming over social- and political empowerment projects. This paper then 
examines economic empowerment programs implemented by NGOs in Syrian 
refugee camps in Jordan, to investigate the implications of placing the burden of 
poverty in “third world” countries on women and their wombs. Throughout, the 
paper questions whether encouraging women to join the workforce is truly the best 
way to promote women’s empowerment.  
 
 
“You have to get into it to see how much development is an alibi for exploitation, 
how much it’s a scam: the responsibility for the entire world’s ills is between the 
legs of the poorest women of the South.”1  
 
— Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in an interview after the Cairo UN 






1 Nermeen Shaikh, “Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,” in The Present as History: Critical 
Perspectives on Contemporary Global Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 194. 








Eugenics and the Economics of Population and Poverty  
The debate surrounding the impact of fertility and population growth on the 
economy has influenced how governments and development-minded 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) approach sexual and reproductive health 
in the modern era. The relationship between fertility and the economy has also 
shaped the way that development NGOs seeking to “empower” women prioritize 
programs that focus on economic empowerment. Since the time of Thomas 
Malthus—eighteenth-century economist who theorized that food production would 
be unable to keep up with population growth, leading to devastating food 
shortages—economists have debated the link and causality between population 
growth and poverty within a development context.2 These debates have a dark 
history of racist, sexist, and classist forced-sterilization and population-control 
programs. Many of the most well known and celebrated birth control advocates, 
including Marie Stopes and Margaret Sanger, expressed eugenic sentiments on the 
subjects of racial purity and mental hygiene.3 During the colonial period, the British 
eugenics movement spread and implanted itself abroad, sparking the establishment 
of new eugenics societies and organizations. These organizations advocated for 
poor women to use contraception or be sterilized in order to create a more fit and 
hygienic population—a population that would lift “underdeveloped” countries out 
of poverty.4 This history shows that discussions of population growth and fertility 
rates in impoverished parts of the world are innately racialized and gendered. 
Furthermore, eugenic ideas about the fertility of women in “developing countries” 
have been appropriated within the development context, framing women as overly 
fecund and as potential barriers to economic development. 
Since the colonial era, advocating for the use of contraceptives has been a 
key part of fighting “third world” poverty within a development framework. Similar 
population-control programs advocated for the sterilization of disabled individuals 
 
2 Donald Gunn MacRae, “Thomas Malthus: English Economist and Demographer,” Encyclopedia 
Britannica, last modified April 5, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Thomas-Malthus. 
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and women of color in the United States.5 Before we delve into the more recent 
economic theory surrounding fertility and economic development, we therefore 
must recognize the damage that forced sterilization and coercive family-planning 
techniques have done in the name of combating poverty. This history should remind 
us to question exactly whom sexual- and reproductive-health programs are 
designed to benefit, and whether those programs take into account the lived 
experiences of the women they are supposed to serve. 
Most economists agree that as incomes increase, fertility rates decrease; as 
people earn more money, they have fewer children.6 No such consensus exists, 
however, on whether “reduced fertility improve[s] the economic prospects of 
families and societies.”7 Those who followed the teachings of Malthus believed that 
high fertility rates would keep states stuck in conditions of “underdevelopment” 
and poverty; only under conditions of slow population growth could states prosper, 
they believed.8 
After World War II, a neo-Malthusian school of thought gained 
prominence, arguing that high rates of population growth damage the potential for 
development. These economists believed that to promote economic development, 
states should implement population-control policies.9 A 1986 report released by the 
US National Research Council, however, argued that although high fertility rates 
do have the potential to limit economic development, the extent is not so great as 
the neo-Malthusians had claimed. The report stated that population growth is only 
one of the many conditions that affect development and that when it does, the 
effects are usually weak.10 
Since the publication of this influential report, other development 
economists, such as David Bloom and David Canning, have examined the impact 
of population growth and demographic change on the economy.11 They theorize 
that as a state’s fertility rates decrease, more of the state’s population falls between 
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the ages of 15 and 65 years. This “demographic bonus” means that more of the 
population can participate in the workforce and less of the population is reliant on 
social services.12 In his article “Population, Poverty and Economic Development,” 
Steven W. Sinding explains that, “assuming countries also pursue sensible pro-
growth economic policies, the demographic bonus ought to translate into a jump in 
income per capita.”13 Sinding therefore argues for fertility-control programs to be 
integrated into states’ comprehensive economic development plans14 and that 
decreasing fertility will not solve the issue of poverty on its own but may be “a 
necessary condition” of economic growth.15  
Economists have long framed women and their ability to reproduce as a 
primary burden of economic development. Responsibility for a successful global 
future is placed, in part, on the backs—or in the wombs—of women in the “third 
world.” Even though Sinding argues that countries must implement projects other 
than population control to promote development, women are still constructed as 
opportunities for economic growth. Speaking years after the 1994 Cairo UN 
Conference on Population and Development, Gayatri Spivak reflected,  
 
It was so clear that everybody, some in a benevolent way, 
some in a hardly disguised malevolent way, were thinking 
to stop poor Third World women from having children 
would save all the world’s problems. … The fact that one 
Euro-American child consumes 183 times what one Third 
World child consumes was never thought of, much less 
articulated.16 
 
It is easy to speak of women in the detached theoretical language of 
economics, but we must remember that the essentializing of women by NGOs and 
governments alike as baby-makers has tangible consequences. It affects the 
programs that NGOs adopt and presents women who have many children as the 
primary reason their families remain in poverty. This view of the relationship 
between reproduction and poverty has led many NGOs to overlook the importance 
of the unpaid care work involved in birthing and raising children in favor of 
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programs that encourage women to find paid work outside the home. Framing 
women’s reproductive behavior as an economic tool to fight poverty has the 
dangerous consequence of erasing the desires and life choices of individual women.   
We should note that NGOs’ fixation on economic development is part of 
the much larger neoliberal system within which Western NGOs operate on the 
global stage. Much simplified, neoliberal ideology celebrates the free market and 
holds that maintaining economic growth is the best way to “achieve human 
progress.”17 As would be expected in a free-market capitalist system, NGOs depend 
on donors for funding to carry out their programming. Often, these funders dictate 
how the NGOs spend their money and craft their development agendas.18 Despite 
the separation from governments indicated by their name, NGOs do receive funding 
from governments and are hired as subcontractors by local governments.19 This 
means that NGOs must account for the money they receive in documentable and 
quantifiable ways, as well as demonstrate that their programs align with the 
specified interests of the states that fund them.20 In his article “NGOs and Western 
Hegemony: Causes for Concern and Ideas for Change,” Glen W. Wright argues that 
this accountability to governments has led NGOs to be less accountable to the 
people who are supposed to be benefiting from their services.21 
As Wright points out, Western standards of accountability privilege 
“numbers, statistics, and efficiency over the qualitative aspects of development” 
that might take into account local cultures and norms.22 He argues that NGOs may 
avoid implementing programming that will not yield a short-term measurable 
result; instead, they opt for setting goals that are easier to measure, “at the expense 
of a more holistic approach.”23 For example, an NGO funded by the World Bank 
and the US government might be particularly attracted to programs that aim to 
increase employment and workforce participation or to decrease fertility rates by 
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preventing unwanted pregnancies. This is not to say that these are not worthy 
causes, but focusing on quantitative results may lead this NGO to overlook the lived 
experiences, shaped by culture and society, of the people it intends to serve. The 
programs that lend themselves to these quantitative results may not align with the 
needs and desires of the target population. 
International Development and Women’s Empowerment  
The global neoliberal system also shapes the lens through which many 
NGOs view empowerment. Their accountability to governments and other 
capitalist institutions dictates the areas in which they attempt to empower people in 
“third world” nations. NGOs tend to focus more on local systems of oppression and 
disempowerment than on global ones. For example, even though “the male 
dominated elite world of IMF [International Monetary Fund] privatizations, 
multinational corporations and local landlords” could certainly be accused of 
exploiting poor men and women in the “third world,” NGOs more often focus on 
the “‘patriarchy’ in the household, family violence, divorce, [and] family 
planning.”24 Of course, exploitation should be condemned no matter where it takes 
place, but it is crucial to note what kinds of disempowerment and exploitation 
NGOs fixate upon and which they overlook. As James Petras asserts in his article 
“NGOs: In the Service of Imperialism,” in their programs to promote gender 
equality and women’s empowerment, NGOs ignore the areas in which white men 
are the oppressors and focus instead on local systems of oppression in which “the 
exploited and impoverished male worker/peasant emerges as the main villain.”25 
The programs that attempt to empower women economically by helping them join 
the workforce and earn money for their families, and thereby promote the economic 
growth of the state, are therefore often not addressing the systemic exploitation of 
workers within a free market economy. While some women may feel empowered 
by working outside the home, other women may feel less empowered in low-wage 
positions, exploited by wealthy business owners, than they were at home, taking 
care of their children. 
 
24 Petras, “NGOs,” 436; for more information about the human rights issues associated with 
privatization, see Philip Alston, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights,” United Nations General Assembly (September 26, 2018), 
https://srpovertyorg.files.wordpress.com/2018/10/a_73_396-sr-on-extreme-poverty-
privatization.pdf. 
25 Petras, “NGOs,” 436.  








That women’s empowerment is characterized as an effective instrument of 
development can also help us investigate the divide between the rhetoric of NGOs 
and the subjective experience of their beneficiaries. The discussions surrounding 
empowerment as a goal of NGO programming demonstrate a neoliberal focus on 
economic empowerment and economic productivity. Rather than advocating for a 
holistic approach to improving women’s overall well-being, NGOs increasingly 
pursue market-led growth in the communities and societies in which they operate.26 
Many NGOs appeal to their donors by exalting the economic benefits of 
empowering women. They argue that if a country’s women learn vocational skills 
and join the workforce, the country will be able to grow its economy and reap 
considerable material benefits.27 Many of the projects intended to economically 
empower women do not take women’s long-term needs into consideration, 
however. For example, some programs provide short-term employment for women 
to mitigate the impact of male unemployment on the economy.28 Economic 
empowerment programs may also inadvertently put women at risk of domestic 
violence from men who feel threatened or emasculated by women’s increased 
economic power.29 NGOs must place value on the lived experiences of women 
rather than on the assumption that entering the workforce will always improve 
women’s lives, to better understand the unintended consequences of their 
programs.30 
As noted before, viewing women in the “developing world” as economic 
opportunities rather than as human beings who deserve to live fulfilling and healthy 
lives is pervasive in international development rhetoric. The World Bank has 
channeled this sentiment into a pithy slogan that accompanies many of its gender-
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equality and women’s empowerment plans: “The empowerment of women is smart 
economics.”31 Rosalind Eyben and Rebecca Napier-Moore report in their article 
“Choosing Words with Care? Shifting Meanings of Women’s Empowerment in 
International Development” that on International Women’s Day in 2009, the 
Director General of UNESCO wrote, “Gender equality is smart and just economics 
for many compelling reasons. It can act as a force for economic development and 
for improving the quality of life of society as a whole.”32 Clearly, it is not sufficient 
to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment for their own sake; gender 
equality and women’s empowerment become attractive to donors only when donors 
realize they will benefit financially from the programs they support. 
The attractiveness of an economic justification for women’s empowerment 
within a neoliberal society is perhaps best demonstrated by Nike’s 2015 Girl Effect 
campaign.33 Speaking about the campaign, Nike CEO Mark Parker stated, 
“Economists have demonstrated that [investing in girls] is the best possible return 
on investment.”34 This multinational corporation is not particularly well known for 
treating its workers in the “third world” justly, yet Nike’s campaign was not aimed 
at improving the working conditions in the sweatshops where women make its 
popular clothing and gear.35 The corporation was, in fact, using the attractive 
rhetoric of women’s empowerment to advertise its goods. By drawing upon this 
theme, corporations like Nike, which exploits low-wage workers, benefit 
monetarily by making charitable and benevolent appeals to their consumers. Again, 
institutions like Nike rely on women whom the neoliberal economic system has 
abused and exploited for cheap labor, simultaneously using the women’s suffering 
as justification for programs that may not even address the issues that affect these 
women the most. 
Moreover, this focus on economic empowerment as a tool of international 
development strategically overlooks the exploitation and marginalization that many 
women experience when they enter the workforce.36 As Eyben and Napier-Moore 
assert, development NGOs have centered a definition of empowerment that focuses 
on “formal institutions and individual autonomy.”37 The authors go on to argue, 
 
31 Eyben and Napier-Moore, “Choosing Words with Care,” 293.  
32 Eyben and Napier-Moore, “Choosing Words with Care,” 293.  
33 Arianne Shahvisi, “‘Women’s Empowerment,’ Imperialism, and the Global Gag Rule,” Kohl: A 
Journal for Body and Gender Research 4, no. 2 (Winter 2018): 174. 
34 Shahvisi, “‘Women’s Empowerment,’” 174. 
35 Shahvisi, “‘Women’s Empowerment,’” 174. 
36 Shahvisi, “‘Women’s Empowerment,’” 177. 
37 Eyben and Napier-Moore, “Choosing Words with Care,” 293.  








“Even with autonomy the emphasis is more on the economic actor contributing to 
growth, and less on, say, decent work and the unpaid care economy—and even less 
on issues of bodily autonomy and the power within.”38 Placing such an emphasis 
on economic empowerment is often more beneficial to governments and 
institutions than it is for the women who are supposed to be benefitting from these 
programs. A focus on growth leads NGOs and other international actors to ignore 
the real needs and desires of women living in poverty. How can economic 
empowerment programs be truly empowering if they do not address the exploitation 
of women within the global neoliberal system? If being economically empowered 
means having the ability to make economic decisions, then organizations should 
not devalue the desire of some women to care for their children or to avoid 
exploitative jobs. Instead, organizations should engage with the women they are 
trying to empower and should find ways to merge unpaid labor with formal work—
ways that fit with, rather than overlook, the women’s own desires and 
responsibilities.  
Syrian Refugees and Economic Empowerment  
The experiences of Syrian refugees in Jordan can further demonstrate the 
limitations of economic empowerment programs. Most Syrian refugees in Jordan 
experience extreme financial insecurity, with 86 percent living below the Jordanian 
poverty line of 2.25 USD per day.39 The unemployment rate in Jordan increased 
22.1 percent between the start of the Syrian civil war (2011) and 2014.40 Many 
Jordanian citizens therefore struggle to find employment and find themselves 
having to compete with Syrian refugees for jobs.41 In 2017, the government of 
Jordan and members of the international community, including the United 
Kingdom and the United Nations, agreed to a plan called the Jordan Compact, 
which intended to address these challenges.42 As UNICEF describes in a report, 
“the central pillar of the Compact is to turn the Syrian refugee crises into a 
development opportunity that attracts new investments and creates jobs for 
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Jordanians and Syrian refugees.”43 In doing so, Jordan agreed to create 200,000 
jobs for Syrians. The agreement thrilled the international community and resulted 
in pledges for $12 billion in grants and $40 billion in loans from Western nations—
sums of money that dwarfed the $3.2 billion that Western countries pledged to the 
humanitarian response to the Syrian refugee crisis.44  
Before the Compact, Syrian refugees were required to apply for work 
permits through the same process required for labor migrants.45 The fees were high 
and required documentation that many refugees had left in Syria. Consequently, the 
Jordanian government issued only 3,000 work permits to Syrian refugees each year 
during the period leading up to the Jordan Compact.46 According to a report by UN 
Women, “In 2017, as a result of policy reforms, the government issued 46,717 work 
permits, of which 5 percent were issued to women. This takes the total number of 
work permits issued as of April 2018 to 99,443, of which 45,850 are currently 
active.”47 That only 5 percent of work permits were given to women in 2017 
demonstrates the barriers Syrian women face in obtaining legal work. Moreover, 
UN Women found that male family members were more likely to be issued work 
permits than were female family members, and the men who did receive permits 
were more likely to be living in the urban centers of Amman and Irbid than in the 
rural areas of Jordan.48  
Because Syrian refugees, particularly women, have limited access to 
employment in Jordan, development NGOs have implemented programs aimed at 
increasing Syrian workforce participation. Because of the persistent difficulties of 
obtaining work permits, many of these are short-term cash-for-work programs that 
do not meet the long-term needs of refugees. For example, the Norwegian Refugee 
Council runs a cash-for-work program in which women “oversee the management 
of seedlings which will be planted in the Royal Botanical Garden.”49 This provides 
both Syrian and Jordanian women with an opportunity to earn money needed to 
survive, yet each group of about twenty women works on this project for only forty 
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days.50 Even though these programs benefit women in the short term, they leave 
women constantly searching for their next cash-for-work opportunity.  
In an article that helped inspire the Jordan Compact, Alexander Betts and 
Paul Collier envisioned a plan to integrate refugees into their host country’s 
economy.51 Using Jordan as a case study, the pair argued for “a reconsidered 
refugee policy [that] would integrate displaced Syrians into specially created 
economic zones, offering Syrian refugees employment and autonomy, incubating 
businesses in preparation for the eventual end of the civil war in Syria, and aiding 
Jordan’s aspirations for industrial development.”52 The idea of benefitting both the 
refugees who need ways to support themselves and their families while 
simultaneously helping Jordan achieve its development goals is incredibly 
attractive. Betts and Collier asserted that “special development zones” would 
provide refugees with “autonomy and opportunity” through integration into the 
global economy,53 but the authors did not once mention Syrian refugee women in 
their article; they did not address the fact that women may not be able to pick up 
and leave their homes and their children to work in industrial zones every day.  
A report by Oxfam detailing the organization’s failed attempt to recruit 
Syrian women to formal work in a garment factory provides insight into the 
challenges faced specifically by women. More specifically, it demonstrates the 
shortcomings of economic integration programs, such as those envisioned by Betts 
and Collier, that overlook women’s needs. The Oxfam report explains that there 
were only 5,000 cash-for-work jobs in Za’atari camp and only one third of these 
jobs were filled by women.54 Ten thousand (10,000) work permits were granted to 
refugees living in Za’atari camp, but Oxfam reports that “these work permits are 
often used in unauthorized ways as entry and exit permits, exposing refugees to 
legal and protection risks when leaving the camp.”55 As a result, Oxfam created the 
Lel-Haya project, a cash-for-work program in which Syrian refugee women worked 
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as seamstresses sewing old UNHCR tents into tote bags.56 The employment office 
at the camp then worked with a garment factory located outside the camp to hold a 
job fair to recruit women into jobs at the factory. Even though the women 
participating in the Lel-Haya project were interested in formal work at the garment 
factory, most did not end up choosing to participate in the employment program.57 
Oxfam was surprised that the women chose not to join “despite childcare incentives 
of 25 Jordanian dinars (approximately $35) per month provided by the factory for 
each child under the age of four, and ILO-arranged buses to transport women from 
their districts to the camp main gate.”58 When Oxfam interviewed the women to 
find out why they had chosen not to work in the factory, the organization discovered 
a wide variety of reasons. First, the distance of the factory from the camp was a 
main barrier for the women, as they could not be away from their families all day. 
Some women who had children over the age of four—and were therefore not 
eligible for the childcare incentive—could not afford to pay someone to watch their 
children. Many women feared leaving their children at home alone, as the shelters 
could easily catch on fire.59 Additionally, women were discouraged by the fact that 
they could not easily and cheaply return to the camp in case of emergency; cheap 
transportation was often considered unsafe, and taxis were too expensive.60 Women 
also realized that if they worked at the factory during the day, they would miss aid 
distributions in the camp. Some women chose not to participate because they had 
heard that treatment of workers was bad in the factories. Another main barrier was 
that only women under 35 were eligible to work in the factory, which excluded 
older skilled seamstresses who were interested in the program.61 
This case demonstrates some of the challenges that Jordan and the 
international community would face if they decided to integrate Syrian refugees 
into “special economic zones” as Betts and Collier suggested.62 There is simply no 
easy way to ensure that Syrian refugees can earn money and develop skills that will 
help them survive once the civil war is over; however, it is clear that seeking to 
integrate refugees into the Jordanian economy without considering the actual lived 
experiences of women will be ineffectual. Employment programs such as this one 
may be beneficial to regional and global economies, but they will not succeed in 
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their goals of empowering Syrian women. Women must be able to carry out their 
roles as mothers and wives if they so desire. Separating women from their families 
and then considering the women empowered ignores their lived experiences. 
Women should be able to work close to their homes, and thus the cost and efficiency 
of transportation must be improved. This would likely include creating formal work 
programs within the camps. There should also be improved access to affordable 
childcare and flexible working schedules. Most importantly, there should be open 
communication with Syrian women (and men) to identify other ways to improve 
access to formal work that enables women to also carry out their roles as mothers 
and wives.  
Western Feminism and the Patriarchy 
Western feminist agendas have also influenced the ways that NGOs 
approach women’s empowerment. The issues that are most important to Western 
feminists working for and funding NGOs may not resonate with women from the 
“third world.”63 As a result, the projects they prioritize “are not always considered 
the most pressing by activists and grassroots women in the aid-receiving 
countries.”64 In her article “Hailing the ‘Authentic Other’: Constructing the Third 
World as Aid Recipient in Donor NGO Agendas,” Chilla Bulbeck points out the 
example of the Ford Foundation’s work in China. She explains that local 
organizations have criticized reproductive-health projects “as reflecting Western 
notions of individualism, informed consent and choice.”65 This is not to say that 
this reaction was universal, but it does demonstrate how Western feminist ideals 
are exported to the “third world,” where they may not align with local cultures, 
practices, and beliefs. If these feminist organizations listen to women from the 
communities they are trying to help, women who may have different ideas about 
feminism and empowerment, perhaps the organizations would be able to implement 
more successful agendas.  
The Western feminist perceptions of patriarchy also demonstrate the 
potential gap between NGOs’ ideas of empowerment and those of women on the 
ground. There is a persistent idea that women’s empowerment is impossible within 
a patriarchal system, that women’s empowerment and patriarchy are mutually 
exclusive. We see this exemplified in Valentine M. Moghadam’s book From 
Patriarchy to Empowerment, the title of which alone suggests that patriarchy makes 
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empowerment impossible.66 In her introduction, Moghadam describes the Middle 
East, North Africa, and South Asia as part of “the patriarchal belt” and explains that 
this system of patriarchy has had “dire implications for women’s status and life 
chances.”67 She urges an immediate shift from patriarchy to empowerment.68 
Although Moghadam does acknowledge the “emergence of vibrant women’s 
movements” in the region, her statement seems to suggest that women are unable 
to exert power and agency from within patriarchal social structures.69 She feeds into 
the assumption that “a timeless, fixed notion of female inferiority exists in the [third 
world].”70 It is this assumption that leads development organizations to essentialize 
the experiences of poor women as victims who need to be saved from the binds of 
the patriarchy.  
I am not arguing that NGOs should ignore the restrictions imposed upon 
women in patriarchal societies. What I am arguing for is a more nuanced look at 
the unintended consequences of painting women as the victims of oppression, 
utterly lacking agency and power. In her article “The Mixed Metaphor of ‘Third 
World Woman’: Gendered Representations by International Development NGOs,” 
Nandita Dogra demonstrates the consequences of simplifying the lived experiences 
of women in societies considered oppressive by the West. She discusses Oxfam and 
World Vision’s Christmas gift catalogues, which listed “the cost of running a 
training kit for women against domestic violence” as one of the possible gifts 
people could buy.71 Dogra argues that this seemingly benign “gift” assumes that if 
women from the “third world” could learn that “domestic abuse is wrong,” they 
would stand up against it.72 The training kit draws on the Western assumption that 
rights are individual and “makes this rights discourse ‘victim-centered and 
retrospective’ but ‘removed from broader frames of analysis, engagement, and 
action.’”73 In reality, Dogra points out, women from the global south and the global 
north “negotiate” and prioritize different interests depending on which needs they 
view as the most important in any given moment, even if this comes at the expense 
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of other interests,74 and a training kit dedicated to teaching women that domestic 
abuse is wrong ignores this complexity: 
 
At best this is another success for the NGO and at its 
worst it is an erasure of the complex ways in which [third 
world] women negotiate their interests by themselves as 
well as of the long history of feminism, awareness and 
conscientisation within [third world] nations. Instead of 
interventions of sensitization, the (largely missing) 
portrayals of [third world] women as protestors, for 
example, could show both agency and knowledge on their 
part. The existing representations merely become yet 
more examples of [third world] women as “the passive 
dupes of patriarchal culture” and “inherently incapable of 
solving their own problems.”75  
 
Here, Dogra eloquently lays out the damage that can be done when NGOs 
essentialize the experience of women from the “third world” as oppressed by 
patriarchy and entirely lacking agency and power. A training kit to sensitize women 
to domestic violence does not pay attention to the hundreds of decisions women 
must make every day, the agency they exert, and the ways that they negotiate their 
interests and fulfill their needs from within a social system in which men tend to 
monopolize authority. The persistent idea that all women from “third world” 
countries lack agency and must be empowered by Western NGOs can lead these 
organizations to implement well-meaning but ineffectual programs—programs that 
ignore the needs and desires of their supposed beneficiaries.  
The Crucial Contradiction 
The portrayal of “third world” women in NGO materials, paired with the 
neoliberal preference for low fertility rates, exposes a crucial contradiction within 
international development: Women are deserving of aid but are also simultaneously 
fecund and over-reproductive.76 They are portrayed as selfless, feminized mothers, 
worthy recipients of aid from development NGOs, and are also expected to 
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contribute to economic development by escaping patriarchal gender norms, having 
fewer children, and joining the workforce. NGOs both “other” and universalize 
women from the “third world,” Dogra argues.77 In a study she conducted of NGO 
messages in newspapers in the United Kingdom between 2005 and 2006, Dogra 
found that 72 percent of people shown in images were mothers and their children.78 
The images show women and children suffering and vulnerable, facing devastating 
conditions of famine and poverty. In a similar way to the training kits mentioned 
before, “Such images in essence project the women (and children) as a 
homogeneously powerless group of innocent victims.”79 Images portraying 
impoverished women holding their babies evoke the universalism of motherhood. 
Dogra poignantly connects these images with “the many iconic Madonna and child 
paintings, where a shoulder or another body part of the mother is revealed to signify 
a physicality and bond between mother and child.”80 These women are at once 
relatable and worthy of aid to a Western audience of potential donors, and also 
sufficiently apolitical and vulnerable so as to not be threatening or suspicious. 
Women are again instruments of development because they are “ideal victims.”81 
As discussed before, however, women in the “third world” are not 
celebrated for having many children. The images of poor women holding their 
children fit within the racialized “colonial discourse” of women of color being 
overly fertile and hypersexual.82 Dogra asserts that this eugenic and racist narrative 
was “transformed within the development discourse into the overcrowded [third 
world], with its over-reproductive women who have a ‘tendency to breed like 
rabbits.’”83 Women from the “third world” are blamed for not limiting their 
reproduction and for thereby perpetuating poverty and economic depression. The 
contradiction that arises when women are characterized as worthy aid recipients 
and tools of development, as well as fecund and overly reproductive, demonstrates 
the illogically essentialized identity of “third world” women. By recognizing this 
contradiction, development organizations may be better equipped to actually 
improve the lives of the women they aim to empower.  
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